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Retrospect  and  Prospect 


WORKS     BY 

CAPTAIN    A.   T.    MAHAN 


The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History, 
1660-1783. 

The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French 
Revolution  and  Empire.      Two  volumes. 

The  Life  of  Nelson,  the  Embodiment  of  the 
Sea  Power  of  Great  Britain.    Two  volumes. 

The  Life  of  Nelson.  Popular  edition.  One 
volume. 

The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power, 
Present  and  Future. 

Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain,  and  other 
Articles. 

The  Problem  of  Asia  and  its  Effect  upon 
International   Policies. 

Types  of  Naval  Officers,  with  Some  Re- 
marks ON  THE  Development  of  Naval 
Warfare  during  the  Eighteenth  Century. 

Retrospect  and  Prospect.  Studies  in  Inter- 
national Relations,  Naval  and  Politi- 
cal. 


Retrospect  ^  Prospect 

Studies  in  International  Relations 
Naval  and  Political 

i  By 

AT.  Mahan,  D.C.L.,  LL.D. 

Captain,  United  States  Nwvy 

Author  of  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History, 

1660-1783,"    "  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power 

upon  the  French   Revolution  and 

Empire,"   etc. 


Boston 

Little,   Brown,  and   Company 
1902 


Copyright,   ipof, 
By  Doubleday,  Page,  &   Co. 

Copyright,  igo2, 
By  Judge  Co. 

Copyright,   igo2. 
By  The  S.   S.    McClure  Co. 

Copyright,  igo2. 
By  Frederick  A.   Richardson. 

Copyright,   igo2. 
By   a.  T.   Mahan. 


All  rights  reser'ved. 
Published    October,    1902. 


UNIVERSITY  PRESS    •    JOHN  WILSON 
AND    SON     •      CAMBRIDGE,    U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

IN  their  main  features,  the  following  essays 
are  in  direct  sequence  to  those  of  the 
author's  previous  volumes,  "  The  Interest  of 
America  in  Sea  Power,"  and  "  The  Problem 
of  Asia."  The  title  article,  Retrospect  and 
Prospect,  in  its  scope  serves  as  a  connecting 
link  between  the  present  and  their  prede- 
cessors ;  indicating  the  continuity  of  interest 
and  gradual  development  of  the  several  sub- 
jects dealt  with.  As  the  future  has  passed 
into  the  present,  it  has  brought  with  it  the 
unfolding  of  inevitable  policy,  evolving  fresh 
problems,  that  are  in  essence  only  new  phases 
of  a  steady  progression,  which  in  its  course  is 
making  history. 

As  has  hitherto  usually  been  the  case,  the 
articles  in  this  book  for  the  most  part  have 
been  written,  not  of  the  author's  own  initiative, 
but  in  response  to  the  request  of  editors.  Such 
significance  as  may  attach  to  this  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  work  consequently  indicates,  not 


vi  Preface 

the  trend  of  a  single  mind,  but  the  outlook  of 
those  whose  business  is  to  study  the  current 
of  events,  to  watch  the  tide  of  popular  interest 
and  feeling,  and  thus  to  provide  for  readers 
information  or  discussion  upon  matters  toward 
which  general  curiosity  is  seen  to  be  turning. 
It  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  general  tend- 
ency thus  avouched,  and  even  illustrative  of  it, 
that  the  series,  if  it  may  be  called  such  in  vir- 
tue of  a  consecutiveness  rather  essential  than 
formal,  has  led  out  from  considerations  nar- 
rowly American,  with  which  the  papers  began, 
into  the  broad  field  of  world  policies ;  for 
thither  our  nation  also  is  indisputably  and 
irresistibly  moving. 

Herein  lies  whatever  of  lastino:  value  or 
interest  may  attach  to  the  subjects  treated,  or 
the  treatment  given.  In  retrospect,  and  from 
this  point  of  view,  it  now  seems  a  kind  of  happy 
forecast  that  the  first  of  the  long  succession, 
written  over  twelve  years  ago,  began  with  the 
words,  "  Indications  are  not  wanting  of  an 
approaching  change  in  the  thoughts  and  policy 
of  Americans  as  to  their  relations  with  the 
world  outside  their  own  borders."  ^  The  pres- 
age has  been  fulfilled,  far  beyond  any  con- 
sciousness then  possible  to  the  writer. 

^  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power,  p.  3. 


Preface  vii 

I  desire  to  return  my  cordial  thanks,  for  the 
permission  here  to  reprint,  to  the  several  pro- 
prietors and  editors  of  the  periodicals  in  which 
the  articles  first  appeared.  I  owe  to  them  not 
only  the  recognition  of  their  courtesy  in  this 
respect,  but  the  further  acknowledgment  that, 
save  for  their  intervention,  probably  no  single 
one  would  have  been  undertaken.  The  name 
of  each  magazine,  with  the  date  of  publication, 
is  attached  to  the  title  in  the  Table  of  Contents. 
The  dates  at  the  head  of  the  articles  show  the 
time  of  writing. 

A.  T.  MAHAN. 

September,  1902. 


CONTENTS 

* 

I 

Page 

Retrospect  and  Prospect 3 

By  Courtesy  of  The  World's  Work,  February,  1902 

II 

Conditions  Determining  the  Naval  Expansion  of 

the  United  States 39 

By  Courtesy  of  Leslie's  Weekly,  October,  2,  1902 

III 

The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War  upon 

the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     ...       57 

By  Courtesy  of  The  National  Review,  December,  1901 

IV 

Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 89 

By  Courtesy  of  The  National  Review  and  the  International 
Monthly,  May,  1902 

V 

Considerations    Governing    the    Disposition    of 

Navies 139 

By  Courtesy  of  The  National  Review,  July,  1902 


Contents 


VI 

Page 

The  Persian  Gulf  and  International  Relations  .     209 
By  Courtesy  of  The  National  Review,  September,  1902 


VII 
The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience  ......     255 

By  Courtesy  of  The  National  Review  and  International 
Monthly,  March,  1902 

VIII 

Admiral  Sampson 287 

By  Courtesy  of  McClure's  Magazine,  July,  1902,  and  the 
Fortnightly  Review,  August,  1902 


RETROSPECT    AND    PROSPECT 


RETROSPECT    AND    PROSPECT 

December,  1901 

IT  has  often  been  remarked,  as  a  curious 
coincidence,  that  momentous  events,  direc- 
tive of  the  fortunes  of  nations  and  of  the 
world,  are  found  to  cluster  about  the  end  of 
our  conventional  centuries.  The  final  decade 
of  the  fifteenth  saw  both  the  discovery  of 
America  and  its  complement  in  maritime 
achievement,  the  reaching  of  India  by  the 
passage  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  It 
witnessed  the  consummation  of  the  Spanish 
monarchy  by  the  fall  of  the  last  of  the  Moorish 
kingdoms,  at  the  very  instant  that  the  new 
possessions  in  America  constituted  the  com- 
mencements of  the  Spanish  Empire.  During 
it  occurred  also,  in  1494,  the  first  of  the 
organized  French  invasions  of  Italy,  concern- 
ing which  a  master  of  history  has  observed 
that  it  marked  the  end  of  the  middle  ages,  — 
and  so  the  beginnings  of  modern  history, — 
because  it  put  forth  a  scheme  of  aggrandize- 


4  Retrospect  and  Prospect  ^ 

ment  foreign  to  medioeval  conceptions.  France 
and  Spain,  in  rivalry,  the  scope  of  which  was 
not  yet  realized  by  either,  were  preparing  to 
attemj^t  the  extension  of  their  power  over  the 
rest  of  Europe. 

In  this  effort  Spain  first  succeeded ;  but,  as 
the  sixteenth  century  drew  to  its  close,  the 
annihilation  of  the  Armada,  in  1588,  gave  re- 
sounding proof  of  her  inefficiency  as  a  maritime 
nation.  This  defect  had  for  its  near  result  the 
success  of  the  Dutch  in  their  struggle  for 
independence ;  but  in  it  was  necessarily  in- 
volved the  ultimate  downfall  of  the  primacy 
of  SjDain  among  nations,  and  of  her  colonial 
Empire,  then  apparently  untouched.  The 
years  remaining  to  1600  were  spent  by  her  in 
continued  strife  with  the  seamen  of  England 
and  Holland,  the  predestined  destroyers  of  her 
international  predominance.  To  this  position 
France  succeeded,  reaching  the  height  of  her 
power  in  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century;  but  in  16S8  the  English  Revolution, 
which  decided  finally  the  conflict  between 
King  and  Parliament,  thus  shaping  the  future 
of  another  Empire,  imparted  also  the  impulse 
for  the  descent  of  France  from  the  eminence 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


she  had  attained.  The  coming  of  William  of 
Orange  to  the  throne  entailed  as  a  necessary 
consequence  the  accession  of  England  to  the 
two  general  wars  of  the  Continent  against 
Louis  XIV.  These,  by  their  drain  upon  his 
resources,  and  the  miseries  undergone  by  his 
kingdom,  sapped  the  foundations  of  the  abso- 
lutism upon  which  the  greatness  of  France  had 
been  erected,  and  precipitated  the  nation  upon 
the  path  to  decay  and  revolution. 

Great  Britain  at  the  same  epoch,  and  through 
the  same  causes,  was  urged  further  along  the 
way  that  led  her  at  the  end  of  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  Succession,  in  1 713,  to  the  unques- 
tioned and  unapproached  naval  supremacy  in 
which  lay  the  germ  of  her  expansion  that  was 
to  be.  Her  progress  in  territorial  and  com- 
mercial aesrrandizement  was  the  dominant 
feature  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which,  though 
one  of  chequered  strife,  was  marked  upon  the 
whole  by  the  ascent  of  Great  Britain,  and  still 
more  by  the  decisive  decline  of  France.  As 
it  drew  to  its  close,  Louis  XVI.,  in  1788,  by 
summoning  the  States  General  to  meet  after 
an  intermission  of  many  generations,  gave  the 
signal  for  the  French   Revolution.     This,  like 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


its  English  predecessor,  brought  France  and 
Great  Britain  into  a  prolonged  warfare  which 
divides  into  two  periods,  the  Republic  and  the 
Empire,  corresponding  to  the  last  two  wars 
of  Louis  XIV.  At  the  peace  of  1815  Great 
Britain  stood  in  influence  at  the  head  of'  the 
states  of  European  civilization,  with  a  secured 
colonial  empire,  which,  in  the  final  decade* of 
the  century,  has  involved  her  in  a  war  the  most 
momentous  she  has  known  since  Waterloo, 
and  probably  productive  of  permanent  results 
to  her  imperial  constitution. 

More  striking  outwardly,  even  if  not  more 
actually  decisive,  were  other  events  that  oc- 
curred between  1890  and  1900.  The  disap- 
pearance of  the  colonial  empire  of  Spain  after 
four  hundred  years  of  continuous  life,  although 
but  the  close  of  a  long  process  of  decline,  had 
singular  dramatic  effect.  The  once  colossal 
structure  that  so  long  was  crumbling  had  yet 
retained  a  phantom  grandeur,  a  relic  of  real 
greatness,  which  enhanced  the  majesty  of  the 
final  fall;  for  in  the  days  of  her  supremacy 
Spain  had  over  England  an  ascendency  which 
France  never  attained,  and  the  vastness  of  her 
power  made  upon  the  imagination  of  English- 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


men  of  that  day  an  impression,  traces  of  which 
long,  remained  and  have  been  transmitted  to 
their  descendants  in  the  United  States.  In 
history,  too,  few  events  have  been  told  us  with 
as  great  narrative  force  as  the  conquest  of 
Granada,  and  the  early  contact  of  Spain  with 
America.  Upon  them  the  genius  of  American 
writers  has  dwelt  with  peculiar  sympathy,  both 
from  their  intrinsic  romantic  interest  and  their 
close  connection  with'  the  beginnings  of  our 
own  country.  In  her  past,  thus  told,  Spain 
has  an  immortality  resembling  that  of  Rome ; 
and  like  her  she  survives  and  ever  will  survive 
in  the  tales  of  her  heroic  prime,  and  in  the 
enduring  impress  of  her  speech  and  national 
characteristics  left  upon  great  part  of  the 
peoples  of  the  new  world. 

The  loss  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Phil- 
ippines, the  last  remnants  of  a  former  vast  do- 
minion. Is  an  event  which,  so  far  as  Spain  is 
involved,  concerns  the  past  only.  At  most, 
if  it  has  for  her  a  future,  it  is  one  as  yet  not 
even  vaguely  indicated.  As  a  matter  of  world 
interests,  its  effect  upon  her  is  part  of  the 
retrospect.  From  the  same  point  of  view  the 
future  of  that  catastrophe  lies  in  the  influence 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


it  is  to  exert  upon  the  prospective  course  of 
the  United  States,  upon  her  internal  consti- 
tutional development  and  her  external  policy. 
Not  only  in  the  lost  possessions  of  Spain  has 
the  old  order  yielded,  giving  place  to  the  new. 
To  the  former  mother  country,  forced  back 
upon  herself,  to  seek  in  the  organization  of 
her  abundant  internal  resources  the  spring  of 
a  new  life,  it  may  yet  prove  a  cause  of  national 
regeneration,  the  precursor  of  re-entrance  at 
some  future  day  upon  international  power  rest- 
ing on  more  solid  foundations.  Upon  the 
United  States  it  has  imposed  the  necessity  of 
reconsidering  some  of  the  postulates  that  were 
supposed  fundamental  and  irreversible  in  the 
scheme  of  her  national  existence,  and  of  her 
international  relations.  The  Bible  of  Ameri- 
can political  tradition  has  had  new  light  thrown 
upon  it,  and  has  had  to  submit  to  new  criti- 
cism, based  upon  truths  newly  apprehended 
under  the  pressure  of  unforeseen  conditions. 
It  would  not  be  unprecedented  that  popular 
conception  of  the  meaning  of  ideas  and  phrases, 
formulated  and  transmitted  by  our  ancestors, 
should  be  found  imperfect  or  exaggerated  under 
the  clearer  appreciation  of  a  later  day.     The 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


authority  hitherto  attaching  to  the  popular 
understanding  may  in  such  case  have  to  be 
transferred  to  the  correcter  signification  which 
advancing  experience  shall  have  revealed ;  and 
obligation,  true  obedience,  will  then  be  seen 
due  to  the  spirit  not  to  the  letter.  This  would 
be  but  the  repetition  of  a  very  old  story  in  the 
political  as  in  the  religious  history  of  mankind. 
Whenever  it  happens,  however,  the  transition 
of  thought  and  action  consequent  upon  such 
riper  views  affects  both  inner  principle  and 
outward  action.  It  must  therefore  bring  shock 
to  those  who  are  too  old  to  change ;  and  when 
compressed  within  a  very  few  years,  as  our 
recent  experience  has  been,  the  blow  is  not 
broken  by  the  slow  reconcilement  which  suc- 
cessive steps  effect.  It  is  not  surprising  that 
the  recoil  on  the  part  of  those  thus  dismayed 
has  been  intense,  and,  it  must  be  added,  marked 
less  by  reasonableness  of  argument  than  by 
extravagance  of  expression ;  by  tenacious  insist- 
ence upon  the  traditional  letter  and  stubborn 
rejection  of  evident  modifying  circumstance. 

Yet,  although  in  point  of  duration  of  time 
the  change  has  been  too  sudden,  or  at  least 
too    rapid,    to    allow   the    process    of    gradual 


lo  Retrospect  and  Prospect 


mental  adjustment  which  obviates  moral  dis- 
tress, it  has  not  been  without  its  marked  suc- 
cessive stages  which  might  have  prepared  an 
attentive  onlooker  for  the  final  outcome.  I 
have  been  told  that  at  the  time  of  the  regener- 
ation of  the  material  of  the  navy,  and  the  lay- 
ing down  of  modern  ships,  some  fifteen  years 
ago,  a  sagacious  political  student  remarked 
that  the  measure  would  be  followed  by  expan- 
sive results  resembling  those  we  have  recently 
witnessed.  There  was  here,  I  think,  the  error 
of  takins:  one  link  in  a  chain  of  events  for  a 
final  cause ;  but  nevertheless  the  observer 
showed  that  having  a  clue  in  his  hand  he 
could,  as  they  say  at  sea,  "  underrun  "  it,  till 
it  led  him  to  the  unseen  point  at  which  it  for 
the  moment  terminated.  That  mysterious 
thread  of  purpose  which  runs  through  the 
progression  of  history  comes  to  the  surface 
from  time  to  time  in  some  marks  of  evident 
preparation.  These  may  be  construed,  accord- 
ing to  individual  bias,  either  as  providential, 
or  merely  as  symptomatic  of  a  tendency  already 
formed,  and  which  unconsciously  manifests 
itself  in  particular  actions  conducive  to  its 
general  end.     Whichever  view  be  adopted,  the 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  1 1 

opportune  renewal  of  the  navy  is  to  my  appre- 
hension not  a  cause,  but  one  in  a  series  of 
events  which  has  constituted  the  general  un- 
witting advance  of  the  nation  towards  wider 
influence.  It  was  the  more  notable  because 
without  visible  immediate  urgency,  save  that 
of  repairing  a  cumulative  neglect  which  had 
resulted  in  atrophy.  No  cloud  on  the  political 
horizon  commanded  it ;  but  when  the  cloud 
afterwards  arose  the  navy  was  there. 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  prefatory  to  the 
following  brief  survey  of  incidents  in  our  own 
history,  which  have  impressed  upon  the  final 
decade  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  significance 
for  us,  resembling  those  noted  in  its  prede- 
cessors, prophetic  of  issues  not  yet  fully  to  be 
foreseen.  It  was  undertaken  at  the  request  of 
the  editor  of  the  World's  Work,  —  not  by  my 
own  initiative.  Thus  much  is  said  in  explana- 
tion of  an  attempt  which  of  my  proper  motion 
would  scarcely  have  been  made;  for  the  hasty 
glance  which  it  caused  over  my  occasional 
magazine  papers,  during  the  ten  years  in  ques- 
tion, gave  me  an  unexpected  start  as  I  realized 
from  them  the  singularly  different  points  of 
view  necessarily  occupied  by  an  American,  at 


1 2  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

their  beginning  and  at  their  end,  because  of 
changes  only  partly  foreshadowed  at  the  earlier 
day  when  I  began  to  write. 

It  was  in  August,  1890,  that  the  editor  of 
the  Atlantic  Moiithly,  Mr.  Horace  E.  Scudder, 
wrote  to  ask  from  me  what  proved  to  be  the 
first  magazine  article  I  ever  published.  He 
referred  to  a  very  brief  and  casual  remark  in 
my  book  then  recently  out — "The  Influence 
of  Sea  Power  upon  History"  —  touching  the 
exposed  condition  of  our  Pacific  Coast  in  the 
event  of  an  isthmian  canal  being  made.  I 
had  quoted  in  that  connection  the  expression 
of  a  French  admiral  to  me,  during  a  cruise 
then  recent,  that  in  our  "little  corner"  of  the 
world  we  did  not  need  the  military  and  naval 
preparation  incumbent  upon  the  nations  of 
Europe.  To  this  I  added,  "  Yet  should  that 
little  corner  be  invaded  by  a  new  commercial 
route  through  the  isthmus,  the  United  States 
in  her  turn  may  have  the  rude  awakening  of 
those  who  have  abandoned  their  share  in  the 
common  birthright  of  all  people  —  the  sea." 

This  reflection,  which  followed  upon  a  sum- 
mary of  the  consequences  to  Spain  —  and,  it 
may  be   added,  to  France  — of  a  like  neglect, 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  1 3 

had  caught  Mr.  Scudder's  attention,  and  he 
wrote  to  know  whether  I  could  give  the 
Atlantic  a  paper  upon  the  following  general 
argument.  "  The  centre  of  maritime  opera- 
tions has  shifted  once  from  the  Mediterranean 
to  the  Atlantic,  It  may  pass  in  the  distant 
future  (my  italics)  to  the  Pacific.  Meanwhile, 
would  not  the  completion  of  a  canal,  taken 
with  the  British  movements  at  the  terminal 
of  the  Canadian  Pacific,  the  occidentalizing  of 
Japan,  and  the  growth  of  Australasia,  im- 
mensely quicken  the  process.-^  and,  if  so,  will 
not  the  Pacific  Coast  of  our  country  become 
a  far  more  important  factor  in  our  historical 
development  than  it  has  been } "  It  will  be 
observed  that  Mr.  Scudder's  suggestion,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  to  himself,  tran- 
scended the  bounds  of  United  States'  interests, 
and  embraced  in  its  scope  the  politics  of  the 
world. 

The  canal  as  yet  is  not,  though  it  has 
very  measurably  advanced  through  the  tedious 
stages  that  precede  undertakings  the  impor- 
tance of  which  is  rather  national  than  corporate, 
and  which  therefore  do  not  find  their  support 
in  private  enterprise  ;  but  how  much  of  what 


1 4  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

is  here  outlined  has  passed  from  the  realm  of 
speculation  to  that  of  action  ?  and  how  little 
distant  docs  that  future  now  appear  as  com- 
pared to  the  anticipations  of  1890?  In  writing 
on  these  themes  in  those  days  one  felt  that, 
while  the  chain  of  reasoning  was  eminently 
logical,  yet  there  was  a  lack  of  solid  foundation; 
that  though  argumentation  were  sound,  premise 
was  perhaps  mistaken ;  and  that  when  indulg- 
ing in  such  forecasts  one  was  in  the  fantastic 
sphere  familiarized  to  us  by  Mr.  Edward 
Bellamy  and  others.  But  what  events  have 
since  happened,  bringing  the  abstract  con- 
ceptions of  theorists  and  extremists,  as  they 
then  seemed,  down  to  earth  in  very  concrete 
realization !  What  once  were  visions  are  now 
accepted  as  solid  present  matters  of  course  by 
our  very  practical  nation.  They  have  almost 
ceased  to  excite  vivid  interest,  because  of  a 
familiarity  which  eliminates  surprise.  The 
condition,  however,  if  no  longer  novel,  is  one 
so  substantial  that  it  can  never  again  in  our 
day  pass  out  of  sight,  or  out  of  national  con- 
sideration. 

Since  Mr.  Scuddcr  wrote,  the  occidentaliza- 
tion    of   Japan,   in    methods    although    not   in 


Retrospect  ajid  Prospect  1 5 

national  spirit,  —  which  changes  much  more 
slowly,  —  has  been  fully  demonstrated  to  an 
astonished  world  by  the  war  of  1894  with 
China.  It  is  one  of  the  incidents  of  the  clos- 
ing nineteenth  century.  To  this  achievement 
in  the  military  sphere,  in  the  practice  of  war 
which  Napoleon  called  the  science  of  barba- 
rians, must  be  added  the  development  of  civil 
institutions  that  has  resulted  in  the  concession 
to  Japan  of  all  international  dignity  and  privi- 
lege; and  consequently  of  a  control  over  the 
administration  of  justice  among  foreigners 
within  her  borders,  not  heretofore  obtained  by 
any  other  Oriental  State.  It  has  thus  become 
evident  that  the  weight  of  Japan  in  the  inter- 
national balances  depends  not  upon  the  quality 
of  her  achievement,  which  has  been  shown  to 
be  excellent,  but  upon  the  gross  amount  of 
her  power.  Moreover,  while  in  wealth  and 
population,  with  the  resources  dependent  upon 
them,  she  may  be  deficient,  —  though  rapidly 
growing,  —  her  geographical  position  relatively 
to  the  Eastern  centre  of  interest,  and  her  ad- 
vantage of  insularity,  go  far  to  compensate  such 
defect.  These  confer  upon  her  as  a  factor  in 
the  Eastern  problem  an   influence  resembling 


1 6  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

in  kind,  if  not  equalling  in  degree,  that  which 
Great  Britain  has  held  and  still  holds  in  the 
international  relations  centring  around  Europe, 
the  Atlantic,  and  the  Mediterranean. 

Yet  the  change  in  Japan,  significant  as  it 
is  and  influential  upon  the  great  problem  of 
the  Pacific  and  Asia,  is  less  remarkable  and 
less  important  than  that  which  has  occurred 
in  the  United  States.  If  in  the  Orient  a 
nation  may  be  said  to  have  been  born  in  a  day, 
even  so  the  event  is  less  sudden  and  less  revo- 
lutionary than  the  conversion  of  spirit  and  of 
ideals  —  the  new  birth  —  which  has  come  over 
our  own  country.  In  this  are  evident  a  rapid- 
ity and  a  thoroughness  which  bespeak  impulse 
from  an  external  source,  rather  than  any  con- 
scious set  process  of  deliberation,  of  self-deter- 
mination within,  such  as  has  been  that  of  Japan 
in  her  recognition  and  adoption  of  material 
improvements  forced  upon  her  attention  in 
other  peoples.  No  man  or  group  of  men  can 
pretend  to  have  guided  and  governed  our 
people  in  the  adoption  of  a  new  policy,  the 
acceptance  of  which  has  been  rather  instinc- 
tive—  I  would  prefer  to  say  inspired  —  than 
reasoned.      There   is   just   this   difference  be- 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  1 7 

tween  Japan  and  ourselves,  the  two  most 
changed  of  peoples  within  the  last  half-century. 
She  has  adopted  other  methods;  we  have  re- 
ceived another  purpose.  The  one  conversion 
is  material,  the  other  spiritual.  When  we 
talk  about  expansion  we  are  in  the  realm  of 
ideas.  The  material  addition  of  expansion  — 
the  acreage,  if  I  may  so  say  —  is  trivial  com- 
pared with  our  previous  possessions,  or  with 
the  annexations  by  European  states  within  a 
few  years.  The  material  profit  otherwise,  the 
national  gain  to  us,  is  at  best  doubtful.  What 
the  nation  has  gained  in  expansion  is  a  regen- 
erating idea,  an  uplifting  of  the  heart,  a  seed 
of  future  beneficent  activity,  a  going  out  of 
self  into  the  world  to  communicate  the  gift  it 
has  so  bountifully  received. 

In  this  connection,  and  in  emphatic  contrast 
of  past  with  present,  how  very  apt  is  the  ex- 
pression of  the  French  admiral,  our  "  little 
corner,"  —  the  Jack  Horner  of  nations.  How 
accurately  did  the  phrase  then  represent  our 
own  estimate,  and  that  of  the  outer  world, 
concerning  our  political  and  international  ex- 
posure, responsibilities,  and  duties,  in  days 
when  the  ideas,  imperialism  and  anti-imperial- 


1 8  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

ism,  had  scarcely  received  formulation.  I  re- 
member that  imperialism  had  not  long  before 
been  associated  in  my  mind  with  certain  vague 
impressions  of  Mr.  Blaine  and  his  supposed 
projects.  As  far  as  my  own  views  went,  I 
might  say  I  was  up  to  1885  traditionally  an 
anti-imperialist;  but  by  1890  the  study  of  the 
influence  of  sea  power  and  its  kindred  expan- 
sive activities  upon  the  destiny  of  nations  had 
converted  me,  and  my  new  faiths,  thus  origi- 
nated, colored  the  first  of  my  writings,  as  they 
have  continued  to  do  the  rest. 

The  natural  tendency  of  the  line  of  thought 
which  leads  up  to  the  appreciation  of  sea 
power  and  to  the  vision  of  expansion  of 
national  influences  —  rather  than  of  national 
possessions  —  when  acting  upon  a  person  in- 
heriting Anglo-Saxon  political  traditions,  is  in 
commercial  matters  towards  freedom  of  trade. 
Mr.  Blaine,  a  protectionist  by  antecedents  and 
by  party  aflfiliation,  as  his  mind  expanded  to 
embrace  the  idea  of  an  American  system,  in- 
evitably moved  on  to  modify  the  idea  of  pro- 
tection to  that  of  reciprocity.  Reciprocity  is 
far  from  being  free  trade ;  but  in  principle  it 
is   nearer  to   that   than   to  protection.      Reci- 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  19 

procity  has  abandoned  the  view-point  of  exclu- 
sive interest,  which  is  the  citadel  of  protection, 
to  embrace  that  of  mutual  benefit,  the  corner- 
stone upon  which  the  advocates  of  freedom  of 
trade  rest  their  argument. 

The  beneficiaries  of  protection  see  this 
clearly  enough,  as  is  shown  by  their  recent 
capture  of  the  Reciprocity  Convention  and 
renewed  proclamation  of  their  favorite  dogma. 
The  fate  of  the  measures  proposed  for  Cuban 
relief,  in  the  session  that  has  passed  since  this 
article  was  first  written,  is  probably  an  indica- 
tion in  the  same  direction.  But  protection  is 
essentially  a  defensive  measure,  and  in  all 
struggles,  in  commerce  as  in  war,  it  is  not  de- 
fensive action  but  offensive  —  conquest,  expan- 
sion—  which  ultimately  wins.  It  is  in  truth 
this  factor  of  offence,  show^n  in  the  activity  of 
the  American  mind,  in  the  energy  with  which 
it  carries  ideas  into  practice  and  in  the  flexibility 
which  readily  embraces  improvement,  that  has 
won  the  superiority  which  enables  us  latterly 
to  invade  the  markets  of  the  world.  The 
credit  is  claimed  for  protection,  and  is  too 
easily  yielded  because  the  coincidence  of  our 
advance  with   the  protective    system    confuses 


20  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

thought;  but  it  is  easy  to  see  that,  left  to  itself 
alone,  the  assurance  of  an  adequate  market  — 
the  secured  home  market  —  removes  that  ne- 
cessity which  is  the  mother  of  invention,  the 
necessity  which  competition  imposes.  Ameri- 
can inventive  aptitude  and  American  energy 
have  triumphed  over  the  enervating  influence 
of  the  protection  that  would  and  long  did 
restrain  them  from  efificient  action  without  their 
own  borders,  and  in  so  doing  hindered  that  de- 
velopment of  sea  power,  commercial  and  naval, 
which  expansion,  material  and  moral,  requires. 
Reciprocity,  increased  freedom  of  movement,  is 
the  logical  corollary  of  expansion,  which  itself 
is  but  increase  of  scope  and  power  to  act. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  a  disconnected  feature 
of  the  situation  that  reciprocity  is  no  longer 
the  idea  of  the  few,  but  has  assumed  a  con- 
spicuous place  in  the  thought  of  a  party  and  of 
a  leader — President  McKinley  —  whose  very 
names  have  been  synonymous  with  protection. 
It  is  but  another  aspect  of  that  mysterious, 
subtle  influence,  already  vaguely  felt  in  the 
early  years  of  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  then,  before  its  end,  bursting 
suddenly  into  life  and  taking  definite  form  in 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  2 1 

the  acceptance  of  national  expansion  —  terri- 
torial, political,  naval,  commercial.  In  every 
one  of  these  aspects  we  find  not  merely  develop- 
ment, but  extension ;  not  merely  growth  from 
what  has  been,  but  the  grafting  on  of  that 
which  before  found  no  place  in  our  national 
conceptions.  It  resembles  the  breach  of  con- 
tinuity between  the  middle  ages  and  modern 
times.  Our  development  on  former  lines  has 
reached  into  maturity  and,  unless  renewed  by 
fresh  influence,  would  pass  into  decadence ; 
that  which  now  succeeds  it  is  new  life,  not  new 
growth.  In  the  Philippines,  Porto  Rico,  and 
Hawaii,  we  have  territorial  expansion.  They, 
as  well  as  Cuba,  require  us  to  constitute  and 
establish  political  relations  of  a  kind  not  here- 
tofore admitted  as  compatible  with  our  scheme 
of  existence,  —  in  short,  expansion  of  political 
thought.  These  changed  conditions  have  ne- 
cessarily entailed  naval  expansion;  and  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  they  will  also  imper- 
ceptibly—  perhaps  the  protectionist  may  say 
"  insidiously  "  —  promote  reciprocity  of  trade, 
expansion  of  commercial  thought,  with  the 
logical  consequences  that  follow  the  admission 
of  a  new  principle. 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


Mr.  Scudder  named  my  first  article,  "  The 
United  States  Looking  Outward."  It  was 
particularly  apt,  for  it  exactly  described  the 
national  attitude  then.  We  were  looking,  but 
we  had  not  got  beyond  that  point  where  a  baby 
vaguely  follows  with  its  eyes  something  which 
has  cauHit  its  attention  but  not  entered  its 
understanding.  Yet  I  have  felt  it  significant, 
then  and  now,  that  in  casting  round  for  a  start- 
ing point  I,  with  all  my  professional  preposses- 
sions naturally  maritime  and  military,  should 
have  opened  my  theme,  not  by  a  discussion  of 
the  naval  or  strategic  situation,  but  by  indicat- 
ing the  essential  feebleness  of  a  commercial 
policy  which  was  primarily  —  nay  wholly  —  de- 
fensive, and  in  which  aggression,  expansion, 
found  no  place.  I  quoted  joyfully  Mr.  Blaine's 
words,  "  It  is  not  an  ambitious  destiny  for  so 
great  a  country  to  manufacture  only  what  we 
can  consume,  or  produce  only  what  we  can 
eat;"  and  I  had  pleasure  in  likening  the  ex- 
travagances of  the  then  recent  tariff  legislation 
to  Napoleon's  Continental  system,  —  a  proph- 
ecy by  implication  which  it  must  be  admitted 
has  not  yet  received  fulfilment. 

There  has,  however,  been  realized  so  much  of 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  2  3 

the  other  indications  of  the  future  in  that  article, 
so  much  beyond  what  I  dared  to  expect  in  my 
time,  that  I  am  not  without  hope  that  herein 
also  I  may  live  to  see  beneficial  results.  This 
paper  some  half-dozen  years  later  was  gath- 
ered into  a  book  with  a  series  of  seven  others 
on  kindred  topics,  all  falling  under  the  general 
head  of  arguments  for  expansion  ;  not,  indeed, 
specific  in  detail,  but  I  think  not  without  clear- 
ness in  the  enunciation  of  principles  governing 
its  general  direction  and  character.  The  very 
enumeration  of  the  successive  titles  has  par- 
ticular suggestion  to  those  interested  in  the 
general  subject,  as  bearing  upon  the  gradual 
expansion  of  the  nation's  thought,  the  gradual, 
though  very  rapid,  development  of  policy;  be- 
cause in  none  save  one,  and  that  the  last  of 
all,  was  the  article  prompted  by  myself.  In 
each  case,  as  in  the  first,  it  was  elicited  by 
the  request  of  the  editors,  whose  perceptions 
were  quickened  by  their  need  to  watch  the 
trend  of  events  and  provide  the  public  with 
matter  concerning  which  its  interest  was 
stirring. 

Of  course,  naval  officers,  moving  round  the 
world,   talking  with  its  inhabitants  in  various 


24  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

localities  and  afterward  bringing  the  various 
ideas  to  the  common  exchange  of  the  mess- 
table  and  of  other  professional  intercourse, 
imbibe  a  good  deal  of  information  particularly 
pertinent  to  the  question  of  expansion,  needing 
only  digestion  and  arrangement  to  have  a  use- 
fulness quite  peculiar  to  itself.  I  was  there- 
fore pretty  full  of  matter,  and  to  this  day 
remember  the  delightful  ease  of  production 
due  to  that  fact,  as  contrasted  with  some  heart- 
breaking work  done  since.  Nevertheless,  for 
the  reasons  noted,  the  record  of  articles  traces 
not  my  development,  but  the  progress  of  na- 
tional awakening  from  1890  to  1897;  to  the 
eve,  that  is,  of  the  great  year  when  old  things 
passed  away,  and  all  things  became  new  in  the 
birth  of  a  new  national  resolve,  quickened  into 
life  by  the  crash  of  a  falling  empire  and  the 
devolution  of  its  responsibilities  upon  our  con- 
science. In  some  measure  through  the  cir- 
cumstances of  my  profession,  but  chiefly 
through  the  solicitation  of  others,  it  fell  to  me, 
though  by  no  means  to  me  alone,  to  chronicle 
from  time  to  time  the  stages  of  the  antecedent 
process  of  preparation ;  to  note  the  advance  of 
ideas,  as  step  by  step  the  editorial  watchers  saw 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  25 

that  advance  had  been  made,  but  needed  defi- 
nition and  formulation. 

As  far  as  known  to  me,  "  The  United  States 
Looking  Outward  "  attracted  no  special  atten- 
tion in  any  quarter.  The  only  comment  I  can 
now  recall  was  by,  I  think,  a  Protectionist  sheet, 
to  the  effect  that  it  seemed  to  be  an  argument 
for  free  trade.  This  critic  apparently  had  not 
got  beyond  the  first  two  pages.  Yet  the  other 
topics,  incidentally  touched  or  more  fully  de- 
veloped, need  only  to  be  named  in  order  to 
show  the  most  casual  reader  of  to-day  the  im- 
portant possibilities  involved  in  the  external 
objects  which  demanded  the  consideration  of 
the  United  States  in  1890.  Samoa;  Hawaii; 
German  commercial  and  colonial  push  in  the 
Caroline  and  other  islands  near  the  Philippines, 
which  the  empire  has  since  acquired  by  pur- 
chase ;  the  progress  of  German  influence  in 
Central  and  South  America,  notably  in  the 
southern  province  of  Brazil ;  the  increasing 
importance  of  the  Pacific  and  the  effects  upon 
it  of  an  isthmian  canal  ;  the  political  wisdom 
of  maintaininof  with  Great  Britain  a  cordial  un- 
derstanding,  approaching  cooperation,  though 
distinctly  rejecting    the   idea   of  alliance;    the 


26  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

question  of  purchase  by  European  powers  of 
stations  in  the  West  Indies,  such  as  the  Danish 
St.  Thomas  and  the  Dutch  Cura9ao;  the 
strategic  features  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  with  the  transcendent  miH- 
tary  vakie  of  Cuba  and  Jamaica  in  that  connec- 
tion. As  regards  these  external  points  the 
United  States  was  perhaps  looking  outward, 
but  she  evidently  was  not,  as  a  nation,  taking 
notice ;  and  my  remarks  that  "  whether  they 
will  or  no,  Americans  must  now  begin  to  look 
outwards,"  rested  upon  the  necessities  of  the 
case  as  set  forth,  not  upon  any  certain  evidence 
of  such  watchfulness  begun. 

The  first  really  arousing  event  occurred 
where  naval  officers  had  long  recognized  the 
most  critical  of  our  external  interests;  the  one 
where  political  change  of  condition  detrimen- 
tal to  our  military  security  was  most  likely  to 
occur,  and  to  be  allowed  by  default.  The 
islands  and  mainland  of  America  were  fairly 
covered  from  serious  aggression  by  national 
susceptibility,  pointed  in  the  phrase  "  the 
Monroe  Doctrine."  What  the  doctrine  was, 
was  perhaps  not  very  clearly  understood,  but  it 
was  a  good  war-cry  and  might  be  depended  on 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  2  7 

to  serve  its  turn,  although  the  experience 
of  generations  had  shown  it  impotent  to  insure 
naval  expansion  adequate  to  enforce  its  asser- 
tion. Hawaii,  however,  could  not  be  construed 
to  fall  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  and,  al- 
though many  men  in  the  country  appreciated 
its  consequence  to  us,  it  was  not  certain  that 
the  people  generally  would  sustain  an  active 
policy  based  upon  the  need  of  our  predominance 
there. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  recall  in  detail  the 
occurrences  in  Hawaii  at  the  end  of  1892, 
which  led  to  the  treaty  of  annexation  sent  to 
the  Senate  by  President  Harrison,  and  with- 
drawn upon  the  change  of  administration  by 
President  Cleveland.  What  then  occurred  was 
the  outcome  of  conditions  which  had  led  me  in 
my  first  article  to  say,  "At  this  moment  inter- 
nal troubles  are  imminent  in  the  Sandwich 
Islands,  where  it  should  be  our  fixed  determi- 
nation to  allow  no  foreign  influence  to  equal 
our  own,"  The  submittal  and  withdrawal  of 
the  treaty  in  rapid  succession  demonstrated  the 
doubtful  attitude  of  national  opinion  in  1893, 
just  as  the  annexation  of  five  years  later  showed, 
not   growth,  but   conversion.      Nevertheless  I 


28  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

have  always  felt  the  first  abortive  movement  to 
have  been  the  more  conspicuous  landmark. 
Though  without  result,  it  was  the  awakening ; 
too  late  to  seize  the  current  opportunity,  but  not 
so  late  as  to  be  unprepared  for  the  events  which 
the  near  future  was  to  bring. 

It  may  profitably  be  noted  that  the  contrary 
decisions  of  the  two  administrations  in  this 
matter  were  prophetic  of  party  fortunes.  In 
the  face  of  an  emergency  such  as  in  1893  arose 
in  Hawaii,  with  its  extravagantly  mixed  popu- 
lation, foreign  not  only  in  extraction,  but  in 
sentiment  and  allegiance,  a  political  party  which 
held  that  our  action  was  to  be  controlled  by  a 
count  of  heads  among  them  was  evidently  un- 
able to  deal  with  impending  questions.  I  do 
not  pretend  to  have  foreseen  the  events  that 
ensued  between  1893  and  1898;  but  it  was 
clear  enough  in  1892  that  we  had  to  look  out 
into  the  Pacific  and  toward  China.  We  could 
never  act  there  efficiently  with  our  intellects 
manacled  by  a  traditionalism  which  saw  in 
the  population  of  Hawaii  a  capacity  for  self- 
determination  like  that  of  the  Pilgrims,  and 
which  failed  to  comprehend  that  Hawaii  was  an 
outpost  of  the  utmost  value  in  the   Pacific,  for 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  29 

the  tenure  of  which,  in  the  rapid  decay  of  the 
aboriginal  population,  East  and  West  were 
already  striving. 

This  Hawaiian  business  drew  from  me,  by 
request  from  the  Foruiii,  of  which  Mr.  Walter 
H.  Page  was  then  editor,  my  second  article, 
"  Hawaii  and  Our  Sea  Power;  "  to  which  suc- 
ceeded almost  immediately  an  invitation  from 
the  Atlantic  to  treat  the  question  of  the  isthmus 
and  its  canal  from  the  same  point  of  view.  The 
latter  of  itself,  coming  so  quickly,  indicates  how 
the  former  affair  had  waked  the  people  up,  not 
to  Hawaii  alone,  but  to  the  broader  issues  of 
which  Hawaii  only  happened  by  special  circum- 
stances to  become  the  exponent.  I  do  not  think 
I  erred  then  in  saying,  in  the  first  of  these 
articles,  with  reference  to  Mr.  Harrison's  treaty, 
"  The  United  States  now  finds  herself  com- 
pelled to  answer  a  question  —  to  make  a  deci- 
sion—  not  unlike  and  not  less  momentous 
than  that  required  of  the  Roman  Senate  when 
the  Mamertine  garrison  invited  it  to  occupy 
Messina,  and  so  to  abandon  the  hitherto  tra- 
ditional poHcy  which  had  confined  the  ex- 
pansion of  Rome  to  the  Italian  peninsula." 
"  What    is    here    involved   is    not   so    much   a 


30  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

particular  action  as  a  principle  pregnant  of 
great  consequences." 

A  reasonable  regard  for  the  patience  of 
readers,  and  for  the  proprieties,  limits  me  to 
mentioning  simply  the  titles  of  the  articles 
asked  from  me  in  the  successive  years  1894, 
1895,  1896,  1897;  indicative  not  only  in  their 
particular  subject,  but  in  the  very  order  of  the 
series,  of  the  awakening  consciousness  of  the 
people,  reflected  in  the  attentive  minds  of 
editors.  They  were,  "  The  Possibilities  of 
Anglo-American  Reunion,"  "  The  Future  in 
Relation  to  American  Naval  Power,"  "  Pre- 
paredness for  Naval  War,"  and  "  A  Twentieth 
Century  Outlook." 

The  last  decade  of  the  century  carried  the 
outward  look  on  from  the  Isthmus  and  Hawaii, 
and  from  the  naval  preparations  essential  to 
maintaining  the  nation's  requirements,  as  form- 
ulated in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  evident  in 
the  conditions  of  the  Pacific,  to  consider  the 
general  outward  movement  of  the  European 
world,  evinced  in  the  new  era  of  colonization 
and  the  search  for  naval  stations  which  had 
recently  begun.  This  impulse,  I  believ^e,  will 
hereafter  be   recoo^nized   as    the   chief    amons: 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  3 1 

those  transmitted  by  the  nineteenth  century 
to  its  successor.  Viewed  with  the  new  and 
significant  restlessness  among  the  Oriental 
peoples,  aroused  at  length,  by  intimate  contact 
with  Europeans,  from  the  torpor  and  change- 
lessness  of  ages  —  an  awakening  of  w^hich  the 
occidentalizing  of  Japan  is  merely  the  most 
conspicuous  incident  —  this  is  the  significant 
feature  of  the  opening  century,  that  should 
direct  the  attention  of  our  people  in  external 
policy.  This  European  movement  has  three 
principal  fields:  the  Levant,  —  in  which  Egypt 
may  for  convenience  be  included,  —  Africa,  and 
Asia.  Though  locally  Asiatic,  the  Levant  is  a 
European  interest,  pure  and  simple  ;  and  Africa, 
in  relation  to  world  politics,  is  but  an  annex  of 
Europe,  geographically  as  well  as,  now,  by  pre- 
emption. Eastern  Asia,  however,  and  China 
especially,  with  all  its  immense  possibilities, 
stands  over  against  us,  demanding  our  most 
careful  and  constant  thought ;  all  the  more 
because  there  would  appear  to  be  a  disposition 
in  some  quarters  to  question  our  right  of  inter- 
est. In  a  Parliamentary  blue  book  published 
some  eighteen  months  ago  with  reference  to 
the   incipient   troubles    in   China   which    after- 


Retrospect  and  Prospect 


ward  became  so  acute,  the  Russian  ambassador 
at  Peking  is  mentioned  as  saying  to  his  British 
colleague  that  only  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
had  serious  interests  in  China.  We  shall  not 
err  greatly,  I  imagine,  in  believing  that  Great 
Britain  does  not  share  this  sentiment. 

As  a  matter  of  national  decision  Hawaii  is 
already  past  history,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
seems  even  now  to  be  approaching  a  condition 
of  general  silent  acquiescence,  which,  if  realized, 
will  give  to  it  also  the  quality  of  permanence  that 
distinguishes  the  past  from  the  present.  The 
living  external  issue  of  the  present  and  the 
future,  the  field  for  us  alive  with  multifold  possi- 
bilities and  uncertainties,  is  Eastern  Asia;  so 
far  in  1901  have  we  travelled,  in  the  eight  years 
that  began  by  seeing  even  Hawaii  rejected  and 
have  ended  with  the  Philippines  possessed.  The 
elements  of  the  situation  in  China,  as  determi- 
native of  national  watchfulness,  may  be  stated 
as  follows.  The  great  stream  and  valley  of 
the  Yangtse  Kiang  is  the  natural  focus  of  trade 
for  the  greater  and  richer  part  of  the  empire, 
which  it  divides  roughly  into  two  halves.  It  is 
navigable  continuously  by  steamers  for  a  thous- 
and miles,  and  for  a  great  part  of  that  distance 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  33 

by  sea-going  vessels,  including  large  ships  of 
war.  Here,  therefore,  is  the  great  command- 
ing interest  of  commercial  nations  and  of  mari- 
time Powers.  Here,  and  here  only,  apart  from 
the  seaboard  itself,  can  they  effectually  assert 
their  force  to  control  infringement  upon  China's 
right  of  self-direction,  and  to  support  the 
Chinese  themselves  in  their  resistance  which, 
unaided,  has  not  been  able  to  retain  Manchuria. 
The  maritime  Powers  are  several ;  but  of  them 
France  has  seen  fit  to  identify  her  policy  with 
Russia  and  cannot  be  depended  upon,  even  if 
her  irritable  national  sensitiveness  permitted 
other  peoples  to  count  upon  the  reasonableness 
of  her  action  in  any  particular  case.  Regard 
for  the  interests  of  China,  of  the  commercial 
world  at  large,  and  of  our  own  people,  there- 
fore impel  us  to  cooperation  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, the  greatest  of  naval  states ;  for  her  aim,  as 
a  free-trade  nation  with  large  carrying  trade, 
must  necessarily  be  to  increase  the  volume  of 
commerce  in  a  country  like  China,  and  to  sup- 
port her  against  the  encroachments  of  another 
people,  of  whose  policy  exclusive  trade  is  a 
dominant  factor.  For  the  same  reasons,  though 
to  a  less  degree,  we  find  ourselves  impelled  to 

3 


34  Retrospect  and  Prospect 

act  in  this  matter  in  unison  with  Germany  and 
Japan.  As  the  world  is  now  balanced,  the 
British  Empire  is  in  external  matters  our 
natural  though  not  our  formal  ally. 

The  canal,  Hawaii,  and  the  Philippines  are 
valuable  to  us  as  positions  even  more  than  as 
possessions.  In  the  problem  of  Eastern  Asia, 
still  in  an  early  stage  of  its  solution  and  of 
doubtful  issue,  they  are  important  as  facilita- 
ting]: our  access  to  the  seas  of  China  and  to  the 
valley  of  the  Yangtse,  and  as  furnishing  terri- 
torial support  to  our  action  there.  Intrinsically, 
their  future  now  presents  but  few  elements  of 
anxiety.  In  the  grave  uncertainties  surround- 
ing China,  it  is  along  the  great  river,  of  which 
Shanghai  is  the  chief  port,  that  the  interest  of 
the  western  world  centres.  From  it  our  eyes 
should  never  wander.  There  rests  the  centre 
of  Chinese  power  as  susceptible  of  future 
development,  and  there  it  should  receive  firm 
support  from  us,  disregardful  of  the  place 
where  the  Chinese  Court  may  see  fit  to  estab- 
lish its  abode.  Peking,  as  has  been  clearly 
shown,  is  too  easily  controlled  from  the  land 
side.  Partition  is  one  thing  which  we  may 
well  reject ;    but    it    would    be    very    different 


Retrospect  and  Prospect  35 

to  see  established  along  the  course  of  the 
Yangtse  a  native  Power  strong  enough  to 
resist  dictation  from  the  capital,  and,  if  need 
be,  strong  enough  also  to  resist  those  by  whom 
the  capital  may  be  oppressed. 


CONDITIONS  DETERMINING  THE 

NAVAL   EXPANSION    OF    THE 

UNITED    STATES 


CONDITIONS   DETERMINING  THE 

NAVAL   EXPANSION    OF   THE 

UNITED    STATES 

January,  1902. 

AT  this  time,  while  naval  manoeuvres  are 
attracting  attention  among  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  it  is  pertinent  to  point  out 
that  it  is  commonly,  but  mistakenly,  supposed 
that  the  present  necessity  for  naval  enlarge- 
ment rests  upon  the  acquisition  of  oversea 
territories,  as  a  consequence  of  the  war  with 
Spain.  The  error  is  natural,  for  undoubtedly 
the  war  convinced  the  Am.erican  people  of  the 
advantage — nay,  the  necessity  —  of  a  great 
navy,  and  so  led  to  the  increase  we  are  wit- 
nessing; but  the  necessity  was  approaching 
unobserved,  and  would  have  come  upon  the 
nation  unawares  and  unprepared,  but  for  the 
fortunate  intervention  of  the  war,  and  its  dem- 
onstration of  the  usefulness  of  navies. 

We  have  the  highest  military  authority  for 
saying  that  the  best  and  only  sure  form  of  de- 


40        Conditions  Determiimig  the  Naval 

fence  is  to  take  the  offensive,  or  at  least  to  be 
evidently  ready  so  to  do  at  brief  notice.  The 
navy  is  essentially  and  pre-eminently  a  force 
that  thus  acts,  in  virtue  of  the  mobility  which 
is  its  prime  quality ;  and  it  is  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  argue  that  the  more  wide-spread  the 
interests  open  to  attack,  the  more  valuable  in 
this  sense  the  navy  is,  and  the  more  numerous 
and  powerful  must  it  be.  So  long  as  the 
United  States  had  no  external  possessions,  it 
was  comparatively  easy  to  blind  people  to  the 
usefulness  of  a  navy,  or  to  the  necessity  for  it. 
A  navy  for  coast  defence  only  was  then  a  plaus- 
ible, though  deceitful,  cry ;  and  it  was  a  very 
easy  further  step  to  say  that  fortifications,  sta- 
tionary land  defences,  were  cheaper  and  more 
effective.  On  the  narrow  ground  of  passive 
defence,  that  is  true ;  therefore,  ignorance  of 
military  principles  being  characteristic  of  man- 
kind generally,  and  of  Americans  perhaps  par- 
ticularly, the  need  of  a  mobile  force  to  act 
offensively  could  not  obtain  recognition. 

It  is  not  the  least  of  the  advantages  derived 
from  the  new  possessions  that  this  condition  of 
the  public  mind  can  exist  no  longer.     It  was 


Expansion  of  the  United  States  4 1 

very  soundly  argued,  by  the  American  oppo- 
nents of  the  expansion  which  has  been  realized 
in  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
that  transmarine  acquisitions  would  be  so 
many  new  exposed  points,  to  be  supported  by 
sea  only,  not  by  land,  as  the  continental  terri- 
tory can.  They  were  very  right,  and  this  is 
very  true ;  the  flaw  in  their  argument,  as  well 
as  the  beam  in  the  eye  of  the  American  public, 
which  prevented  it  from  seeing  clearly,  was  the 
failure  to  note  that,  even  when  not  possessing 
a  square  foot  of  territory  without  its  borders, 
there  were  manifold  interests  abroad,  assailable 
by  a  superior  navy,  and  only  to  be  protected 
by  such  display  of  force  as  should  make  it  not 
worth  while  to  arouse  the  nation  to  action. 

The  argument  of  the  opponents  of  territorial 
expansion,  even  within  moderate  limits,  and 
with  due  regard  to  locality  and  consequent 
utility  in  the  positions  acquired,  was  thus 
plausible,  and  was  deplorably  successful ;  but 
it  was  fallacious.  It  adduced  a  sound  military 
reason,  —  the  increased  exposure,  —  but  wholly 
ignored  qualifying  considerations  of  the  most 
serious  character,  reversive  of  conclusions.  It 
may  with  much  more  certainty  be  now  alleged, 


42         Conditions  Determining  the  Naval 

and  the  assertion  can  be  supported  to  the  point 
of  demonstration,  that  the  acquisitions  of  re- 
cent years,  despite  the  additional  requirement 
of  their  defence  imposed  upon  the  United 
States,  have  not  necessitated  any  increase  of 
naval  force  beyond  that  which  would  have  been 
imperatively  demanded  at  the  present  time, 
had  they  never  passed  into  American  hands. 
More  still,  they  have  lessened  the  burden  of 
purely  naval  increase,  which  but  for  them 
would  have  been  necessary  ;  for  by  the  tenure 
of  them,  and  due  development  of  their  re- 
sources, the  navy  itself  receives  an  accession 
of  strength,  an  augmented  facility  of  move- 
ment, by  resting  upon  strong  positions  for 
equipment  and  repair,  —  upon  bases,  to  use  the 
military  term,  —  in  several  parts  of  the  world 
where  national  interests  demand  naval  pro- 
tection of  the  kind  already  mentioned ;  namely, 
readiness  to  take  the  offensive  instantly. 

Facilities  of  this  character  add  a  percentage 
of  value  to  a  given  mobile  force,  military  or 
naval,  for  they  by  so  much  increase  its  power 
and  its  mobility.  This  percentage  may  be 
difhcult    of   precise    definition    as   to   amount, 


Expansion  of  the  United  States  43 

but  it  none  the  less  exists.  That  coal  can  be 
obtained  near  at  hand,  plentifully,  and  with 
certainty ;  that  ships  can  remain  in  readiness, 
and  in  security,  near  the  possible  scene  of  op- 
erations ;  that  they  can  be  repaired  there,  in- 
stead of  returning  to  the  United  States ;  all 
these  conditions,  which  the  new  possessions 
will  afford,  enable  the  work  on  the  spot  to  be 
done  by  fewer  ships.  Furthermore,  by  their 
storage  facilities,  by  their  accumulated  and 
natural  resources,  they  diminish  the  immediate 
dependence  upon  home  by  a  long  chain  of 
communications,  which  is  the  great  drain  on 
all  military  operations. 

Thus,  according  to  the  particular  conditions, 
one  ship  may  do  the  work  of  two,  or  three  ships 
of  five,  or  perhaps  nine  of  ten ;  but,  be  the  pro- 
portion more  or  less,  the  gain  in  efficiency 
means,  as  such  gain  always  does,  smaller  num- 
bers and  therefore  less  expense.  When  a 
battleship  in  war  time  runs  upon  an  un- 
charted rock,  as  the  Oregon  did  a  year  ago 
in  the  China  Seas,  it  makes  an  immense  differ- 
ence to  an  admiral,  and  to  the  operations  in 
hand,  whether  she  can  be  repaired  at  a  dis- 
tance of   five   hundred  miles,  or  of  five   thou- 


44         Condi iioits  Determining  the  Naval 

sand.  The  case  is  the  same  with  minor  repairs, 
and  with  the  renewal  of  coal,  one  of  the  great- 
est of  naval  anxieties.  For  instance,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  value  of  Guanta- 
namo,  only  fifty  miles  from  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
to  the  American  fleet  off  the  latter  port,  which 
otherwise  had  to  coal  in  the  open,  or  depend 
upon  a  base  many  hundred  miles  away. 

It  may  be  advisable  here  to  notice  passingly 
an  argument  at  times  maintained,  and  often 
advanced  during  recent  discussions  concerning 
the  annexation  of  the  Philippines,  that,  while 
such  bases  of  naval  action  are  intrinsically 
advantageous,  there  attaches  to  them  no  ex- 
pediency of  holding  adjacent  territory  in  polit- 
ical tenure.  The  United  States  therefore,  so 
it  was  urged,  for  the  security  of  her  naval  situa- 
tion in  eastern  waters  would  require  in  the 
Philippines  no  more  than  a  navy  yard.  From 
the  military  point  of  view  this  is  w^holly  in- 
accurate. Any  military  permanent  station, 
land  fortress  or  naval  arsenal,  gains  immeasur- 
ably in  strength  from  the  support  of  a  friendly 
region  in  which  it  is  situated,  because  of  the 
contribution  to  its  resources  and  the  distance 
at  which  attack  is  held.     The  impressiveness 


Expansion  of  the  United  States  45 

of  the  word  "  isolation,"  which  we  all  instinc- 
tively feel,  testifies  to  this  condition.  Nor  is  it 
conclusive  against  the  military  argument  that 
the  friendliness  be  of  a  passive  or  reluctant 
character,  as  of  a  population  subjected  to  mili- 
tary control.  This  consideration  is  indeed 
material  to  the  general  conduct  of  a  war,  for 
the  force  thus  engaged  in  insuring  submission 
is  withdrawn  from  that  available  for  other 
operations ;  but  so  long  as  it  is  effective  in 
compelling  or  inducing  the  co-operation  of  the 
inhabitants,  either  as  peaceful  workmen  and 
agriculturists,  or  more  positively  in  the  field, 
the  particular  fortress,  land  or  sea,  is  far 
stronger  than  it  could  be  if  surrounded  by 
territory  under  alien  government,  even  though 
neutral. 

Extent  of  territory  is  a  real  factor  in  military 
strength,  and  for  this  reason  a  small  island  is 
decisively  less  valuable  than  a  large  one.  It 
is  a  distinct  weakness  to  Gibraltar  that  it  is 
backed  by  a  country  wholly  foreign,  though 
probably  not  belligerent ;  and  Malta,  if  severed 
from  a  predominant  navy,  would  find  its  in- 
trinsic power  inadequate  to  prolonged  endur- 
ance.    On  the  other  hand,  places  on  the  coast 


46         Conditions  Determining  the  Naval 

of  the  United  States,  or  of  Australia,  or  New 
Zealand,  though  individually  weak  from  a 
purely  military  standpoint,  derive  great  in- 
crease of  resistant  force,  and  still  more  of  pro- 
ductive energy,  —  a  large  element  in  military 
offensive  efficiency, —  because  in  the  midst  of 
a  friendly  and  industrious  community.  The 
questions  of  resources  and  of  support,  both 
very  important  factors  in  military  vigor,  turn 
largely  upon  this  one  consideration. 

This  is  not,  in  itself,  an  argument  for  large 
annexations,  or  indefinite  territorial  expansion. 
These,  if  desirable,  rest  upon  reasons  other 
than  military.  We  are  dealing  here  with  a 
purely  military  consideration,  and  supporting  it 
by  military  argument,  which,  however,  cannot 
be  pressed  to  the  extent  of  supporting  an  action 
political  in  origin.  The  military  argument 
amounts  simply  to  this :  that  a  moderate  num- 
ber of  such  bases,  suitably  chosen  in  view  of 
their  position  and  resources,  strengthen  a  mili- 
tary or  naval  situation,  and  thereby  enable 
fewer  men  or  fewer  ships  to  do  the  necessary 
work ;  but  it  must  be  at  once  qualified  by  the 
other  perfectly  familiar  military  maxim,  that 
the  multiplication  of  such  bases,  as  soon  as  you 


Expansion  of  the  U^iited  States  47 

pass  the  limits  of  reasonable  necessity,  becomes 
a  source  of  weakness,  multiplying  exposed 
points,  and  entailing  division  of  force.  It  is 
not  even  a  matter  of  indifference  that  you  have 
too  many ;  it  is  a  positive  injury.  Conse- 
quently, the  necessity  of  naval  bases  to  efificient 
naval  action  cannot  by  itself  be  made  into  an 
argument  for  indefinite  expansion. 

Such  oversea  expansion  as  the  United  States 
has  so  far  made  has  not  been  primarily  for 
military  purposes.  Incidentally,  it  has  contrib- 
uted to  naval  power,  and  it  has  not  as  yet 
transcended  the  limit  of  utility  to  that  end. 
What  has  been  already  gained  is  useful,  either 
directly  or  indirectly ;  the  increase  of  exposure, 
as  yet,  does  not  equal  the  increase  in  strength. 
It  is,  of  course,  very  possible  that  considerations 
of  political  or  commercial  expediency,  or  even 
necessity,  might  lead  to  acquisitions,  the 
exposure  and  burden  of  which  would  find  no 
compensation  in  increase  of  naval  strength,  or 
of  general  national  military  security.  The 
justification  of  such  measures,  if  taken,  must 
rest  on  other  than  military  or  naval  rea- 
sons,   and  would   not   concern  this  argument ; 


48        Conditions  Determining  the  Naval 

but  in  fact  no  such  undue  expansion  has  yet 
occurred. 

The  march  of  events,  not  in  the  United 
States  only,  but  over  the  world  at  large,  not  of 
military  or  naval  events  chiefly,  but  of  political 
events,  events  economical  and  commercial,  has 
brought  about  a  necessity  for  large  navies; 
for  navies  much  increased  over  the  standard  of 
twenty  years  ago.  This  is  now  universally 
recognized.  Of  this  course  of  events  in  those 
two  decades,  and  their  result  to-day,  the  war 
with  Spain,  which  led  directly  or  indirectly  to 
the  acquisition  of  every  foot  of  insular  territory 
possessed  by  the  United  States,  is  simply  one 
incident;  and  that  an  incident  rather  discon- 
nected, something  of  a  side  issue,  though  one 
most  timely  for  the  welfare  of  the  nation. 

Had  that  war  not  occurred,  there  is  no 
reason  to  believe  that  the  mighty  events  which 
have  transpired  in  Africa,  Egypt,  the  Levant, 
and  China,  would  not  have  happened ;  still  less 
that  there  would  not  have  been  the  immense 
commercial  developments,  which,  if  less  strik- 
insf,  are  even  more  momentous,  and  more 
influential  at  this  moment  upon  the  policy  of 
nations.     Issues  and  conditions  which  are  mov- 


Expansion  of  the  United  States  49 

ing  the  world  would  have  been  as  they  are  had 
the  distress  of  Cuba  never  compelled  interven- 
tion. The  difference  now  would  have  been  that 
the  United  States  would  be  without  Porto  Rico, 
Hawaii,  and  the  Philippines ;  without  reserved 
rights  in  Cuba,  the  key  of  the  West  Indies  and 
Gulf  of  Mexico ;  and  that  she  would  not  have 
received  the  impulse,  which  the  war  and  its 
consequent  acquisitions  most  timely  gave,  to  the 
building  of  the  navy  towards  a  point  necessary 
to  meet  the  demands  of  a  political  and  com- 
mercial future,  which  in  any  case  would  have 
arrived,  and,  but  for  that  war,  have  found  the 
nation  unprepared. 

The  general  strenuous  impulse  of  the  great 
civilized  states  of  the  world,  to  find  and  to  estab- 
lish markets  and  commercial  relations  outside 
their  own  borders  and  their  own  people,  has 
led  to  multifold  annexations,  and  to  commer- 
cial and  naval  afjQrressions.  In  these  the  United 
States  has  had  no  part,  but  they  have  consti- 
tuted a  political  situation  that  immensely  in- 
creases her  political  and  commercial  anxieties, 
and  consequently  her  naval  responsibilities ; 
for,  as  interests  of  this  kind  are  outside  the 
North  American  continent,  it  is  upon  the  navy 

4 


50        Conditions  Determining  the  Naval 

that  their  support  rests.  This  external  impulse 
of  the  commercial  nations  is  of  two-fold  char- 
acter. First,  there  is  the  perfectly  legitimate 
and  unobjectionable  form  of  commercial  com- 
petition, in  open  field  and  without  favor ;  but 
there  is,  besides,  the  effort  to  extend  and  sustain 
commercial  advantage  by  the  extension  of  politi- 
cal power,  either  by  controlling  influence  or  by 
actual  annexation,  under  cover  of  either  of 
which  the  commercial  system  of  the  particular 
country  obtains  favored  conditions,  injurious  to 
others,  from  special  privilege  all  the  way  up  to 
a  practically  exclusive  market.  The  history  of 
the  past  twenty  or  thirty  years  abounds  in  such 
instances,  reversive  of  the  course  of  trade,  even 
to  the  destruction  at  times  of  a  well-established 
commerce. 

Much  of  this  politico-commercial  movement 
has  occurred  in  regions  where  the  United 
States  has  been  compelled,  by  her  recognized 
traditional  policy,  to  abstain  from  intervention, 
or  even  remonstrance.  The  politics  are  none 
of  our  business,  and  the  resultant  commercial 
inconvenience,  if  it  touch  us,  has  to  be  ac- 
cepted. This  applies  to  Europe  generally ;  to 
Africa,  which,  both   by  position  and    now  by 


Expansion  of  the  United  States  5 1 

annexation,  is  an  appendage  of  Europe ;  and 
probably  also  to  those  parts  of  Asia  commonly 
known  as  the  Levant,  which  by  juxtaposition 
are  European  in  interest.  The  case  is  very 
different  in  South  America,  in  Eastern  Asia, 
and  in  the  Pacific.  From  interest  in  none  of 
these  is  the  United  States  excluded  by  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  corollaries,  by  which 
she  simply  defines  her  policy  to  be  hands- 
off  in  matters  of  purely  European  concern; 
while  by  express  declaration  political  interfer- 
ence in  South  America,  of  a  character  to 
intrude  European  political  control,  will  be 
resented  as  directly  injurious  to  American 
security. 

As  regards  the  Pacific  and  China,  the  move- 
ment there,  and  especially  in  the  latter,  has 
been  lately  so  much  before  the  public  that  it 
is  unnecessary  to  recall  details.  It  is  obvious, 
however,  that  where  the  commercial  interests 
at  stake  are  so  great,  and  political  conditions 
so  uncertain,  the  desire  to  secure  commercial 
opportunity  will  lead  countries  that  possess 
force  into  a  dangerous  temptation  to  use  it  for 
the  extension  of  their  influence.  Therefore, 
unless  prepared  to  maintain  the  national  rights, 


52         Conditions  Determining  the  Naval 

either  singly  or  in  combination  with  others, 
backed  by  force  at  hand,  the  United  States 
may  find  her  people  excluded,  more  or  less, 
by  the  encroachment  of  rivals. 

The  case  in  South  America  is  even  more 
serious;  for  political  interference  there  not  only 
may  injure  the  nation  commercially,  but  would 
certainly  dishonor  it,  in  face  of  its  clearly 
avowed  policy.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
this  extension  of  commerce  by  political  pres- 
sure is  a  leading  element  in  the  spirit  of  the 
times  ;  and,  when  such  a  spirit  is  looking  watch- 
fully for  a  field  in  which  to  act,  one  so  fruitful 
and  so  promising  as  South  America  can  secure 
exemption  only  by  a  display  of  power  to  resist, 
which  South  America  itself  does  not  possess, 
and  which  the  United  States  alone  can  supply. 

These  are  among  the  leading  conditions 
which  necessitate  the  creation  of  a  powerful 
navy  by  the  United  States,  and  they  are  quite 
independent  of  her  relatively  small  external 
possessions,  most  valuable  though  these  are 
from  the  naval  point  of  view.  She  is  con- 
fronted, in  short,  by  a  general  m.ovement  of 
the  nations,  resting  upon  a  spirit  spread  among 


Expansio7i  of  the  United  States  5  3 

their  peoples,  which  seeks  to  secure  commer- 
cial advantages  in  all  quarters  of  the  world ; 
peaceably,  if  may  be,  but,  if  not,  by  pressure. 
In  this  collision  of  interests,  force  will  have  a 
determining  part,  as  it  has  in  all  periods  of 
the  world's  history ;  and  force,  in  such  remote 
localities,  means  necessarily  naval  force.  It  is 
upon  the  spread  of  this  spirit  and  the  action 
ensuing  from  it,  that  the  necessity  for  a  great 
navy  rests,  and  not  upon  the  fact  of  having 
assumed  oversea  charges.  Porto  Rico,  Hawaii, 
the  Philippines,  and  if  there  be  any  other 
acquisition  at  present,  have  not  created  the 
necessity ;  on  the  contrary,  they  have  reduced 
the  weight  of  the  burden,  by  contributing  to 
support  it. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH 
AFRICAN  WAR  UPON  THE  PRES- 
TIGE OF  THE    BRITISH  EMPIRE 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH 
AFRICAN  WAR  UPON  THE  PRES- 
TIGE OF  THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE 

November,  1901. 

WITHOUT  seeking  excessive  refinement 
in  definition,  it  may  profitably  be  re- 
called that  the  common  colloquial  use  of  the 
word  "  prestige  "  overlooks  its  primary  significa- 
tion, which  involves  the  idea  of  illusion,  or 
even  of  delusion.  When  employing  it  in  ordi- 
nary speech  we  do  not  think  of  a  veil  conceal- 
ing truth,  but  of  a  solid  basis  of  achievement 
or  power  which  underlies  present  acknowl- 
edged reputation.  Thus  the  word  is  practically 
affirmative,  not  negative ;  it  suggests  actuality, 
not  a  mask.  But  for  the  very  reason  that 
prestige  is  popular  impression,  resting  upon 
surface  appearance  assumed  to  be  substantial 
fact,  it  is  among  the  most  uncertain  of  posses- 
sions ;  upon  a  pedestal  to-day,  in  the  dust  to- 
morrow,   with    the    facile    fickleness    noted    in 


58      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

populaces.  When  to  this  source  of  error  in 
the  adoption  of  opinion  is  added  the  misguid- 
ing influence  of  strong  prejudices,  when  mis- 
understandino:  of  conditions  combines  with  bias 
of  judgment,  mutabilities  of  prestige  may  be 
both  sudden  and  extreme.  "  Presto !  Change  !  " 
and  prestidigitator,  are  prominent  and  charac- 
teristic members  of  the  volatile  family  to  which 
prestige  owes  its  birth.  The  decline  of  prestige 
may  involve  as  much  illusion  as  its  growth ; 
therefore  its  value,  while  not  to  be  denied,  may 
easily  be  exaggerated. 

Prestige  then  does  not  necessarily  corre- 
spond with  fact,  even  moderately ;  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  apt  to  be  much  in  excess  or 
much  in  defect.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  valuable 
possession ;  an  asset  which  counts  for  a  good 
deal  in  the  reckoning  of  international  balances. 
Accepted  at  its  face  value,  and  repeated  in  the 
street  from  man  to  man,  it  constitutes  a  mass  of 
impression  which  finally  affects  even  the  more 
judicious  and  better-informed,  and  may  become 
of  weight  in  diplomatic  action.  Consequently, 
when  impaired,  it  is  worth  the  effort  to  restore 
it,  and  to  bring  it  into  conformity  with  material 
facts.     These  do  not  change  either  with  the 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Em-pire     59 

suddenness,   or  in  the  degree,  to  which  mere 
moral  effect  is  specially  liable. 

Qualifying  the  word  and  its  idea  with  the 
remarks  so  far  made,  the  prestige  of  the  British 
Empire  has  assuredly  suffered  diminution  from 
the  South  African  war.  Men  in  the  street, 
and  the  hurried  writers  of  the  press,  have  re- 
ceived an  impression  of  bafflement,  or  even  of 
failure,  in  holding  which  they  support  one 
another.  From  the  very  outset  prepossession 
stood  ready  upon  the  Continent,  and  among 
many  of  the  American  people,  not  only  to  re- 
joice over  British  reverses,  but  to  draw  from 
them  quick,  disparaging  conclusions,  affecting 
prestige,  by  the  easy  process  of  forgetting  fun- 
damental conditions  and  dwelling  upon  surface 
events.  Precisely  the  same  disposition  was 
entertained  towards  the  United  States  a  year 
before,  at  the  beginning  of  our  war  with  Spain, 
as  I  had  opportunity  to  observe  by  the  experi- 
ence of  dining  in  company  with  several  diplo- 
mats in  a  European  capital  at  the  moment  of 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  That  the  gratifica- 
tion of  gloating  over  our  defeats  was  confi- 
dently anticipated  also  is  a  matter  of  common 
notoriety.     We    were    out    of   favor,    and    our 


6o     The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

prestige  was  naturally  low.  The  fortunate 
event  of  our  war  having  at  least  not  lowered 
it  further,  there  is  no  necessity  to  inquire  how 
far  the  original  estimate  corresponded  with  the 
facts.  Of  one  thing,  however,  we  may  be  sure ; 
that  had  temporary  unsuccess  attended  us,  the 
difHculties  of  our  undertaking,  which  formed  the 
basis  of  unfavorable  prediction  and  were  by  no 
means  small  to  a  dispassionate  judgment,  would 
not  in  the  least  have  qualified  unfavorable  criti- 
cism. Prejudice  is  a  two-edged  sword,  and 
cuts  both  ways.  So  it  has  been  in  South 
Africa.  The  evident  military  diiificulties  gave 
hostile  sentiment  the  basis  on  which  to  build 
prophecies  of  disaster ;  but  having  served  that 
purpose,  when  it  comes  to  comment  and  infer- 
ence, the  difficulties  no  longer  find  place  for 
consideration. 

The  military  conditions  before  and  during 
the  war,  and  now  existing  in  South  Africa,  are 
so  much  matters  of  present  remembrance  that 
it  is  unnecessary  to  enumerate  them  at  large. 
What  can  profitably  be  done  is  to  select  from 
them  those  which  constitute  the  distinctive 
characteristics,  differentiating  this  from  other 
struggles,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  enabling  it 


upon  tJie  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     6 1 

to  be  in  some  measure  classified ;  for  such 
features  suggest  resemblances  as  well  as  differ- 
ences. The  prominent  facts,  thus  separated 
from  less  noteworthy  surroundings,  can  then 
be  brought  to  the  test  of  criticism  as  to  their 
positive  influence  in  the  present  case,  and  also 
to  comparison  with  other  historical  experiences. 
Whatever  may  be  the  prestige,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word,  of  the  British  Empire,  at 
home  or  abroad,  its  real  meed  of  praise  or 
blame  depends  upon  the  way  it  has  met,  and  is 
meeting,  these  distinctive  conditions. 

The  characteristic  elements  of  this  war  re- 
sulting fronl  the  permanent  conditions,  irre- 
spective of  the  conduct  of  the  present  hostilities, 
and  anterior  to  their  beginning,  are  (i)  The 
remoteness  of  the  British  base  of  operations 
from  the  scene  of  fighting,  contrasted  with  the 
nearness  of  the  Boers;  in  other  words,  the 
length  of  the  British  lines  of  communication. 
(2)  The  nature  and  extent  of  the  country  over 
which  operations  had  to  be  conducted.  ( 3 )  The 
character  of  the  hostile  people  ;  including  there- 
in the  advantage  which  familiarity  with  a  region 
and  its  conditions,  especially  when  sparsely 
settled,  undeveloped,  and  consequently  imper- 


62      The  Injhience  of  the  SoiitJi  African  War 

fcctly  known,  always  gives  to  inhabitants  over 
invaders.  All  three  particulars,  indeed,  fall 
under  the  general  head  of  communications, 
which,  on  the  strategic  side  at  least,  dominate 
war.  The  nature  and  extent  of  the  country 
affect  materially  the  maintenance  of  commu- 
nications, their  security  and  their  rapidity.  So 
also  the  native  and  acquired  characteristics  of 
the  enemy  act  and  react  upon  communications. 
If  of  extremely  simple  wants,  capable  of  rapid 
movement,  familiar  with  the  country, surrounded 
by  sympathizers,  their  own  communications  are 
relatively  invulnerable,  and  to  the  same  degree 
they  are  facilitated  in  attacking  those  of  the 
invader.  Roles  are,  in  a  measure,  reversed; 
the  offence  is  constantly  on  the  defence  for  his 
communications,  the  defence  on  the  offensive 
against  them. 

These  factors,  onerously  adverse  to  Great 
Britain,  were  and  are  permanent.  To  them 
must  be  added  a  present  consideration,  which 
existed  from  the  beginning,  but  which  it  was 
then  perhaps  impossible  to  anticipate ;  namely, 
the  difficulty  under  which  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  be  placed  in  dealing  with  partially 
organized  forces  maintaining  insurrection  rather 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     6 


o 


than  war ;  with  no  organic  social  system  be- 
hind them,  and,  from  that  very  lack,  without 
vital  centres,  or  social  articulations,  at  which 
to  strike ;  capable  of  indefinite  subdivision  and 
consequent  elusiveness,  due  to  the  very  low 
type  of  social  and  political  cohesion  which  has 
been  characteristic  of  the  Boer  peoples  from 
their  beginnings.  When  highly  organized  and 
complex,  national  vitality  may  be  paralyzed 
without  killing  men ;  but  where  organization 
is  defective,  the  same  end  cannot  be  quickly 
reached  without  a  slaughter  of  individuals  from 
which  modern  humanity  rightfully  revolts. 

Here  has  been  the  difficulty  confronting  the 
Empire  since  the  end  of  the  war  proper.  From 
the  delay  in  solving  it  proceeds  the  present 
impairment  of  prestige,  which,  granting  the 
idea  of  illusion  inseparable  from  the  word,  is 
natural  and  to  be  expected.  For  many  obvious 
reasons,  the  individual  Boer,  when  caught,  can- 
not be  killed.  Great  Britain  is  limited  to  cap- 
ture and  exportation ;  processes  indefinitely 
tedious,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  other  causes  before  noticed,  and  further 
protracted  by  the  necessity  of  diverting  a  huge 
fraction    of   the  large  available    forces    to    the 


64      The  ht/liicnce  of  the  South  African  War 

protection  of  the  communications.  These 
stretch  a  thousand  miles  from  the  sea-board  to 
the  seat  of  war,  and  thence  ramify  throughout 
the  extensive  regions  over  which  desultory  and 
elusive  fighting  may  spread.  This  burden  is 
even  greater  than  during  regular  hostilities, 
both  because  the  lines  are  more  disseminated, 
and  because  the  evasive  action  of  the  small 
bands  now  in  the  field  is  harder  to  counteract 
than  the  efforts  of  large  masses,  compelled  by 
their  very  size  to  consider  their  own  com- 
munications. 

The  military  operations  of  the  war  in  South 
Africa  may  be  divided  into  two  principal  and 
easily  recognized  stages.  There  is,  first,  that 
of  regular  hostilities,  which  terminated  not  long 
after  the  fall  of  Pretoria;  to  which  succeeded 
the  existing  conditions  of  what  is  commonly 
called  guerilla  warfare.  In  the  former,  the 
British  were  confronted  by  large  numbers, 
more  or  less  organized,  acting  in  masses,  and 
representing  a  regular  Government  which  had 
its  staff  of  officials  and  local  habitat.  In  the 
present  embarrassing  situation,  the  permanent 
natural  factors  (the  nature  of  the  country,  and 
the  racial  characteristics  of  the  opponents,  with 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     65 

their  consequent  individual  tendencies  of  ac- 
tion) remain  much  the  same ;  but  the  accidental 
temporary  elements  are  changed.  The  Boer 
forces  are  no  longer  organized,  in  the  sense  of 
having  a  common  centre  of  action,  or  a  regular 
gradation  of  even  military  authority.  They  no 
longer  act  in  masses,  but  are  scattered  in  small 
bodies,  much  of  whose  immunity  depends  upon 
their  faculty  of  melting  away  and  subsequently 
reuniting ;  and  there  is  behind  them  no  recog- 
nized and  efificient  civil  government.  On  the 
civil  side  the  Boer  bands  represent  a  past,  not 
a  present;  the  organic  society  and  government 
no  longer  exist. 

The  conduct  of  the  earlier  stasre  of  the  war 
by  the  British,  with  its  effect  upon  prestige,  is 
first  to  be  considered.  Bearing  in  mind  the 
respective  distances  of  the  antagonists  from  the 
seat  of  war,  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  gave  to 
the  Boers  the  advantage,  to  the  British  the  dis- 
advantage, of  a  surprise.  That  this  is  so  is 
seen  by  considering  how  the  case  would  have 
stood  had  the  British  Islands  been  where  Cape 
Colony  is.  That  larger  organized  forces  were 
not  assembled  in  South  Africa  at  an  early  date 
will  be  differently  criticised  even  by  impartial 

5 


66      The  Infltience  of  the  South  African  War 

observers.  It  may  at  least  be  observed  that,  if 
injurious  to  the  prestige  of  the  Government  on 
the  score  of  unwise  delay,  it  cannot  at  the 
same  time  be  attributed  to  eagerness  for  war. 
Also,  however  viewed,  this  is  chargeable  to 
political  calculation,  not  to  military  ineffi- 
ciency. But  when  war  was  at  last  resolved,  it 
cannot,  I  think,  be  considered  as  less  than  ad- 
mirable that  over  165,000  men,  with  the  vast 
mass  of  warlike  equipment,  were  transferred 
six  thousand  miles  from  the  British  Islands  to 
South  Africa  in  six  months.  Nor  yet  that, 
from  the  sea-coast,  the  same  huge  numbers 
and  equipment  were  carried  by  single  track 
railroads  a  thousand  miles  inland,  there  main- 
tained, and  within  eight  months,  not  of  their 
arrival  in  Africa,  but  of  their  earliest  departure 
from  England,  had  possession  of  the  capitals 
of  both  their  opponents,  having  driven  them 
from  position  to  position  in  a  notoriously  diffi- 
cult country,  devoid  alike  of  natural  and  of 
artificial  resources.  The  numbers  of  the  Brit- 
ish, doubtless,  were  fully  adequate  to  this  work. 
They  were  greatly  superior  to  the  Boers,  but 
not,  I  think,  to  a  degree  much  exceeding  that 
which   any  prudent    military  man   would  esti- 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     67 


mate  as  absolutely  necessary  for  such  a  task ; 
considering,  that  is,  the  character  and  extent 
of  the  countr)^  the  length  of  the  communica- 
tions, and  the  general  difficulties  inherent  in 
all  invasions. 

I  fail,  therefore,  to  see  that  the  ultimate 
results  up  to  the  fall  of  Pretoria,  and  during 
the  subsequent  disintegration  of  the  Boer 
forces  under  continued  pressure,  are  so  unsatis- 
factory as  in  any  way  to  constitute  a  reason  for 
that  diminution  of  credit  which  we  call  loss  of 
prestige.  During  the  operations  which  thus 
terminated,  that  is,  during  the  process  that  pro- 
duced the  results,  there  occurred  numerous  in- 
cidents; some  attended  by  success,  some  by 
grave  disaster.  The  latter  chiefly  require 
notice,  for  they  are  the  food  for  criticism. 
The  advance  towards  Kimberley  was  brought 
sharply  to  a  standstill ;  the  fact  being  marked 
by  the  slaughter  at  Magersfontein,  which  we 
may  say  ought  not  to  have  been.  It  was  not, 
however,  the  particular  repulse  that  constituted 
the  check,  but  the  want  of  numbers,  which 
showed  that  the  advance  had  been  premature. 
Almost  simultaneously  came  the  defeat  at 
Colenso,  which  postponed  the  relief  of  Lady- 


68      TJie  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

smith ;  and  upon  these  two  rebuffs  followed 
the  strain  of  national  endurance,  through  the 
two  months  of  painful  uncertainty  as  to 
whether  the  isolated  British  garrisons  could 
hold  out. 

Now,  I  hold  no  brief  to  defend  the  advance 
on  either  line  at  the  moment  chosen.  But  I 
do  feel  very  strongly  that  it  is  unreasonable  to 
judge  military  operations  carried  on  by  repre- 
sentative governments  on  merely  military 
grounds,  leaving  out  of  account  the  absolute 
necessity  of  convincing  the  people  represented. 
The  American  General  Grant  certainly  did 
not  lack  self-dependence  or  firmness,  nor  did 
his  subordinate,  Sherman,  lack  eminent  military 
characteristics  and  acquirements ;  yet  when 
Sherman  remonstrated  against  the  movement 
round  Vicksburg,  in  1863,  on  very  sound  mili- 
tary grounds  of  communications.  Grant  replied 
that  to  fall  back  to  a  new  base  for  a  secure  line 
of  communications  would  so  dishearten  the 
nation  "  that  bases  of  supplies  would  be  of  no 
use ;  neither  men  to  hold  diem  nor  supplies  to 
be  put  in  them  would  be  furnished."  The  con- 
clusion was  perhaps  extreme,  but  the  remark 
has  value.      In   countries  where   the    voice    of 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empijx     69 

the  people  is  mighty  it  cannot  be  disregarded, 
nor  can  the  soldier  so  separate  his  military 
convictions  from  the  popular  sentiment  as  to 
neglect  it  wholly.  To  the  utmost  possible  ex- 
tent he  doubtless  should  act  on  strict  military 
reason.  Disastrous  as  the  determination  ap- 
peared to  be  for  a  time,  I  have  always  ap- 
plauded White's  holding  on  to  Ladysmith,  nor 
have  I  been  able  greatly  to  condemn  the  risk 
taken  in  remaining  at  Dundee  until  the  neces- 
sity of  evacuation  was  not  only  seen  but  dem- 
onstrated. For  the  same  reason  I  hesitate  to 
criticise  Methuen's  advance  to  the  Modder, 
though  it  was  shown  to  be  premature  by  the 
long  delay  necessary  after  Magersfontein. 

In  brief,  therefore,  while  the  attempts  at  ad- 
vance may  have  been  premature,  militarily  con- 
sidered, they  were  almost  unavoidable  under 
the  imperfectly  understood  difficulties  of  re- 
lieving Kimberley  and  Ladysmith.  To  hold 
advanced  positions,  and  to  push  advance,  were 
inevitable,  if  only  to  demonstrate  the  difficulties 
and  the  need  of  more  men ;  yet  to  see  the 
effort  of  a  great  empire  blocked  by  two  small 
republics  inevitably  affected  prestige.  Failure, 
until  redeemed,  cannot  but  do  so;  but,  in  fact, 


JO      The  Injlzicnce  of  the  South  African  War 

there  was  no  occasion  for  disheartenment  had 
the  circumstances  been  intelligently  appre- 
ciated. I  am  not  aware  that  in  these  main 
operations,  up  to  the  standstill  in  December, 
there  was  anything  that  impeached  the  general 
military  character  of  the  army.  Mistakes  in 
generalship  I  think  there  were.  These  affect  the 
reputation  of  the  general,  but  they  should  not 
that  of  the  nation.  Experience  is  universal 
that  a  very  large  percentage,  probably  a  ma- 
jority, of  able  men,  men  of  high  promise  both 
in  character  and  acquirement,  break  down  in 
chief  command.  The  South  African  war  is 
not  in  this  respect  different  from  others.  I 
know  that  in  our  Civil  War  we  had  bitter  disap- 
pointments; and  I  believe  that  Dupont,  who 
surrendered  somewhat  ignominiously  at  Baylen, 
in  1808,  had  stood  very  high  in  the  esteem  of 
Napoleon  himself.  Nevertheless,  for  lack  of 
this  correct  appreciation,  a  merely  personal 
defect  is  carried  to  the  losing  balance  of  na- 
tional prestige. 

There  were,  however,  in  both  advances  inci- 
dents of  a  character  which  have  since  too  often 
recurred  not  to  reflect  upon  the  reputation  of 
the   army.     Passing    over   questions  involving 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire 


the  Commander-in-Chief,  as  being  too  essen- 
tiall}^  personal  to  warrant  general  conclusions, 
the  inference  prompted  by  the  battle  of  Co- 
lenso,  by  the  deadly  surprise  at  Magersfontein, 
and  by  many  subsequent  episodes,  is  unques- 
tionably that  of  inadequacy,  or  of  remissness 
in  subordinate  duties,  which  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  reasonable  requirements  of  efficiency. 
Taken  singly,  any  one  incident  may  be  due  to 
unexpected  causes,  or  to  some  one  person ; 
but  the  impression  produced  —  and  in  speak- 
ing of  prestige  I  necessarily  deal  with  impres- 
sions —  by  the  numerous  surprises,  and  some 
surrenders,  is  that  of  a  proportion  of  incom- 
petency in  the  grades  of  subordinate  officers 
too  large  to  be  creditably  accounted  for.  I 
have  even  heard  surrenders  attributed  to  decay 
in  the  fighting  quality  of  the  race ;  than  which 
imputation  none  can  be  more  injurious  to 
military  prestige.  This  has  appeared  to  me 
nothing  short  of  absurd,  in  view  of  the  abun- 
dance of  good  fighting  that  has  been  done  ; 
and  we  Americans,  as  a  nation  courageous  and 
warlike,  but  not  military,  have  had  experience 
enough  of  panic  in  troops  badly  officered  to 
dismiss  peremptorily  any  such  suggestion.    For 


72      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

such  discreditable  episodes,  however,  the  only 
one  alternative  solution  is  incompetent  leader- 
ship; and  when  it  is  remembered  that  the 
leaders  in  these  small  affairs  are  the  subordi- 
nates, and  sometimes  the  principal  subordi- 
nates, in  large  operations,  the  impression  of 
dangerous  unsoundness  in  the  main  body  is 
deepened.  In  contemplating  the  question  of 
their  own  acquirements,  ofificers  should  re- 
member that  failure  on  their  part  must  thus 
react  upon  their  troops  at  times,  even  to  the 
accusation  of  cowardice.  I  confess  that  while 
I  think  the  prevalent  impression  of  incompe- 
tency among  officers  exaggerated,  it  does  not 
seem  to  me  unfounded.  It  errs  by  neglect  to 
take  due  account  of  the  mass  of  good  work 
done ;  but  that  is  always  the  case  with  such 
criticism,  and  the  loss  of  prestige  which  it 
asserts  is  not  without  reason  in  fact,  though 
immoderate  in  terms. 

If  this  be  so,  the  defect  is  precisely  one  that 
would  be  conspicuously  felt  when  the  war 
passed  into  its  second  stage,  and  on  both  sides 
took  the  form  of  wide  dissemination  in  small 
bodies,  which,  however  united  in  some  general 
scheme,    were    locally    self-dependent.       This 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     ']i 

multiplication  of  small  commands  necessarily 
multiplies  the  chance  of  inefficiency  betraying 
itself,  and  not  improbably  accounts  for  some 
mischances.  On  the  other  hand,  a  constant 
sifting  process  goes  on,  and  dearly  bought 
experience  will  remedy  this  evil.  I  have  no 
doubt  that  the  efficiency  of  the  force  under 
Lord  Kitchener  is  double  now  what  it  was  a 
year  ago,  both  by  such  process  of  elimination 
and  by  the  increase  of  facility  which  constant 
practice  bestows  even  upon  those  previously 
well-equipped.  There  can  scarcely  be  a  cor- 
responding gain  to  the  Boers,  who  already 
possessed  the  particular  local  aptitudes  which 
the  British  have  had  to  acquire.  Of  this  the 
makers  of  prestige  have  probably  taken  too 
little  account. 

Equally  do  they  fail  to  take  account  of  the 
grave  difficulties  which  should  qualify  the  sur- 
face impressions  produced  by  the  mere  pro- 
longation of  the  trouble.  The  British  Army 
in  South  Africa  during  eighteen  months,  practi- 
cally since  the  fall  of  Pretoria,  has  been  engaged 
in  a  task  analogous  to  that  of  which  the  United 
States  Army  during  the  past  century  has  had 
large  experience.      Setting  aside  the  savagery 


74      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

in  the  practices  of  North  American  Indians, 
the  Boers  have  much  in  common  with  them,  as 
combatants.  To  the  adaptation  of  methods  to 
environment  which  distinguishes  both,  as  it 
docs  natives  usually,  they  have  further  brought 
the  brain  capacity  of  the  white  man  ;  and  instead 
of  the  tribal  tradition  of  the  Indian,  they  have 
that  of  a  known  common  history  and  of  a 
national  existence,  which,  although  excessively 
loose  and  unorganized,  furnishes  a  certain  bond 
of  cohesion.  Concert  of  action  and  persistence 
are  thereby  attainable  to  a  degree  impossible  to 
the  Indians,  ever  prone  to  disintegration,  and 
fickle  with  the  fickleness  of  the  savage.  In 
scope  of  design  and  intelligence  of  direction 
there  is  also  no  comparison.  Let  it  be  added 
that  in  both  cases  the  methods  of  fighting  are 
not  external  habits,  assumed  like  a  change  of 
garments,  or  superinduced  as  training  upon 
a  recruit,  but  the  outgrowth  of  surrounding 
circumstances  and  everyday  life  ;  an  evolution 
rather  than  a  system,  and  marked  therefore  with 
a  spontaneity,  a  facility,  and  a  readiness,  not  to 
be  attained  offhand  by  imitators.  As  well  might 
a  coat  be  expected  to  rival  the  skin  in  adapting 
itself  to  the  form  and  movements  of  the  body. 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     7  5 

Forces  of  this  character,  acting  within  their 
usual  environment,  and  unimpeded  by  consider- 
ations common  to  men  of  complex  civilization, 
possess  a  power  of  injury  and  an  elusivcness 
which  are  enormous ;  to  be  matched  only  by 
their  powerlessness  for  good,  and  for  self- 
initiated  progress  in  the  civil  order.  To  meet 
the  conditions  in  South  Africa  —  which,  though 
not  unparalleled  in  kind  are  perhaps  unpre- 
cedented in  degree,  because  the  brains  of  white 
men  are  utilizing  the  capacities  and  immunities 
of  the  savage  —  are  needed  both  adequate 
methods,  probably  somewhat  original  in  char- 
acter, and  also  familiarity  with  the  particular 
circumstances  which  practice  alone  confers. 
In  this  also,  and  for  this  reason.  Kitchener's 
command  must  be  much  more  competent  now 
than  it  possibly  could  be  a  twelvemonth  ago. 

Some  very  bad  blunders  are  doubtless  charge- 
able against  the  management  of  British  detach- 
ments in  the  early  and  more  regular  part  of  the 
war  —  blunders  against  which  the  training  of 
the  of^cers  should  have  been  sufificient  preven- 
tion ;  but  I  cannot  see  so  much  discredit,  as 
the  apparent  loss  of  prestige  would  imply,  in 
the  mere  fact  that  a  final  blow  has  not  yet  been 


76      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

dealt  to  the  novel  and  Irregular  resistance  now 
encountered.  The  task  is  one  historically  and 
proverbially  difficult.  I  am  not  an  expert  in 
knowledge  of  our  Indian  wars;  but  I  have 
greatly  misunderstood  what  has  been  said  and 
written,  if  the  most  successful  methods  there 
applied  have  not  been  the  joint  product  of  prac- 
tice and  of  that  species  of  mental  effort  which 
corresponds  to  invention  in  industrial  life,  —  a 
happy  thought  occurring  to  an  individual  whose 
mind  is  absorbed  in  overcoming  difficulties 
with  which  he  has  made  a  thorough  experi- 
mental acquaintance.^  The  history  of  our 
Indian  hostilities  is  not  without  its  record  of 
grave  perplexities,  of  bafflement,  or  of  occasional 
appalling  disaster;  and  in  the  present  case, 
upon  a  fair  balancing  of  achievement  against 

^To  Lord  Kitchener,  thus  pondering,  and  driven  by  experiment 
from  one  expedient  to  another,  there  came  the  solution  of  the  block- 
house system.  The  problem  before  him,  and  the  underlying  prin- 
ciple of  the  plan  adopted,  have  been  thus  described  since  the  peace. 
"  An  army  largely  immobile,"  partly  from  natural  characteristics  and 
partly  from  the  absolute  necessity  of  hovering  near  railway  lines,  to 
the  protection  of  which  it  was  tied,  "  had  to  cope  with  one  entirely 
mobile.  He  used  his  immobile  troops  to  form  artificial  frontiers  " 
(the  blockhouse  lines)  "against  which  the  enemy  could  be  driven. 
It  was  a  heavy  task,  but  he  had  found  the  solution,  and  the  Boers 
were  quick  to  recognize  the  fact.  They  saw  in  the  blockhouse  line 
and  the  drive  the  end  of  their  struggle,  which  depended  all  through 
upon  unlimited  power  of  evasion."  —  LottJofi  Times,  July  12,  1902. 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     7  7 

difficulty,  I  should  find  ground  for  increase  of 
hope  rather  than  for  diminution  of  prestige. 
The  man  in  the  street,  I  fear,  judges  differently, 
and  his  judgment  is  prestige. 

Upon  the  whole,  therefore,  while  I  can  see 
abundant  room  for  criticism  of  detail,  I  do  not 
in  the  military  record  find  cause  to  warrant 
loss  of  prestige.  The  main  defect  of  the  aver- 
agre   British   officer  —  that  he  is  not   what  the 

o 

French  call  instruit,  nor  even  disposed  to  be- 
come so  —  has  been  his  trouble  historically  and 
always  ;  and  it  is  emphasized  now  by  an  enforce- 
ment of  systematic  training  in  continental 
armies,  and  by  the  United  States  in  their  mili- 
tary academy,  with  which  the  British  authorities 
are  not  inclined  to  comply,  either  in  army  or 
navy.  The  successes  of  Great  Britain  in  other 
times  have  been  attained  under  this  disadvan- 
tage. To  meet  difficulties  as  they  arise,  instead 
of  by  foresight,  to  learn  by  hard  experience 
rather  than  by  reflection  or  premeditation,  are 
national  traits ;  just  as  is  contempt  for  consti- 
tutions which  are  made  instead  of  evolved. 
Personally,  if  I  must  choose,  I  prefer  the  knowl- 
edge given  by  experience,  the  acquirements  of 
growth    to   those    of    formulated    instruction  ; 


78      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

but  I  see  no  reason  wh}'^  one  should  exclude 
the  other,  to  the  injury  of  both.  The  British 
officer  might  possess  more  knowledge,  more 
reading,  more  grasp  of  precedent  and  principle, 
without  injuring  his  adaptability.  The  stu- 
dent's lamp  has  its  part  as  well  as  the  football 
field  or  the  cricket  ground  in  equipping  an 
officer. 

So  much  for  contemplating  the  reasonable  in- 
fluence upon  military  prestige  of  what  has  so  far 
occurred  and  now  exists  in  South  African  condi- 
tions. Upon  the  broader  question  of  present 
prestige  of  the  Empire  I  cannot  enlarge,  and 
will  limit  myself  to  a  brief  enumeration  of  exist- 
ing factors  as  they  appear  to  me,  with  an  esti- 
mate of  the  consequent  real  status  of  the  Empire 
among  the  Powers  of  the  world. 

First  among  symptoms  is  one  which,  to  my 
mind,  sfives  immeasurable  assurance  of  national 
power — the  sure  guarantee  of  prestige  —  and 
that  is  the  progress  towards  unanimity  in  the 
nation,  centring  round  the  idea  of  Imperialism, 
and  finding  an  immediate  impetus  in  the  South 
African  problem.  Whatever  the  faults  of  a 
Government,  or  the  failures  of  an  army,  a  unan- 
imous and  sustained  national  spirit  is  the  vital 


upon  the  Preslige  of  the  Bi^itish  Empire     79 

force,  of  which  prestige  is  at  best  but  the  out- 
ward sign  and  faint  reflection.  The  increase 
of  unanimity  throughout  the  Empire  is  wit- 
nessed both  by  the  movement  of  the  Colonies, 
and  by  the  rejection  of  the  disintegrating  ten- 
dency in  the  Liberal  party  by  its  younger  and 
abler  members,  to  whom  the  future  belongs. 
Imperialism  has  shown  itself  an  idea  capable  of 
quickening  national  self-consciousness,  of  be- 
stowing strength  of  purpose,  and  of  receiving- 
indefinite  expansion. 

Again,  the  sea-power  of  the  Empire  still 
stands  pre-eminent.  I  do  not  here  consider 
the  accuracy  of  the  many  allegations  made,  of 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  Government  to  main- 
tain necessary  progress.  Even  if  these  be  true, 
no  irreparable  harm  has  yet  been  done.  The 
Imperial  movement  of  the  Colonies,  in  con- 
tributing to  the  war,  is  greatly  contributive  to 
sea-power.  By  strengthening  the  Imperial 
tie,  it  gives  assurance  of  local  support  in  many 
seas  —  the  bases  —  which  sea-power  requires; 
while  the  military  effort,  and  the  experience 
gained  by  the  colonial  troops  engaged,  render 
the  defence  and  security  of  these  local  bases 
much   more    solid    than    ever   before,   because 


8o     The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

dependent  upon  men  experienced  in  warfare. 
The  foundations  are  surer. 

Again,  closely  connected  with  this  last  con- 
sideration is  the  inevitable  superior  efficiency  of 
the  army  at  large,  Imperial  as  well  as  colonial, 
consequent  on  this  protracted  experience  of  war. 
I  made  this  remark  twenty  months  ago  to  an 
American  audience,  which  I  believed  to  be 
impressed  with  the  idea  of  lost  prestige,  and 
forgetful  of  this  prolonged  warlike  practice, 
obvious  as  its  effect  upon  efficiency  should  be. 
The  comment  rests  now  on  an  even  wider 
and  firmer  basis  than  when  first  uttered.  The 
British  army,  including  colonial  contingents, 
is  to-day,  to  the  number  of  over  200,000  men,  a 
vastly  more  useful  instrument  than  it  could 
have  been  two  years  ago ;  and  this  gain  will 
last  for  at  least  a  decade,  as  a  matter  of  inter- 
national calculation,  just  as  the  disbanded  but 
tempered  forces  of  the  United  States  remained 
after  the  Civil  War. 

The  Confederation  of  the  Empire,  whatever 
shape  that  may  ultimately,  if  ever,  attain,  has 
doubtless  been  furthered,  not  hindered,  by  the 
war.  Community  of  sentiment  and  community 
of  action  have  both   been  fostered.      I   would 


up 071  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empi^'e    8 1 

not  speak  with  exaggeration,  nor  overlook  the 
immense  difficulties  in  maintaining  community 
of  interest  and  of  aim  between  political  entities 
so  widely  scattered  as  the  component  parts  of 
the  Empire.  The  work  is  one  of  time,  of  tact, 
and  labor.  I  say  only  that  the  war  has  furth- 
ered it,  and  most  justly;  for  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  British  Islands  alone  —  the 
Imperial  idea  apart  —  the  war,  so  far  from  be- 
ing selfish,  has  been  self-sacrificing.  It  is  the 
Empire,  not  the  Mother  Country,  that  is  most 
interested  in  this  comparatively  ex-centric  and 
remote  dependency. 

In  development  of  power,  both  local  and 
general,  therefore,  I  believe  the  war  to  have 
strengthened  materially  the  British  Empire, 
and  I  believe  it  has  likewise  given  renewed  and 
increased  force  to  the  spirit  of  union,  of  con- 
centration upon  great  ideals,  without  which 
material  strength  runs  to  waste.  As  an  im- 
mediate result,  I  look  for  the  establishment 
of  a  group  of  South  African  communities,  in 
which  the  English  tradition  of  law  and  liberty 
will  henceforth  prevail,  partly  by  force  of  con- 
quest, partly  because  of  its  inherent  fitness  to 

survive.     Of  this  eminent  inherent  fitness  the 

6 


82      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

United  States  of  America  gives  the  most  signal 
illustration,  because,  though  so  heterogeneous 
in  the  composition  of  its  jDopulation,  the  Eng- 
lish tongue  and  the  Ensrlish  tradition  overbear 
all  competitors,  reconcile  in  themselves  all 
rivalries,  and  sustain  themselves  in  directive 
control;  modified  doubtless,  but  not  weakened, 
by  the  variety  of  foreign  influences  to  which 
they  are  subjected. 

With  these  obvious  gains  —  development  of 
Imperial  purpose,  strengthening  of  Imperial 
ties,  broadening  and  confirming  the  bases  of 
sea-power,  increase  of  military  efficiency,  dem- 
onstrated capacity  to  send  and  to  sustain 
200,000  men  on  active  service,  for  two  years, 
6000  miles  from  home— I  do  not  believe  the 
international  prestige  of  Great  Britain  has 
sunk  in  foreign  Cabinets,  however  it  may  be 
reckoned  in  the  streets  and  cafes  of  foreio;n 
cities.  Against  this,  in  order  to  support  a 
charge  of  loss  of  prestige,  is  set  the  weary  pro- 
longation of  the  war.  Men  need  not  deceive 
themselves ;  there  is  here  no  even  balance. 
The  gain  outweighs  the  loss.  I  unfeignedly 
wish  that  the  war,  with  its  sorrows  and  sus- 
pense,  might    end;    but  it    remains    true,   sad 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     83 

though  the  argument  is,  that  the  more  com- 
pletely the  Boer  exhausts  himself  now,  the 
more  convinced  and  the  more  final  will  his 
submission  necessarily  be. 

I  have  not  thought  it  incumbent  upon  me, 
or  even  becoming,  to  enter  into  discussion  of 
the  vexed  question  concerning  the  manage- 
ment of  the  later  stage  of  the  war  by  the 
Home  Government.  The  conduct  of  a  par- 
ticular government,  like  that  of  a  particular 
general,  gives  no  assured  indication  of  national 
worth,  unless  its  ei^ciency  or  inefficiency  pro- 
ceeds, clearly  and  inevitably,  from  causes  in- 
trinsically national ;  as  from  a  close  division 
in  national  sentiment,  or  failure  in  material 
resources.  There  is  no  sign  of  such  division 
or  such  failure  at  the  present  time;  rather  the 
contrary.  Whatever  the  fault  or  merit  of  the 
present  Government,  challenged  as  I  know  it 
to  be  by  many  of  its  own  followers  as  well  as 
by  the  Opposition,  the  point  considered  in  this 
paper  is  not  the  deserts  of  a  group  of  individ- 
uals, but  the  real  power  of  the  nation,  on  which 
its  prestige  should  depend.  It  will  be  retorted 
that  this  begs  the  question,  that  the  nation 
cannot  put  forth  its  power  without  the  neces- 


84      The  Influence  of  the  South  African  War 

sary  and  adequate  instrument  which  a  Govern- 
ment is  intended  to  supply,  and  which,  it  is 
urged,  this  Government  does  not.  The  argu- 
ment, I  think,  is  exaggerated.  Governments 
may  do  more  or  less ;  they  may  impede  or 
facilitate  ;  but  they  cannot  prevent  the  exertion 
of  the  national  will.  That  they  have  not  done 
so  in  this  instance  is  assured  —  to  me  —  by 
the  very  recent  assertion,  resting  on  the  ven- 
erated authority  of  Lord  Roberts,  that  "  Lord 
Kitchener,  in  whom  we  all  have  implicit  con- 
fidence, has  never  made  one  single  demand  for 
men,  for  horses,  or  for  stores,  that  has  not  been 
immediately  complied  with."  This  result  is 
quite  compatible  with  much  error,  delay,  and 
extravagance ;  but  nevertheless  it  is  the  main 
point  secured.  The  nation  does  well  to  be 
watchful  and  exacting,  for  in  the  wretched 
plight  to  which  the  regular  party  Opposition 
is  reduced,  voluntary  organization  or  individual 
criticism  must  supply  the  corrective  of  super- 
vision, without  which  ofificials  never,  and  private 
individuals  rarely,  do  their  best;  but  when  Lord 
Roberts  can  say  what  he  has  it  is  clear  that 
much  has  been  done,  even  thouQ^h  the  most 
may  not  have  been.     Loss  of  prestige,  worth 


upon  the  Prestige  of  the  British  Empire     85 

considering,  will  come  when  the  nation  loses 
heart. 

This  article,  as  first  penned  in  November, 
1 90 1,  ended  here.  As  it  opened  with  comment 
upon  the  fundamental  primary  definition  of  the 
word  "  prestige,"  let  us  now,  nearly  a  year  later, 
recur  to  the  secondary  accepted  meaning,  as 
given  by  authorities.  "  Prestige  is  the  moral 
influence  which  past  successes,  as  the  pledge 
and  promise  of  future  ones,  breed."  The 
British  war  in  South  Africa,  esteemed  by  many 
to  be  of  doubtful  outcome  when  I  first  wrote, 
has  since  been  carried  to  a  victorious  issue.  It 
is  now  a  past  success ;  can  it  be  considered  to 
carry  pledge  and  promise  for  the  future.'*  A 
correct  answer  must  depend  upon  due  con- 
sideration of  conditions.  A  year  ago  belief  in 
the  final  result,  now  realized,  rested  upon  an 
intellectual  appreciation  of  the  decisive  facts 
then  attainable,  reinforced  by  a  reference  to  the 
historical  teaching:  of  British  warfare  in  the 
past.  Putting  aside  the  particular  merit  of 
individuals,  as  foreign  to  the  general  estimate, 
success  in  the  present  instance,  as  on  former 
occasions,  has  been  due  to  national  tenacity. 


86      The  Injliicncc  of  the  South  African  War 

and  ultimate  aptitude  to  meet  conditions  as 
they  arise,  combined  with  the  essential  justice 
of  the  national  contention.  It  has  been  gained 
despite  a  certain  degree  of  unreadiness  and 
inadequacy  at  the  outset,  which  cannot  be  pro- 
nounced wholly  excusable.  Great  Britain  has 
won,  as  she  has  before,  by  national  endurance, 
supported  by  superior  resources,  and  strength- 
ened by  the  felt  goodness  of  her  cause  around 
which  determination  could  harden.  In  these 
substantial  strong  qualities  of  national  charac- 
ter, the  foundations  of  her  prestige  are  seen  to 
be  the  same  that  they  were  a  year  ago,  and 
have  commonly  been  in  the  past.  Another 
demonstration  has  been  added ;  but  her  people 
may  hope  that  she  will  not  further  tempt  for- 
tune by  failing  to  correct  practical  deficiencies 
which  have  been  revealed. 


MOTIVES    TO    IMPERIAL 
FEDERATION 


MOTIVES    TO    IMPERIAL 
FEDERATION 

March,  1902. 

WITHIN  the  last  twenty  years  Great 
Britain  has  passed  through  two  crises 
which  should  appeal  strongly  to  the  attention 
and  intelligence  —  if  not  also  to  the  practical 
sympathy  —  of  Americans.  Not  only  have 
they  an  analogy  to  problems  we  ourselves  have 
met  and  solved  in  the  course  of  our  national 
existence,  but  the  result  to  which  they 
tend,  by  confirming  the  power  of  the  British 
Empire,  will  probably  strengthen  likewise  the 
external  policy  of  the  United  States  during  the 
next  generation.  Interest,  due  in  any  case, 
is  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  the  issue  at 
stake  has  been  the  same  in  both  these  momen- 
tous instances.  Under  all  superficial  divergen- 
ces and  misleading  appearances,  the  real  ques- 
tion about  Ireland  and  about  South  Africa  has 
been,  "  Shall  Great  Britain  exist  as  an  Empire, 


90  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

or  shall  it  fall  to  pieces  by  a  series  of  willing 
or  tolerated  secessions  ?  "  As  Joseph  said  to 
Pharaoh  concerning  the  two  visions  of  the  lean 
kine  and  the  blasted  ears,  —  the  dream  is  one. 
The  impetus  given  to  Imperial  Federation  by 
the  South  African  war,  the  striking  root 
downward  and  bearing  fruit  upward  of  the 
imperial  idea,  has  doubtless  been  immense ; 
but  the  moment  really  decisive  of  the  Em- 
pire's future  —  as  an  Empire  —  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  period  when  Mr.  Parnell's  effort 
at  disruption  obtained  the  support  of  Mr. 
Gladstone.  That  was  the  critical  instant, 
which  determined  both  that  the  conception 
should  come  to  the  birth,  and  that,  being  born, 
it  should  not  be  strangled  in  its  cradle. 

An  impressive  article  published  in  1885,  on 
the  eve  of  the  general  election  which  resulted 
in  that  disastrous  stroke  of  policy,  Mr.  Glad- 
stone's Irish  Bill,  both  foretold  its  coming  and, 
in  a  spirit  of  prophecy,  perhaps  not  fully  con- 
scious of  the  scope  of  its  utterance,  predicted 
likewise  the  inevitable  revulsion  of  the  nation 
from  a  foreign  policy  marked  by  constant 
feebleness  and  repeated  disgrace,  as  well  as 
from  an  economical  propaganda  which,  what- 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  9 1 

ever  its  possible  fitness  to  a  future  yet  distant, 
had  too  far  outrun  the  general  sentiment  of  the 
people  to  be  practicable.  The  foreign  policy 
—  summed  up  in  the  words  of  Candahar, 
Majuba,  Suakim,  Khartoum,  and  Gordon  — 
was  identified  by  the  writer  with  the  name  of 
Mr.  Gladstone ;  the  economical  programme 
with  that  of  Mr.  Chamberlain.  Neither  the 
one  nor  the  other  was  longer  acceptable.  The 
issue  indicated,  and  since  fulfilled,  was  the 
abatement  of  interest  in  internal  changes  and 
the  concentration  of  national  sentiment  upon 
external  policy. 

It  needed  only  the  announcement  of  Mr. 
Gladstone's  Irish  Bill  of  1886  to  precipitate  the 
conclusion,  for  which  men's  minds  were  already 
prepared.  The  Irish  measure,  in  form  a  matter 
of  arrangement  internal  to  the  United  King- 
dom, was  in  essence  one  of  which  the  gravest 
bearing  was  upon  external  policy;  for  in  prin- 
ciple it  involved  the  dissolution  of  the  Empire. 
It  is  to  the  undying  honor  and  distinction  of 
Mr.  Chamberlain  that  he  quickly  recognized 
the  issue,  and  decided  without  hesitation  that 
the  existence  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Empire, 
in  undiminished  power,  involved  the  interests 


92  Alotives  to  Imperial  Federation 

of  every  class  of  the  community,  and  therefore 
utterly  exceeded  in  immediate  importance  all 
projects  of  social  readjustment.  Subordinating 
to  the  general  welfare  the  objects  with  which 
he  had  been  most  closely  associated,  he  sep- 
arated himself  from  the  party  of  his  lifelong 
allegiance,  wherein  lay  the  best  hope  of  accom- 
plishing his  social  programme,  and  thenceforth 
has  given  pre-eminence  to  the  imperial  interests 
which  he  saw  threatened.  This  postponement 
of  political  objects  involved  a  sacrifice  of  per- 
sonal ambition,  to  be  appreciated  only  by  recall- 
ing the  conditions  of  that  time.  The  same 
astute  observer,  writing  but  a  year  later,  when 
the  momentous  step  had  been  taken,  derided  its 
finality.  "  Mr.  Chamberlain  is  the  obvious  suc- 
cessor of  Mr.  Gladstone  in  leadership  of  the 
democracy.  It  is  idle  to  suppose  he  would 
sacrifice  this  prospect  for  the  sake  of  taking 
a  subordinate  position  in  a  Conservative  or 
even  a  Coalition  Ministry.  Sooner  or  later  the 
logic  of  facts  must  separate  him  from  his  present 
associates.  .  .  .  His  assistance  to  Unionists 
is  welcome  as  long  as  it  lasts.  Of  its  essence, 
however,  it  is  transitory.  Mr.  Chamberlain 
will  return  to  the  Liberal  fold,  probably  at  no 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  93 

remote  date."  The  logic  of  one  great  thought, 
Imperial  Unity,  the  exclusive  leading  of  the 
single  eye,  has  falsified  these  predictions ;  but 
it  is  only  fair  to  accept  their  measurement 
of  what  Mr.  Chamberlain  surrendered  by  his 
act. 

It  is  to  be  apprehended  that  the  recent 
striking  outburst  of  blended  national  and  impe- 
rial sentiments  in  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies, 
the  display  of  unified  enthusiasm  sweeping  over 
the  various  quarters  of  the  Empire,  has  been  an 
unpleasant  surprise  to  the  world  at  large.  In 
it  has  been  recognized  the  strong  bond  of 
national  feeling,  oneness  of  origin  and  blood, 
joined  to  and  inspiring  the  imperial  conviction 
which  involves  a  fundamental  unity  of  policy. 
If,  in  the  union  of  the  two,  deed  answered  to 
word,  if  success  followed  upon  attempt,  a  power 
nothing  short  of  new  had  arisen  in  the  world. 
The  fluttering  conception  of  twenty  years  ago 
had  become  a  reality ;  incipient,  perhaps,  but 
with  what  a  possible  future !  To  this,  doubt- 
less, lias  been  due  in  great  part  the  correspond- 
ing unanimity  of  denunciation  on  the  Continent. 
An  unexpected  manifestation  of  power  and  reso- 
lution has  elicited  an  echoing  outcry  from  disap- 


94  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 


pointed  anticipation.  It  is  not  quite  thirty 
years  (1874)  since  a  foreign  naval  captain 
remarked  to  me  that  in  his  belief  England  was 
a  "  colosse  a  pieds  d'argile."  This  impression 
was  general.  The  phrase  voiced  a  wish  as 
well  as  a  thought ;  and  it  may  be  said  that 
then  there  was  much  to  justify  the  implied 
prophecy,  whether  it  took  the  shape  of  a  hope  or 
a  fear,  prompted  by  dislike  or  by  affection.  The 
tendency  of  the  great  money-getting  era  of 
trade  and  material  prosperity,  of  exclusive 
devotion  to  purely  commercial  ideas,  of  the 
prevalence  of  strictly  national,  internal,  domes- 
tic interests  over  colonial  sympathies  and  impe- 
rial ambitions,  was  then  culminating  to  its 
decline ;  and  one  looked  in  vain  for  the  appear- 
ance of  higher  aspirations  and  broader  views, 
bearing  promise  of  a  fresh  spring  to  national 
life.     A  down  grade  seemed  at  hand. 

After  the  long  supremacy  of  the  doUars- 
and-cents  standards  of  policy,  which  arose  and 
flourished  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  to  languish  and  droop  with  its  clos- 
ing decades,  experience  is  refreshed,  and  hope 
stimulated,  by  the  sight  of  two  great  peoples, 
who   speak   the   same   tongue    and   inherit   the 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  95 

same  tradition,  casting  aside  considerations  of 
mere  monetary  cost  and  abandoning  them- 
selves to  the  domination  of  a  lofty  ideal. 
This  the  United  States  did  in  1861  under  the 
tremendous  impetus  exerted  by  the  simple 
words  "  The  Union,"  which,  cherished  almost 
to  idolatry  by  the  boyhood  of  the  North  dur- 
ing preceding  generations, — as  the  writer  well 
remembers, — lifted  the  nation  to  its  feet  as  one 
man  when  disruption  threatened.  The  Union 
was  to  us  a  personification,  devotion  to  which 
probably  afforded  the  nearest  approach  to  per- 
sonal loyalty  that  the  spirit  of  our  institutions 
warrants.  Again,  although  to  a  less  degree, 
in  the  Philippines  matter,  where  no  such  com- 
manding motive  or  long  tradition  exists  to 
inspire,  there  is  nevertheless  to  be  found, 
surely  disengaging  itself  from  the  confused 
tumult  of  impressions  inevitable  upon  deci- 
sions taken  in  the  heat  of  pressing  action,  the 
deep  conviction,  widespread  among  the  people, 
that  here  is  no  mere  question  of  gain  or  loss, 
of  land  or  money,  but  one  of  moral  responsi- 
bility. Upon  us  has  devolved,  by  an  inevitable 
sequence  of  causes,  responsibility  to  our  con- 
science for  an  assemblage  of  peoples  in  moral 


96  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

and  political  childhood ;  and  responsibility 
further  to  the  world  at  large,  and  to  history, 

—  the  supreme  earthly  judge  of  men's  actions, 

—  for  our  course  in  the  emergency  thrust  upon 
us.  As  such,  the  United  States  has  accepted 
the  burden.  Its  duties  are  not  to  be  dis- 
charged by  throwing  them  overboard,  or  by 
wrapping  our  political  talent  in  a  napkin  for 
our  own  national  security  and  ease. 

The  noble  record  of  Great  Britain  in  Egypt 
during  the  past  twenty  years,  justly  considered, 
gives  inspiration  and  direction  to  our  purposes 
for  the  Philippines.  External  conditions  are 
doubtless  most  diverse ;  but,  if  the  informing 
spirit  be  the  same,  it  will  adapt  itself  to  the 
circumstances,  and  the  good-will  find  the  way 
to  manifest  itself  in  the  damp  lowlands  and 
mountains  of  the  islands  as  surely  as  in  the 
dry  Nile  Valley.  Here  the  example  has  been 
set  us  for  encouragement ;  and  to  cavilers  at 
the  integrity  of  our  purpose,  or  at  the  advantage 
of  our  efforts  to  a  subject  people,  we  have  but 
to  cite  Egypt,  which,  like  the  Philippines,  and 
but  a  few  years  before  them,  is  emerging  from 
along  period  of  oppression,  to  advance  through 
national   childhood    to    such   measure   of   self- 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  97 

administration    as    its    people    may    prove    fit 
for. 

As  regards  the  question  of  federal  union,  the 
priority  of  experience  is  reversed.  However 
great  the  difference  of  conditions  here  pre- 
sented to  the  British  Empire  and  to  America, — 
and  it  is  at  least  greater  than  the  diversity  be- 
tween the  Philippines  and  Egypt,  —  the  United 
States  has  been  first  to  find  a  solution.  The 
American  colonies  began  their  attempt  under 
the  difficulty  of  mutual  alienation,  due  to  long 
standing  tradition,  and  with  interests  differing 
probably  more  radically  than  those  which  now 
exist  between  the  several  English-speaking 
parts  of  the  British  Empire.  Despite  this 
serious  initial  obstacle,  the  thirteen  original 
States,  aided  later  by  those  afterwards  consti- 
tuted, worked  out  the  problem  of  union  through 
a  prolonged  period  of  perplexity,  anxiety,  re- 
pulsion, and  dissension.  The  final  achievement 
has  been  so  complete  that  the  men  of  to-day 
have  almost  lost  the  very  memory  of  the  ante- 
cedent traVail,  and  of  the  narrow  margin  by 
which  ruin  was  more  than  once  escaped.  Here, 
as  in  Egypt,  but  with  more  vital  issues,  there  is 
the  cheering  example  of  success;  wrung  in  this 

7 


98  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

instance  out  of  the  jaws  of  imminent  failure. 
Hence,  while  the  difference  of  circumstances 
surrounding  the  problem  of  Imperial  Federa- 
tion precludes  in  great  measure  any  advantage 
of  precedents  to  be  found  in  the  historic  path 
by  which  the  American  communities  made 
their  way  to  union,  it  may  safely  be  argued 
that,  if  the  informing  spirit  of  desire  be  present, 
the  adequate  motives  to  a  closer  imperial  bond 
recognized,  the  questions  of  form  and  method 
will  be  solved  in  the  one  case  as  they  have 
been  in  the  other.  In  both,  the  purpose  and 
end  is  the  same :  to  assure  unified,  or  imperial, 
external  action,  by  the  means  of  an  adequate 
organ,  common  to  all,  while  preserving  the  in- 
dependence of  the  several  parts  in  their  in- 
ternal affairs.  Whatever  the  particular  solution 
appropriate  to  either,  both  present  the  diflfi- 
culty  of  reconciling  in  practical  working  two 
principles,  which  in  terms  appear  contradictory, 
whereas  in  fact  they  may  prove  complementary. 
Questions  of  such  difficult  character  do  not 
recommend  themselves  to  practical  mankind 
as  political  conundrums,  in  answering  which 
the  satisfaction  of  the  intellect  is  its  own  sufifi- 
cient  reward.     They  are  not  accepted  by  men 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  99 

as  recreations,  but  are  forced  upon  them  by 
urgency.  They  must  supply  their  own  ade- 
quate motive,  and  propose  their  own  reasonable 
end,  or  they  receive  no  attention.  Only  by 
motives  most  grave,  by  danger  most  pressing, 
by  inconveniences  serious  in  the  present  and 
threatening  to  be  intolerable  in  the  future, 
were  the  American  States  first  driven  into  a 
combination,  imperfect  and  often  grudging. 
From  this,  still  under  the  pressure  of  renewed 
urgency,  they  advanced  into  a  union  more  per- 
fect in  form  but  still  sadly  lacking  in  unity, 
either  of  understanding  or  sentiment,  until, 
finally,  to  avert  dismemberment,  physical  force 
itself  had  to  be  exerted  by  those  who  had  come 
not  only  to  believe  in  the  Union,  but  by  long 
unquestioning  devotion  to  love  it  supremely. 
Mutual  jealousy,  quite  as  much  as  mutual 
love,  characterized  the  first  efforts  of  the  States 
at  association.  As  feeling  grew  kinder  and 
warmer,  divergence  of  interest  and  of  political 
ideals  still  tended  to  preserve  and  to  promote 
the  elements  of  repulsion,  as  was  shown  in  the 
debates  on  the  acceptance  of  the  present  Con- 
stitution, and  in  many  incidents  of  checkered 
national   life    through   two  generations.     Ulti- 


lOO         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

mately,  translated  into  broader  action,  from 
individual  States  to  groups  of  States,  the  last 
manifestation  of  the  disruptive  tendency  took  on 
a  sectional  form,  upon  a  scale  so  large  that  the 
ensuins:  war  was  in  character  rather  international 
than  "civil,"  as  it  has  been  commonly  styled. 

With    one  exception,  there  does   not    exist 
among  the  different  bodies  which  should  com- 
pose   a  federal    Empire  of  Great   Britain    the 
traditional     alienation     which    hampered     the 
movement  of  the  American  States  in  their  first 
efforts     towards    union.       The    exception,    of 
course,  is   Ireland.     Practically  regarded,  it  is 
impossible  for  a  military  man,  or  a  statesman 
with    appreciation    of    military    conditions,  to 
look  at  the  map  and  not  perceive  that  the  am- 
bition of  Irish  separatists,  if  realized,  would  be 
even  more  threatening  to  the  national  life  of 
Great  Britain  than  the  secession  of  the  South 
was  to  that  of  the  American  Union.     It  would 
be   deadlier,  also,  to  imperial  aspirations ;  for 
Ireland,  by  geographical  position,  lies    across 
and    controls     the    communications    of    Great 
Britain  with  all   the  outside   world,   save  only 
that  considerable,  but   far  from   preponderant, 
portion  which  borders  the  North  Sea  and  the 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  loi 

Baltic.  Independent  and  hostile,  it  would 
manacle  Great  Britain,  which  at  present  is,  and 
for  years  to  come  must  remain,  by  long  odds 
the  most  powerful  member  of  the  federation,  if 
that  take  form.  The  Irish  question,  therefore, 
is  vitally  important,  not  to  Great  Britain  only, 
but  to  the  colonies.  The  considerations  that 
swayed  the  mind  of  the  Union  in  the  Civil 
War  apply  with  peculiar  force  to  the  connec- 
tion between  Great  Britain  and  Ireland.  And 
let  it  be  distinctly  noted  that  the  geographical 
relation  of  Ireland  to  Great  Britain  imposes  as 
indispensable  a  political  relation  which  would 
be  fatal  to  any  scheme  of  federation  between 
the  mother  country  and  the  remote  great  col- 
onies. The  legislative  supremacy  of  the  British 
parliament,  against  the  assertion  of  which  the 
American  colonists  revolted,  and  which  to-day 
would  be  found  intolerable  in  exercise  in  Can- 
ada and  Australia,  cannot  be  yielded  in  the 
case  of  an  island  where  independent  action 
might  very  well  be  attended  with  fatal  conse- 
quences to  its  partner.  The  instrument  for 
such  action,  in  the  shape  of  an  independent 
parliament,  could  not  safely  be  trusted  even  to 
avowed  friends. 


I02  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

The  constant  lightening  of  control  by  the 
mother  country,  and  the  concession  of  substan- 
tial self-government,  have  removed  from  the 
problem  before  Great  Britain  and  her  colonics 
the  initial  disadvantage  under  which  the  Amer- 
ican States  drew  together ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  idea  of  Imperial  Federation  long 
awaited  the  impulse  which  they  received,  first 
from  a  common  extreme  danger,  and  afterwards 
from  their  close  contact  with  one  another, 
which  emphasized  the  general  injury  that 
mutual  independence  and  inconsiderate  action 
were  daily  causing.  It  is  not  fanciful  to  say 
that,  as  the  common  dangers  to  the  American 
colonies  from  the  power  of  Great  Britain,  which 
was  to  them  irresistible  unless  they  combined, 
supplied  the  first  motive  to  effectual  association  ; 
so  the  needed  impulse,  urgent  if  not  imperative, 
was  found  by  the  members  of  the  British  Em- 
pire in  the  danger  and  threatened  oppression 
of  one  of  their  number  by  alien  blood.  The 
feeling  of  nationality,  the  sentiment  of  one 
blood  and  one  political  tradition,  wrought  pow- 
erfully in  support  of  imperial  action  in  South 
Africa ;  and  it  is  a  commonplace  that  action 
intensifies  sentiment. 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  103 

When  the  American  colonists  united  in  form, 
however  defective,  they  had  made  a  large  prac- 
tical step  towards  the  sentiment  of  union,  which 
as  a  constraining  force  is  even  stronger  than 
interest.  In  that  which  has  been  well  named 
"  the  critical  period  "  of  American  history,  be- 
tween the  War  of  Independence  and  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  the  love  of  the  Union 
showed  itself  forcibly  in  the  utterances  even  of 
those  who  dreaded  union  on  the  terms  proposed. 
When  we  consider  the  narrow  majorities  by 
which  these  were  accepted,  it  is  easy  to  believe 
that  only  the  realization  in  act  of  the  first  union, 
that  of  the  Confederacy,  made  possible  the 
second, —  the  federal  Union.  When  the  British 
colonies  and  the  mother  country,  three  years 
ago,  rose  together  in  defence  of  a  threatened 
brother  and  child,  translating  into  action  an 
idea  nascent  but  as  yet  weak  in  its  grasp  of 
men's  affections,  they  also  advanced  a  first 
stage,  the  most  important  stage,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  a  further  unity,  under  such  ultimate 
form  as  their  particular  relations  may  de- 
mand. The  analogy  of  the  two  cases  is  per- 
fectly real.  The  idea  of  union  was  not  new 
to    Americans    before    their    Revolution.     On 


I04         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

the  contrary,  its  advantages  were  obvious ; 
but  all  attempts  prompted  by  manifest  in- 
terest fell  abortive,  until  pressure  was  sup- 
plied by  the  Stamp  Act  and  its  train  of 
incidents.  The  legislation  of  the  Transvaal, 
supplemented  by  the  Afrikander  Bond,  has 
fulfilled  the  same  ofBce  in  the  history  of  Impe- 
rial Federation  ;  unless,  indeed,  a  prior  claim 
to  that  honor  be  established  for  Mr.  Parnell. 
Not  the  conception  nor  yet  tentative  theories 
were  wanting ;  but  languid  inclination  had  to 
be  quickened  into  stirring  life  by  contact  with 
pressing  occasion- 
Two  successive  dangers,  Ireland  and  South 
Africa,  have  thus  contributed  to  the  onward 
movement  of  imperialism  in  Great  Britain. 
They  have  indicated  a  need  and  furnished  a 
motive.  The  first  gave  birth  to  aspiration,  con- 
scious and  definite,  towards  a  higher  form  of 
imperial  development;  corresponding  in  anal- 
ogy, though  by  no  means  necessarily  in  outward 
resemblance,  to  the  "more  perfect  union "  of 
the  once  loosely  combined  American  States. 
The  second  emphasized  the  wisdom  of  such  a 
policy  by  a  concrete  example  of  its  advantages. 
Aspiration,  having  found  its  opportunity,  was 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  1 05 

translated  into  action ;  and  action  in  turn  rein- 
forces and  stimulates  aspiration  by  demonstra- 
tion, and  by  its  powerful  effect  upon  sentiment, 
the  great  motive  force  of  humanity.  Happily, 
too,  for  the  general  impulse,  the  illustration  of 
advantage  has  been  afforded  in  one  of  die  great 
colonies,  where  national  self-existence,  entire 
independence  of  outside  control,  and  exemption 
from  the  exposure  attendant  upon  an  imperial 
war,  might  have  a  preponderant  hold  upon 
men's  minds.  The  specific  utility  of  the  impe- 
rial connection  to  the  large  secondary  members 
was  shown ;  for  the  menace  to  one  of  them 
came  from  a  State  which,  though  in  form  in- 
ternal to  the  Empire,  was  in  fact  and  power 
external  as  well  as  alien. 

Similar  conditions  may  well  arise  elsewhere, 
with  extreme  increase  of  danger  to  one  of  the 
great  colonies,  if  severed  by  independence  from 
the  support  of  the  British  navy.  Canada, 
doubtless,  whatever  she  might  lose  otherwise, 
would  find  territorial  immunity  in  the  policy  of 
the  United  States,  avowed  in  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  —  as  applicable  to  her  as  to  South 
America;  but  to  South  Africa,  Australia,  and 
New  Zealand,  local  difficulties,  —  such  as  those 


1 06         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

of  the  Transvaal,  and  of  New  Guinea  twenty 
years  ago,  —  would,  in  the  absence  of  the  impe- 
rial bond,  assume  a  very  different  aspect  if 
incurred  with  a  powerful  European  naval  State. 
These  instances  also  bring  into  conspicuous 
evidence  the  general  truth  that  sea  power,  the 
material  strength  and  bond  of  an  Empire  the 
component  parts  of  which  are  separated  by 
thousands  of  miles  of  ocean,  is  equally  essen- 
tial to  the  individual  security  of  the  several 
members.  Imperial  Federation,  in  action,  will 
manifest  itself  pre-eminently  along  ocean  and 
naval  lines. 

At  present  the  large  colonies,  while  retain- 
ing their  hold  upon  the  support  of  the  Empire, 
to  the  power  of  which  they  in  turn  can  con- 
tribute much,  substantially  control  all  that 
relates  to  their  internal  affairs.  Taxation, 
regulation  of  commerce,  the  purse  and  the 
sword,  are  in  their  own  hands.  Were  they  to 
become  immediately  independent,  no  jar  would 
be  felt  in  the  continuance  of  the  local  adminis- 
tration. The  appointment  of  the  governors 
by  the  Crown,  may,  if  choice  be  judicious, 
materially  help  to  maintain  the  reality,  as  it 
does  the  form,  of   political   attachment  to   the 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  107 

mother  country ;  but  the  actual  government 
is  parliamentary,  and  assumption  of  independ- 
ence would  not  necessarily  involve  any  serious 
modification  of  institutions.  Further,  in  two 
out  of  the  three  large  aggregations  of  colonial 
communities,  in  Canada  and  in  Australia,  there 
exists  now  a  federal  compact,  by  which  bodies 
but  a  few  years  ago  politically  separate,  linked 
only  by  common  allegiance  to  Great  Britain, 
are  united  into  one  State.  British  South 
Africa  still  remains  an  assemblage  of  colonies, 
with  particular  local  and  domestic  difficulties 
of  their  own,  on  which  it  is  inopportune  here 
to  enlarge. 

These  are  the  present  political  conditions  of 
the  principal  factors  of  which  an  Imperial 
Federation,  if  realized,  will  be  composed.  It 
seems  inevitable,  however,  that,  when  the  re- 
sistance of  the  Boers  shall  have  ended,  some 
form  of  union  will  be  requisite  to  insure  the 
dominance  of  British  political  ideas  and  tradi- 
tions throughout  the  mass  of  South  African 
colonists;  for  in  such  community  of  sentiment 
a  federal  union  of  the  Empire  must  find  the 
homo2:eneousness  without  which  it  will  be  but 
a  vain    word.       The    term    nation,    it    is    said, 


I  oS         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

applies  primarily  to  community  of  blood  ;  but 
I  question  whether  a  closer  bond  is  not  to  be 
found  in  inherited  acceptance,  inborn  and  in- 
bred, of  the  same  political  ideas,  fundamental 
laws,  and  habits  of  thought,  which  regulate  the 
relations  and  intercourse  between  man  and 
man,  and  constitute  congeniality.  If  to  these 
a  common  tongue  be  added,  environment  will 
have  done  more  to  promote  unity  than  it  is  in 
the  power  of  mere  blood  to  effect. 

It  may  fairly  be  questioned  whether  the 
phrase  Imperial  Federation  is  not  something 
of  a  misnomer,  altogether  too  broad  in  its  im- 
plication. It  has  obtained  currency ;  and  in 
a  general  way  is  understood  with  as  much  pre- 
cision as  is  perhaps  attainable  in  the  present 
inchoate  stage  of  the  idea  involved.  Are  all 
parts  of  the  present  Empire  to  be  admitted  as 
component  States  in  the  Federation }  Take 
India  as  the  crucial  instance,  on  account  of 
its  extent  and  population,  extremely  important 
elements  in  state  existence;  is  its  constitution, 
racial,  social,  and  political,  such  that  it  could 
be  admitted  at  the  present  time  as  one  of 
several  self-governing  communities,  under  the 
federation  of  which  the  affairs  of  the  Federal 


Motives  to  Lnpcrial  Federation  1 09 

State,  the  interests  common  to  all,  and  the 
external  policy  of  the  whole,  could  be  adminis- 
tered? Can  India  be  properly  described  as  a 
State?  Without  statehood  a  community  can 
be  a  member  of  an  Empire,  as  a  dependency, 
but  it  can  scarcely  be  a  member  of  a  federation. 
Logomachies,  when  nothing  more,  are  un- 
profitable ;  but  in  attempting  the  solution  of 
such  a  problem,  difficult  both  on  the  intellectual 
and  the  practical  sides,  accuracy  of  expression 
demands  closeness  of  thought,  and  is  rewarded 
by  increased  clearness  of  vision  as  to  the  exact 
nature  of  the  object  desired.  I  do  not  propose 
myself  to  pursue  the  interrogatory  I  have  sug- 
gested; but  apparently  the  aim  of  those  who 
desire  federation,  the  importance  of  which  is 
to  me  undeniable,  should  not  be  so  much  a 
federated  Empire  —  is  not  that  a  contradiction 
in  terms?  —  as  a  federal  State,  or  kingdom, 
composed  of  some  half-dozen  principal  mem- 
bers, substantially  homogeneous  in  their  prin- 
ciples of  government.  To  this  system  would 
remain  attached  a  huge  dominion  of  subordi- 
nate communities,  differing  much  between 
themselves  in  size  and  importance,  as  well  as 
in  blood,  institutions,  and  social  development. 


1 1  o         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

and  linked  together  only  by  the  common  rule 
of  the  Federal  State,  as  they  now  are  by  that 
of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  Federal  King- 
dom and  the  dependencies,  taken  together,  and 
in  their  respective  relations  of  governing  and 
governed,  would  compose  the  Empire. 

It  is  such  rule  and  control  over  peoples  not 
yet  fully  fitted  to  go  alone  that  in  strictness 
of  phrase  constitute  Empire.  Empire  is  not 
a  particular  form  of  government.  It  is  a  fact, 
independent  of  particular  methods.  The  Re- 
public of  the  United  States,  already  a  federal 
State,  has  found  itself  by  the  impulse  and 
sequence  of  events  in  just  this  position  of 
Empire ;  charged  with  the  responsibility  of 
subordinate  communities  which  it  would  be 
impossible  now  to  admit  to  statehood  in  the 
federation.  Against  this  condition  of  empire 
—  actual  and  inevitable  —  from  which  there 
has  been,  and  is,  no  escape  at  once  honorable 
and  safe,  a  small  minority  of  Americans  have 
revolted  violently.  They  regard  it  as  destruc- 
tive of  cherished  formulas,  political  maxims, 
which  are  identified  with  and  accurately  ex- 
press the  principles  of  our  own  national  exist- 
ence and  growth,  and  therefore  are  assumed, 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  1 1 1 

inconsequently,  to  apply  equally  to  races  en- 
tirely different  in  antecedents  and  in  present 
development.  Words  and  phrases,  however, 
war  hopelessly  against  facts  with  which  they 
are  inconsistent;  nor  is  there  any  more  curious 
instance  than  this  of  veritable  and  futile  I02:- 
omachy.  To  more  practical  Americans,  thus 
committed  despite  themselves  to  imperialism 
after  federation,  it  is  impressive  to  watch  a 
converse  process ;  to  see  a  consolidated  king- 
dom, a  unified  State,  possessed  of  an  already 
existing  Empire,  feeling  its  way  to  perpetuation 
and  intension  of  power  by  means  of  federation 
with  those  members  of  its  present  empire  which 
are  homogeneous  to  itself. 

Imperialism,  the  extension  of  national  au- 
thority over  alien  communities,  is  a  dominant 
note  in  the  world-politics  of  to-day.  Compara- 
tively a  newcomer,  it  already  contends  for  pre- 
eminence with  commercial  ambition,  to  which 
also  it  ministers.  This  out-reaching  of  an 
imperialistic  arm  by  all  the  greater  nations, 
whether  voluntary  or  compelled  by  circum- 
stances, constitutes  and  summarizes  the  motive 
to  a  closer  union  than  that  which  now  exists 
between  the  members  of  the  British    Empire. 


1 1 2  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

In  the  past,  Ireland  and  the  Transvaal  have 
given  impulsion ;  the  joresent  and  the  future 
have  further  reason,  no  less  imperious.  The 
conditions  have  ceased  under  which  inde- 
pendence might  conceivably  be  more  advan- 
tageous to  the  larger  colonies.  If  ever  true,  it 
is  no  longer  so  that  the  colonial  tie  brings 
them  no  compensative  advantage  for  exposure 
in  war.  They  are  now  surrounded  by  ambitions 
and  confronted  by  navies  which  till  recently 
did  not  exist.  Once  war  meant  to  them  only 
incidental  injury;  now  it  may  well  mean  per- 
manent mutilation  to  a  colony  thrown  by  in- 
dependence upon  its  own  resources.  Not 
now,  if  ever,  much  less  now  than  ever  before, 
can  colonial  interests  be  viewed  as  separate 
from  the  politics  of  Europe  and  America.  In 
peace  as  in  war,  in  peace  to  avert  war,  or  to 
stay  trespass  which  armed  power  alone  can 
restrain,  each  colony  now  needs  the  strong  arm 
of  the  mother  country's  fleet  to  sustain  its  local 
strength.  According  to  the  circumstances, 
such  support  may  be  given  either  immediately 
in  colonial  waters,  or  by  diversion,  in  Europe 
or  elsewhere,  keeping  the  enemy's  battleships 
remote.     In  one  way  or  the  other  it  is  indis- 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  113 

pensable.  With  it  the  colony  will  be  —  not 
invulnerable,  perhaps,  but  —  invincible;  with- 
out it,  immunity  can  be  insured  only  by  the 
maintenance  of  a  local  navy  approaching  equal- 
ity with  those  of  Europe. 

The  greater  European  powers  are  now  colo- 
nially  present  in  several  quarters  of  the  globe, 
and  there  renew  through  their  colonies  the 
contact  and  collision  of  interests  which  have 
marked  European  history.  The  histories  of 
Australasia  and  South  Africa,  possibly  of  Can- 
ada also,  are  yet  to  make.  Colonial  jealousies 
in  turn  are  transmitted  back  to  the  mother 
countries,  and  there  give  rise  to  diplomatic 
friction  perhaps  more  dangerous,  certainly 
more  frequent,  than  do  questions  purely  Euro- 
pean. In  the  latter,  rulers  meet  facts  of  terri- 
torial tenure  so  founded  in  popular  acceptance 
and  mutual  jealousies  as  to  give  little  expec- 
tation of  facile  modification  by  resort  to  war. 
In  newer  countries,  as  the  history  of  North 
America  witnesses,  the  undetermined  condi- 
tions which  exist,  and  the  resultant  unrest  in 
men's  minds,  predispose  colonists  to  jealousies 
which  readily  find  or  give  provocation ;  and 
strife  is  promoted  by  the  comparative  ease  with 


1 1 4         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

which  great  territories  may  change  masters 
through  the  fortune  of  war,  as  Canada  and 
India,  for  instance,  passed  from  France  to 
Great  Britain  in  the  eighteenth  century.  In 
our  own  day,  the  political  future  of  the  vast 
tract  known  as  British  South  Africa  is  being 
decided  by  a  war  that  has  found  its  origin  in 
colonial  friction,  but  to  the  successful  issue  of 
which  imperial  intervention  and  sea  power 
were  essential.  The  consequences  to  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies  of  failure  in  this  case, 
and  the  possibilities  inherent  in  the  proximity 
of  German  East  and  Southwest  Africa,  illus- 
trate further  the  contingencies  with  which  the 
present  and  the  future  of  the  British  Empire 
will  have  to  deal. 

This  reliance  of  the  colonies  upon  the 
mother  nation  finds  its  correlative  in  the  fact 
that  European  States  in  turn  rest  upon  their 
colonies  for  maintenance  in  necessary  activities. 
They  can  no  longer  extend  freely  within  their 
own  continent,  nor  there  find  adequate  markets 
for  their  ever  increasing  production ;  yet,  in 
order  that  they  may  securely  expand  elsewhere, 
they  must  have  local  support  in  the  several 
quarters  whither  their   energies    reach.     This 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  1 1 5 

interaction  of  mother  countries  and  colonies, 
their  reciprocal  dependence  and  importance, 
are  decisive  facts,  to  which  development  and 
organization  should  be  s^iven.  For  local  se- 
curity,  or  for  the  assertion  of  external  rights  or 
interests,  the  colonies  cannot  as  yet  dispense 
with  the  material  force  of  the  home  govern- 
ment. Without  it  they  are  unequal  to  a  con- 
flict, necessarily  in  the  main  naval,  with  any 
one  of  three  or  four  foreign  nations  whose 
colonial  possessions  are  near  them.  A  Euro- 
pean fleet,  on  the  other  hand,  must  rely  upon 
local  bases  of  action  far  more  than  in  the  days 
when  coal  renewal  was  not  a  question.  For 
this,  isolated  fortified  stations,  like  Bermuda 
and  Gibraltar,  may  be  most  useful  from  unique 
geographical  situation ;  but  in  intrinsic  value 
they  do  not  compare  with  positions  which  have 
behind  them  a  loyal  continent,  with  extensive 
social  and  commercial  organization,  such  as 
Canada,  Australia,  and  South  Africa  afford. 

This  reciprocal  service  and  utility  constitute 
the  chief  general  and  common  interest  in  which 
the  motive  to  Imperial  Federation  at  present 
lies.  It  is  not  alone,  but  it  is  paramount,  and 
will,  I  think,  be  found  to  embrace  all  the  many 


1 1 6         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

minor  interests  which  now,  and  in  peace,  tend 
to  union;  for  it  defends  them,  and  in  defending 
perpetuates.  It  is  essentially  an  interest  of 
general  defence  imposed  by  novel  and  growing 
world-conditions.  It  must  be  recognized  as 
covering,  not  only  the  local  welfare  of  each  and 
all  the  parts,  but  also  the  communications  be- 
tween them,  chiefly  by  sea,  which  may,  and  in 
large  measure  do,  lie  remote  from  any  one  of 
the  federation.  The  several  members,  and  the 
highways  between  them,  together  make  one 
whole,  to  the  maintenance  of  which  each  even 
now  contributes.  The  object  of  federation  is 
to  promote  the  security  of  this  imperial  system 
and  its  development  on  firmer  lines.  To  the 
general  acceptance  of  this  fact  of  a  supreme 
common  interest  must  be  added  on  all  hands  a 
hearty  disposition  to  subordinate  local  interests 
to  the  general  welfare,  when  they  clash.  Just 
here,  of  course,  arises  the  difficulty  of  realizing 
any  federation,  especially  in  its  early  stages ; 
later,  like  everything  possessed  of  inherent 
usefulness,  federation  gains  strength  by  its  hold 
upon  men's  affections.  The  difficulty  is  very 
real,  for  not  only  does  each  member  naturally 
exaggerate  its  own  claims,  but  it  also  tends  to 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  1 1  7 

disregard  the  needs  of  others,  of  which  it  has 
not  immediate  experience.  Out  of  touch,  out 
of  mind,  is  the  evil  genius  of  all  federative 
efforts,  to  be  expelled  only  by  the  superior 
influence  of  a  dominating  affection  for  the  tie 
of  union,  through  experience  of  its  benefits. 

In  the  order  of  logical  sequence,  federation 
finds  its  orisjin  and  motive  force  in  a  common 
interest,  which  is  the  first  impulse  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  desired  object.  The  next  step  is  to 
recognize  clearly  what  is  this  object,  this  goal 
of  attainment,  by  reaching  which  the  admitted 
interest  shall  be  subserved.  The  object,  I  sup- 
pose, is  to  provide  the  several  members  with 
an  organism,  an  instrument  common  to  all, 
which  shall  be  specifically  efficient  in  the  main- 
tenance of  the  common  interests,  and  inopera- 
tive towards  strictly  individual  concerns.  This 
object  is  loosely  styled  Imperial  Federation, 
but  its  particular  form  and  the  method  of 
attainment  are  yet  indeterminate.  The  form 
of  an  instrument,  and  the  method  of  its  fabri- 
cation, though  dictated  by  the  use  for  which  it 
is  designed,  are  in  process  distinct  from  it. 
The  States  of  the  American  Union,  for  example, 
having    recognized    certain  common   interests, 


ii8         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

formed  the  common  object  of  making  a  special 
provision  for  the  care  of  those  specific  interests 
and  of  none  others.  The  particular  method, 
—  adapted  subsequently  to  the  recognition  of 
interest  and  object,  —  was  a  central  govern- 
ment fully  equipped  with  executive,  legislative, 
and  judicial  functions.  This  form  suited  them, 
but  most  probably  may  not  suit  the  conditions 
of  the  British  Empire,  the  members  of  which 
at  present  seem  in  the  position  of  having  rec- 
ognized, somewhat  imperfectly,  a  community 
of  interest.  Thence  has  arisen  a  desire,  vague 
and  somewhat  feeble,  for  an  object,  an  instru- 
ment, they  see  not  yet  just  what,  to  which 
the  common  interest  may  be  solely  intrusted. 
When  minds  are  definitely  settled  on  these  two 
points,  that  they  have  the  interest  and  need 
the  instrument,  thinking  men  will  sooner  or 
later  evolve  methods.  In  a  recent  excursion 
into  that  realm  of  unfulfilled  prophecy,  the 
magazines  of  twenty  years  ago,  I  found  affirmed 
the  hopelessness  of  Australian  federation.  Fol- 
lowing by  a  few  numbers,  perhaps  elicited  by 
this,  Sir  Henry  Parkes  stated  that  all  the  more 
thoughtful  men  in  Australia  had  thought  out 
in  one  form  or  another  the  question  of  federa- 


Motives  to  Imperiat  Federation  1 1 9 

tion.  The  result  in  Australia  is  now  before  us. 
Imperial  Federation  is  doubtless  a  problem 
very  different  in  kind,  but  not  necessarily  more 
hopeless.  The  need  being  recognized,  individ- 
uals will  frame  methods,  from  the  discussion 
of  which  feasible  measures  will  result.  Interest 
is  the  foundation  of  the  whole;  the  object  is 
the  building  to  be  raised  thereon,  the  plan  of 
which  depends  upon  the  needs  of  those  who 
shall  use  it.  The  interest,  again,  is  self- 
existent;  whether  men  like  it  or  not,  there  it 
is;  the  object  —  union  in  some  form  —  is  a 
matter  of  voluntary  acceptance  and  purposeful 
effort  on  the  part  of  those  interested.  The 
method  by  which  the  object  is  to  be  attained  is 
the  last  in  the  mental  processes. 

The  contrivance  of  methods  requires  close 
detailed  knowledge  of  the  political  conditions 
of  the  several  parts,  to  be  attained  only  by 
prolonged  personal  contact.  A  foreigner  of 
reasonable  modesty  will  here  forbear  sug- 
gestion, but  may  with  less  presumption  con- 
sider some  of  the  obvious  circumstances  which 
make  the  object  more  or  less  desirable,  and 
the  methods  of  its  attainment  more  or  less 
intricate. 


1 20         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 


From  the  wide  dispersion  of  the  principal 
members  it  is  evident  that  each  one,  by  acqui- 
escing in  any  federal  bond,  enters  into  such 
new  relations  with  its  fellows  as  involve  a 
policy  external  to  itself,  additional  to  that 
already  existing  towards  distinctly  foreign  na- 
tions. Internal  affairs  remain  in  the  hands  of 
each  one;  foreign  relations  continue  unaltered; 
but  superimposed  upon  both  come  relations  to 
one  another  on  the  part  of  communities  geo- 
graphically far  apart,  and  heretofore  practically 
severed,  save  for  the  loose  tie  now  uniting 
them  to  the  mother  country.  These  relations 
are  new  and  are  external ;  their  maintenance 
involves  an  established  politic  action  —  policy 
—  distinctly  external.  Moreover,  whatever  the 
nature  of  the  federal  bond,  there  is  conceded 
to  it  a  certain  amount  of  the  virtually  entire 
independence  previously  enjoyed.  This  will 
be  true  of  Great  Britain  as  well  as  of  the 
colonies.  At  the  present  writing,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  federal  union,  the  mother  country 
has  entire  management  of  the  foreign  policy 
of  the  Empire.  Concern  for  the  interests  of 
the  colonies,  regard  to  their  possible  action  in 
case  of  serious  discontent  with  particular  meas- 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  1 2 1 

ures,  certainly  and  necessarily  modify  the  de- 
cisions of  the  British  Cabinet.  In  this  way  the 
colonies  possess  influence;  but  influence  is 
different  from  power,  less  assured  in  exercise, 
and  less  dignified  in  recognition.  Colonial  in- 
terests, as  affected  by  foreign  relations,  not  only 
are  not  in  the  hands  of  the  colonists,  but  they 
have  no  constitutional  voice  in  determining 
them.  In  this  chiefly  their  dependency  now 
consists ;  and  Sir  Henry  Parkes,  whose  ideal 
of  Australian  independence  was  not  severance 
from  the  Empire,  but  entrance  upon  a  due 
share  in  the  government  of  a  united  Empire, 
avowed  his  conviction  that  there  was  no  pos- 
sibility of  permanent  contentment  with  the 
status  of  dependency.  Deprecating  separate 
independence,  he  defined  the  only  alternative 
to  be  "  sharing  on  equal  terms  in  all  the  glory 
of  the  Empire."  The  precision  of  this  phrase 
is  in  one  respect  noteworthy.  It  does  not 
demand  an  equal  share,  but  a  share  "  on  equal 
terms."  This  not  only  admits,  but  prescribes, 
that  the  power  constitutionally  exercised  by 
each  member  shall  bear  some  proportion  to 
the  strength  contributed  by  it  to  the  whole. 
Otherwise   there  is  no  equality. 


122  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

Here,  apparently,  whatever  the  method 
adopted,  there  will  have  to  be  concession  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain.  Constitutional  re- 
straint upon  her  present  unlimited  control  of 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Empire,  by  some  clear 
voting  power  on  the  part  of  the  other  mem- 
bers, would  seem  an  inevitable  concomitant  of 
federation.  In  return,  evidently,  the  colonies 
by  acquiring  a  voice  in  the  determination  of 
foreign  policy  would  incur  a  proportionate  ob- 
ligation to  bear  the  burdens  necessary  to  its 
enforcement.  In  place  of  the  purely  volun- 
tary and  unregulated  assistance  now  given, 
there  must  be  accepted  a  compulsory  and  de- 
terminate contribution  to  the  general  defence. 
The  amounts  may  be  fixed  at  the  first  by  an 
agreement  to  which  all  the  parties  may  be 
voluntary  participants  ;  but,  unless  the  federa- 
tion is  to  be  periodically  renewable  at  choice, 
—  a  most  unsatisfactory  arrangement,  —  its 
terms  must  provide  the  means  for  readjust- 
ment of  obligations,  as  the  several  parties  ad- 
vance in  strength,  at  rates  probably  unequal. 
This  is,  in  effect,  entrusting  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion to  a  central  organ  established  by  the  federal 
Constitution.     Unless  acceptance  of  this  reap- 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  i  2  3 

portionment  of  burdens,  as  provided  for  by  the 
terms  of  federation,  is  obligatory  upon  every 
member,  the  federation  carries  in  its  constitu- 
tion the  seeds  of  decay.  It  is  doomed  from 
its  birth ;  for  not  only  is  each  member  at  lib- 
erty to  withdraw,  but  the  sense  of  that  liberty 
will  continually  sap  the  sentiment  for  union 
which  supplies  the  spirit  of  federation,  as  mu- 
tual interest  does  its  body. 

We  meet  here  clearly  an  initial  diflRculty  in 
the  inequality  of  population  and  resources 
among  the  members  of  the  supposed  federa- 
tion. I  assume  that  these  would  be  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  the  Aus- 
tralian Commonwealth,  New  Zealand,  and  the 
group  of  South  African  colonies,  as  yet  un- 
combined.  These,  at  least,  would  be  the  prin- 
cipal pillars  of  the  federated  Empire.  Among 
them  the  United  Kingdom  is  now  so  greatly 
preponderant,  upon  any  ordinary  basis  of  com- 
parison, as  to  outweigh  all  the  others  put 
together.  As  in  the  case  of  the  province  of 
Holland  amono;  the  seven  United  Netherlands, 
this  is  in  effect  a  cohesive  force  now,  but  it 
evidently  introduces  a  grave  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  formal  federation.     Shall   the   colonies 


1 24  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

put  themselves  under  bonds  to  any  central 
body,  in  which  their  total  voice  is  outweighed 
by  the  vote  of  the  home  country  ?  Could 
Great  Britain  accept  an  arrangement  like  that 
of  the  first  American  confederacy,  where  each 
State,  large  and  small,  had  one  vote  ?  Is  there 
any  feasible  combination  of  these  two  alterna- 
tives, such  as  is  to-day  presented  by  the  national 
le2:islature  of  the  United  States  ? 

It  is  needless  to  insist  upon  the  practical 
dififtculty  as  to  method.  Evidently,  to  over- 
come it,  motive  must  be  strong.  We  must 
fall  back  upon  the  common  interest  which 
points  the  way  to  the  common  object,  leaving 
to  the  ingenuity  of  those  directly  concerned, 
or  to  evolution,  —  perhaps  to  both,  —  the  de- 
termination of  means.  The  common  interest 
demands  increased  mutual  support  throughout 
the  Empire,  in  view  of  the  new  conditions  of 
the  world  which  have  transferred  the  rivalries 
and  the  needs  of  Europe  to  colonial  and  other 
foreign  regions.  The  object  is  to  reach  some 
working  arrangement,  by  which  the  several 
contributions  of  the  various  parts  of  the  Em- 
pire to  the  general  support  and  defence  may 
be    not  only   determined     but    enforced.       In 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation         125 

peace  things  may  drift  along  as  they  are ; 
but  Imperial  Federation  is  needed  for  prob- 
able emergencies,  to  combine  military  prep- 
aration, to  avert  war  by  evident  readiness,  or 
to  meet  it  if  it  come.  It  requires,  therefore, 
the  power  of  the  sword  and  the  purse,  guar- 
anteed by  something  more  binding  than  the 
voluntary  action  from  time  to  time  of  the  in- 
dividual communities  composing  it.  For  sus- 
tained effort  Imperial  Federation  will  be 
impotent,  unless  at  the  very  least  the  several 
members  are  willing  to  accept  a  fixed  burden, 
periodically  determined  by  some  competent 
body,  external  to  all,  but  in  the  constitution 
of  which  each,  of  course,  has  a  voice.  The 
experience  of  the  United  States  goes  farther. 
They  found  it  not  sufficient  to  determine  in  a 
lump  amount  the  proportion  due  from  each 
member;  effective  union,  efHciency  for  the 
defence  of  the  whole,  was  not  obtained  until 
power  was  given  to  the  central  government, — 
not  merely  to  fix  the  quotas  in  men  and  money 
of  the  several  States, —  but  to  lay  and  to  exact 
taxes  upon  the  citizens  of  all  the  States,  pass- 
ing over  the  State  governments  directly  to  in- 
dividual men.     The  power  refused  by  them  to 


126         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

the  British  ParHament  was  dehberately,  for  the 
sake  of  union,  granted  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  in  which  the  States  and  their 
citizens  were  severally  represented. 

This  it  will  be  seen  was  a  question  of 
method.  Its  adoption  resulted  from  long, 
bitter  experience.  Only  so,  and  hardly  so,  was 
it  conceded.  It  was  the  final  step  in  the  prog- 
ress to  union.  Like  its  predecessors,  it  was  ex- 
torted by  dire  emergency.  This  imparted  the 
motive;  bringing  men  to  desire,  as  a  political 
object,  the  organism,  the  scheme,  which  out 
of  the  States  framed  the  Nation  and  started  it 
on  the  road  to  success.  To  the  American  mo- 
tive geographical  nearness  contributed  much ; 
for  the  different  communities  could  not  help 
seeing  the  injury  all  were  receiving  from  their 
mutual  indifference  or  antagonism.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  British  Empire  are  in  this  less 
fortunate.  Their  remoteness  makes  less  evi- 
dent the  interaction  of  conditions  and  events. 
That  the  suffering  of  one  member  involves 
injury  to  each,  because  of  its  effect  upon  the 
whole,  becomes  less  easy  to  realize.  Motive 
thereby  becomes  less  clear  and  less  imperative. 
The  impulse  to  form  an  object,  and  to  grapple 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  127 

with  the  difficulties   of  method  which  impede 
its  accomplishment,  is  weakened. 

Still,  the  motives  are  there.  Let  each  mem- 
ber of  the  Empire  consider,  for  instance,  what 
it  would  mean  to  the  general  welfare  to  have 
an  independent  and  hostile  Ireland  lying  across 
the  access  of  Great  Britain  to  the  outer  world. 
What  would  the  weakening  of  the  chief  mem- 
ber of  the  Empire  be  to  every  other .?  What 
would  a  conquered  and  hostile  South  Africa 
have  meant  to  Australia?  and  beyond  Aus- 
tralia, to  British  influence  in  the  Far  East } 
Can  decay  of  British  influence  in  China  be 
seen  with  equanimity  by  Canada,  with  its  Pa- 
cific seaboard  }  For  the  same  reason  it  cannot 
be  indifferent  to  Canada  whether  the  British 
navy  and  commerce,  in  war,  find  their  way  to 
the  Farther  East  through  the  Mediterranean, 
or  be  forced  to  the  long  Cape  route.  It  is, 
therefore,  matter  of  interest  to  her,  and  to 
Australia,  if  a  hostile  naval  power  be  firmly 
based  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  In  a  way,  these 
are  internal  questions.  They  are  so  imme- 
diately, with  reference  to  the  Empire  at  large ; 
but  it  is  easy  to  see  that  their  determination 
affects    powerfully,    possibly    even    vitally,    the 


128         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

external  and  foreign  relations  of  the  whole  and 
of  each  part.  One  member  has  just  been 
saved  from  destruction  by  the  com.bined  effort 
of  all,  supported  by  the  supreme  sea  power  of 
the  mother  country.  This  result,  too,  is  in- 
ternal to  the  Empire ;  but  is  it  not  also  of  vast 
importance  to  its  external  security  and  foreign 
policy  ?  What  has  made  the  Transvaal  so 
formidable  to  the  adjoining  colonies  and  to  the 
Empire  ?  It  is  because  not  only  was  the  pop- 
ulation hostile,  but  the  hostility  was  organized, 
armed,  and  equipped,  under  the  shield  of  com- 
plete self-government.  Had  Ireland  been  con- 
ceded the  substance  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  bill,  or 
should  she  hereafter  attain  it,  would  not  her 
power  of  mischief,  in  case  of  foreign  war, 
make  such  demands  upon  the  presence  of  the 
British  navy  as  seriously  to  lessen  its  ability  to 
protect  commercial  routes  and  colonies  }  She 
is  to  the  United  Kingdom  what  the  Transvaal 
has  been  to  South  Africa.  The  consideration 
shows  both  how  important  the  status  of  Ire- 
land is  to  the  colonies,  and  how  much,  by  the 
development  of  their  own  forces,  relieving  the 
navy  of  the  United  Kingdom,  they  can  con- 
tribute to  its  security,  and   thereby  to   that  of 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  129 

the  commercial  routes,  which  is  the  common 
interest  of  all. 

In  the  question  of  foreign  relations  are  con- 
spicuously to  be  seen  the  advantages  of  federa- 
tion, which  on  the  internal  side  is  not  without 
its  drawbacks.  Its  look  is  distinctively  out- 
ward, recognizing  that  there  conditions  have 
undergone  decisive  change.  It  faces  the  world, 
ai\d  sees  that  to  do  so  with  success  it  must 
show  a  united  body.  For  that  purpose  it  seeks 
to  find  a  means,  an  organ,  in  which  and  by 
which  union  may  be  established  and  main- 
tained. For  that  purpose  it  must  be  willing  to 
endure  the  internal  sacrifices,  the  inevitable 
concessions  of  individual  independence,  and 
the  burdens  of  additional  expense.  For  these 
concessions  on  either  hand  there  will  be  com- 
pensation. The  colonies  by  entering  upon 
a  share  in  determining  the  foreign  policy  of 
the  whole,  gain  wider  scope  of  action,  elevation 
of  idea,  increased  dignity  of  existence,  and  state 
equality  with  the  United  Kingdom,  actual  in 
kind,  partial  in  degree  ;  an  equality  resembling, 
doubtless,  in  principle  that  of  the  lower  house 
of  the  United  States,  where  the  representation 
for  all  the  States  is  the  same  in  character,  but 

9 


1 30         Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

in  voting  power  proportioned  to  the  respective 
populations.  Individual  colonists  would  claim 
and  find  imperial  careers,  as  the  interests  and 
obligations  of  their  native  land  gained  ever 
increasing  expansion  in  the  general  growth 
and  interaction  of  the  Empire.  To  Sir  Henry 
Parkes  this  seemed,  for  Australia,  a  higher 
destiny  than  independence ;  he  called  it  "  a 
rightful  share  in  what  may  be  a  more  glorious 
rule  than  mankind  has  ever  yet  seen." 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  superficially, 
perhaps  by  force  of  tradition,  the  benefit  of 
federation  seems  chiefly  to  inure  to  the  mother 
country.  This  impression  probably  derives 
from  the  old  idea  of  state  property,  underlying 
the  colonial  relation.  Under  such  a  concep- 
tion, the  benefit  of  the  owner  of  this  estate, 
the  mother  country,  was  naturally  the  primary 
object  in  administration.  The  subordination 
of  the  colony  was  not  merely  in  political  con- 
nection, but ,  in  economical  treatment.  This 
was  admitted  by  the  American  colonists,  who, 
though  they  rebelled  promptly  at  commercial 
regulation  by  tariff,  for  the  raising  of  imperial 
revenue,  as  being  indirect  taxation,  acquiesced 
in    regulation    which    alleged    the   benefit   of 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation  131 

imperial  trade  as  a  whole,  though  they  suffered 
by  it. 

Such  conditions,  however,  have  passed  away; 
and  after  the  temporary  domination  of  the 
contrary  belief,  that  colonies  are  of  little  or  no 
advantage,  it  is  now  recognized  that  in  the 
mutual  relation  there  is  reciprocity  of  benefit, 
even  though  there  be  not  equality.  Colonies 
trade  more  readily  with  the  mother  country 
than  with  others ;  and  the  capital  of  the  latter, 
other  things  being  equal,  seeks  investment  more 
readily,  with  greater  feeling  of  security,  in  com- 
munities kindred  in  political  and  legal  tradition, 
and  of  a  common  allegiance.  The  question  of 
military  and  naval  reciprocity  of  usefulness  has 
been  touched  on.  To  this  is  to  be  added 
the  wider  and  grander  sphere  open  to  the 
colonies,  as  communities  and  as  individuals, 
when  closer  relations  gain  them  increasing 
entry,  and  opportunity  for  activity,  in  the  inter- 
nal administration  and  foreign  policy  of  a  great 
established  State  like  the  United  Kingdom.  In 
the  present  threatening  and  doubtful  question 
of  the  future  of  China  are  the  elements  of  a 
world-conflict,  in  which  the  British  navy  is  one 
of    the    largest    among   several    determinative 


132  Motives  to  Imperial  Federation 

factors.  Its  strength  can  be  supported  and 
enlarged  by  tlie  conditions  attendant  upon 
federation,  and  the  colonies  can  thus  share  in 
both  the  benefits  and  the  distinction  of  influence 
upon  great  political  issues ;  but  what  of  weight 
or  of  prestige  can  they  there  display,  if  severally 
independent  ?  They  may  receive  the  benefit  of 
the  open  door,  but  not  the  self-contentment  of 
self-help.  Self-dependence,  as  distinct  from 
nominal  independence,  is  to  be  found  in  federa- 
tion, not  in  separation.  As  time  passes,  it  can 
hardly  fail  that  the  premier  and  government  of 
the  Australian  federation  will  be  greater  in 
position  and  wider  in  activities  than  the  cor- 
responding officials  of  the  several  states;  and 
in  like  manner  a  man  will  be  larger  in  his  own 
eye  and  that  of  the  world  as  a  citizen  of 
Australia,  than  as  belonging  to  a  particular 
division  of  the  Commonwealth.  The  federation 
of  the  United  States  exalted  irresistibly  the 
name  American  far  bevond  all  local  desio^na- 
tions.  So  Imperial  Federation  will  dignify  and 
enlarge  each  State  and  each  citizen  that  enters 
its  fold. 

Imperial  Federation  proposes  a  partnership 
in    which    a   number   of   younger  and  poorer 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation         133 

members  are  admitted  into  a  lono:  standino^ 
wealthy  firm.  This  simile  is  doubtless  not  an 
exhaustive  statement;  but  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  it  is  sufficiently  just  to  show  where 
the  preponderance  of  benefit  will  for  the  time 
fall.  The  expenditure  of  the  United  Kingdom 
on  the  South  African  war  offers  a  concrete 
example  of  this  truth,  doubly  impressive  to 
those  who,  like  the  writer,  see  in  this  instance 
great  imperial  obligation  but  little  material 
interest,  save  the  greatest  of  all,  —  the  preser- 
vation of  the  Empire.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
view  of  the  spreading  collision  of  interests 
throughout  the  world,  it  is  hard  to  over-value 
the  advantage  of  healthy,  attached,  self-govern- 
ing colonies  to  a  European  country  of  to-day. 
Blessed  is  the  State  that  has  its  quiver  full  of 
them.  Under  such  conditions,  and  with  the 
motives  to  union  that  have  been  presented,  it  is 
petty  to  fasten  attention  on  comparative  benefit 
to  the  exclusion  of  mutual  benefit.  Not  by 
such  grudging  spirit  are  great  ideas  realized, 
or  great  ends  compassed.  Sentiment,  imagina- 
tion, aspiration,  the  satisfaction  of  the  rational 
and  moral  faculties  in  some  object  better  than 
bread  alone,  —  all  must  find  a  part  in  a  worthy 


1 34  Motives  to  I'}nperial  Federation 


motive ;  not  to  the  exclusion  of  reasonable 
interests,  but  to  their  ennoblement  by  marriage 
to  loftier  aims,  seeking  gratification  in  wider 
activities.  Like  individuals,  nations  and  em- 
pires have  souls  as  well  as  bodies.  Great  and 
beneficent  achievement  ministers  to  worthier 
contentment  than  the  filling  of  the  pocket. 

Finally,  the  broadening  and  strengthening  of 
British  power  by  the  progress  of  Imperial 
Federation  is  necessarily  an  object  of  profound 
interest  to  Americans.  In  many  quarters  it 
will  find  deep  sympathy ;  in  others,  perhaps, 
jealousy  may  be  manifested.  For  this  there  is 
no  good  cause.  The  American  Commonwealth 
and  the  British  Empire  have  had  many  jars  in 
the  past,  the  memory  of  which  has  not  wholly 
disappeared ;  but  more  and  more  clearly  are 
coming  into  view  the  permanent  conditions 
that  from  the  first  have  existed,  but  until  now 
have  been  overlaid  and  buried  by  the  wreckage 
of  past  collisions  and  disputes.  In  language, 
law,  and  political  traditions  there  is  fundamen- 
tal identity ;  and  in  blood  also,  though  to  some 
extent  differentiated  in  each  by  foreign  admix- 
ture. Coincidently  with  these,  there  is  a  clearly 
defined  and  wide  belt  of  geographical  separa- 


Motives  to  Imperial  Federation         1 35 

tion  between  their  several  spheres,  —  save  the 
one  common  boundary  between  Canada  and 
the  United  States.  These  constitute  perma- 
nent factors,  tending  on  the  one  hand  to  pro- 
mote understanding,  and  on  the  other  to  avert 
misunderstandings.  To  reinforce  these,  there 
is  rapidly  arising  a  community  of  commercial 
interests  and  of  righteous  ideals  in  the  Far 
East.  In  proportion  to  the  hold  which  abiding 
factors  such  as  these  have  upon  the  mind  of 
the  statesman,  will  be  the  light  he  finds  to 
thread  his  way  through  the  passing  perplexities 
of  revolving  years.  The  tactical  changes  of 
front  and  redistribution  of  arrangements,  which 
the  incidental  progress  of  events  necessitates 
from  time  to  time,  will  lack  intelligence,  cohe- 
rence, and  firmness,  unless  governed  by  con- 
stant reference  to  the  things  which  cannot  be 
shaken,  and  which  bear  to  policy  the  same 
relation  that  the  eternal  principles  of  strategy 
do  to  the  conduct  of  war. 


CONSIDERATIONS    GOVERNING 
THE    DISPOSITION    OF    NAVIES 


CONSIDERATIONS    GOVERNING 
THE    DISPOSITION    OF   NAVIES 

May,  1902. 

WE  have  the  highest  military  authority  for 
saying  that  "  War  is  a  business  of  posi- 
tions "  ;  a  definition  which  includes  necessarily 
not  only  the  selection  of  positions  to  be  taken, 
with  the  reasonings,  or  necessities,  which  dic- 
tate the  choice,  but  further  also  the  assignment 
of  proportionate  force  to  the  several  points 
occupied.  All  this  is  embraced  in  the  easy 
phrase,  "  The  distribution  of  the  fleet."  In 
these  words,  therefore,  ought  to  be  involved,  by 
necessary  implication,  an  antecedent  apprecia- 
tion of  the  political,  commercial,  and  military 
exigencies  of  the  State  in  the  event  of  possible 
wars  ;  for  the  dispositions  of  peace  should  bear 
a  close  relation  to  the  contingency  of  war.  All 
three  elements  form  a  part  of  the  subject-matter 
for  consideration,  for  each  is  an  essential  factor 
in  national  life.     Logically  separable,  in  prac- 


140  Considerations  Governing 

tice  the  political,  commercial,  and  military 
needs  are  so  intertwined  that  their  mutual 
interaction  constitutes  one  problem.  The  fre- 
quent statement  that  generals  in  the  field  have 
no  account  to  take  of  political  considerations, 
conveys,  along  with  a  partial  truth,  a  most  mis- 
leading inference.  Applied  even  to  military 
and  naval  leaders,  it  errs  by  lack  of  qualifica- 
tion ;  but  for  the  statesman,  under  whom  the 
soldier  or  seaman  acts,  the  political  as  well  as 
the  military  conditions  must  influence,  must  at 
times  control,  and  even  reverse,  decision. 

The  choice  of  situations,  localities,  to  be  held 
as  bases  of  operations,  is  governed  by  considera- 
tions of  geographical  position,  military  strength, 
and  natural  resources,  which  endure  from  age 
to  age;  a  permanence  which  justifies  the  ex- 
pense of  adequate  fortification.  The  distribu- 
tion of  mobile  force,  military  or  naval,  is 
subject  to  greater  variation,  owing  to  changes 
of  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  at  any  one 
historical  moment,  of  peace  or  war,  this  ques- 
tion also  admits  of  an  appropriate  fixed  deter- 
mination, general  in  outline,  but  not  therefore 
necessarily  vague.  This  conclusion  should  be 
the  outcome  of  weighing  the  possible  dangers 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  141 

of  the  State,  and  all  the  various  factors  —  po- 
litical, commercial,  and  military  —  which  affect 
national  welfare.  The  disposition  thence 
adopted  should  be  the  one  which  will  best 
expedite  the  several  readjustments  and  combi- 
nations that  may  be  necessitated  by  the  out- 
break of  various  particular  wars,  which  may 
happen  with  this  or  that  possible  enemy.  Such 
modification  of  arrangements  can  be  predicated 
with  reasonable  certainty  for  a  measurable 
period  in  advance.  The  decision  thus  reached 
may  be  called  the  "  strategic  "  solution,  because 
dependent  upon  ascertainable  factors,  relatively 
permanent,  of  all  which  it  takes  account ;  and 
because  also  it  is  accepted,  consciously  and  of 
purpose,  as  preliminary  to  the  probable  great 
movements  of  war,  present  or  prospective. 

In  the  particular  cases  that  afterwards  arise 
from  time  to  time,  and  of  which  the  outbreak  of 
war  may  itself  be  one,  the  unforeseen,  the  unex- 
pected, begins  to  come  into  operation.  This  is 
one  of  the  inevitable  accompaniments  of  war- 
fare. The  meeting  of  these  new  conditions, 
by  suitable  changes  of  plan,  is  temporary  in 
character,  varying  possibly  from  day  to  day ; 
but  it  will   generally  be  found   that  the  more 


142  Co7isiderations  Governing 

comprehensive  has  been  the  previous  strategic 
study,  and  the  more  its  just  forecasts  have  con- 
trolled the  primary  disposition,  —  the  distribu- 
tion of  force, —  the  more  certainly  and  readily 
will  this  lend  itself  to  the  shifting  incidents  of 
hostilities.  These  movements  bear  to  the  fun- 
damental general  dispositions  the  relations 
which  tactics  have  to  strategy.  In  them,  on 
occasions,  one  or  two  of  the  leading  considera- 
tions which  have  each  had  their  full  weight  in 
the  original  dispositions,  may  have  to  be  momen- 
tarily subordinated  to  the  more  pressing  demand 
of  a  third.  In  war,  generally  and  naturally, 
military  exigencies  have  preponderant  weight ; 
but  even  in  war  the  safety  of  a  great  convoy, 
or  of  a  commercial  strategic  centre,  may  at  a 
given  instant  be  of  more  consequence  than  a 
particular  military  gain.  So  political  condi- 
tions may  rightly  be  allowed  at  times  to  over- 
weigh  military  prudence,  or  to  control  military 
activity.  This  is  eminently  true,  for,  after  all, 
war  is  political  action.  The  old  phrase,  "  The 
cannon  is  the  last  argument  of  kings,"  may  now 
be  paraphrased,  "  War  is  the  last  argument  of 
diplomacy."  Its  purpose  is  to  compass  political 
results,  where  peaceful   methods   have   failed ; 


The  Disposition  of  Navies 


14: 


and  while  undoubtedly,  as  war,  the  game  should 
be  played  in  accordance  with  the  well-estab- 
lished principles  of  the  art,  yet,  as  a  means  to 
an  end,  it  must  consent  to  momentary  modifi- 
cations, in  accepting  which  a  well-balanced 
mind  admits  that  the  means  are  less  than  the 
end,  and  must  be  subjected  to  it. 

The  question  between  military  and  political 
considerations  is  therefore  one  of  proportion, 
varying  from  time  to  time  as  attendant  circum- 
stances change.  As  regards  the  commercial 
factor,  never  before  in  the  history  of  the  world 
has  it  been  so  inextricably  commingled  with 
politics.  The  interdependence  of  nations  for 
the  necessities  and  luxuries  of  life  have  been 
marvellously  increased  by  the  growth  of  pop- 
ulation and  the  habits  of  comfort  contracted 
by  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  America  through 
a  century  of  comparative  peace,  broken  only  by 
wars  which,  though  gigantic  in  scale,  have  been 
too  short  in  duration  to  affect  seriously  com- 
mercial relations.  The  unmolested  course  of 
commerce,  reactinf^  upon  itself,  has  contributed 
also  to  its  own  rapid  development,  a  result  fur- 
thered by  the  prevalence  of  a  purely  economi- 
cal conception  of  national  greatness  during  the 


144  Considerations  Governing 

larger  part  of  the  century.  This,  with  the  vast 
increase  in  rapidity  of  communication,  has  mul- 
tipHed  and  strengthened  the  bonds  knitting  the 
interests  of  nations  to  one  another,  till  the 
whole  now  forms  an  articulated  system,  not 
only  of  prodigious  size  and  activity,  but  of  an 
excessive  sensitiveness,  unequalled  in  former 
ages.  National  nerves  are  exasperated  by  the 
delicacy  of  financial  situations,  and  national 
resistance  to  hardship  is  sapped  by  generations 
that  have  known  war  only  by  the  battlefield, 
not  in  the  prolonged  endurance  of  privation  and 
straitness  extending  through  years  and  reach- 
ing every  class  of  the  community.  The  preser- 
vation of  commercial  and  financial  interests 
constitutes  now  a  political  consideration  of  the 
first  importance,  making  for  peace  and  deter- 
ring from  war;  a  fact  well  worthy  of  observa- 
tion by  those  who  would  exempt  maritime  com- 
mercial intercourse  from  the  operations  of  naval 
war,  under  the  illusory  plea  of  protecting  pri- 
vate property  at  sea.  Ships  and  cargoes  in 
transit  upon  the  sea  are  private  property  in 
only  one  point  of  view,  and  that  the  narrowest. 
Internationally  considered,  they  are  national 
wealth  engaged  in  reproducing  and  multiplying 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  145 

itself,  to  the  intensification  of  the  national 
power,  and  that  by  the  most  effective  process  ; 
for  it  relieves  the  nation  from  feeding  upon  itself, 
and  makes  the  whole  outer  world  contribute  to 
its  support.  It  is  therefore  a  most  proper 
object  of  attack ;  more  humane,  and  more  con- 
ducive to  the  objects  of  war,  than  the  slaughter 
of  men.  A  great  check  on  war  would  be  re- 
moved by  assuring  immunity  to  a  nation's  sea- 
borne trade,  the  life-blood  of  its  power,  the 
assurer  of  its  credit,  the  purveyor  of  its  comfort. 
This  is  the  more  necessary  to  observe,  be- 
cause, while  commerce  thus  on  the  one  hand 
deters  from  war,  on  the  other  hand  it  engenders 
conflict,  fostering  ambitions  and  strifes  which 
tend  towards  armed  collision.  Thus  it  has 
continuously  been  from  the  beginning  of  sea 
power.  A  conspicuous  instance  was  afforded 
by  the  Anglo-Dutch  wars  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  There  were  other  causes  of  dissatis- 
faction between  the  two  nations,  but  commer- 
cial jealousies,  rivalry  for  the  opening  markets 
of  the  newly  discovered  hemispheres,  and  for 
the  carrying  trade  of  the  world,  was  the  under- 
lying national,  as  distinguished  from  the  purely 
governmental  motive,  which  inspired  the  fierce 


146  Considerations  Governiiig 

struggle.  Blood  was  indeed  shed,  in  profusion ; 
but  it  was  the  suppression  of  maritime  com- 
merce that  caused  the  grass  to  grow  in  the 
streets  of  Amsterdam,  and  brought  the  Dutch 
Republic  to  its  knees.  This  too,  it  was,  that 
sapped  the  vital  force  of  Napoleon's  Empire, 
despite  the  huge  tributes  exacted  by  him  from 
the  conquered  states  of  Europe,  external  to  his 
own  dominions.  The  commerce  of  our  day 
has  brought  up  children,  nourished  popula- 
tions, which  now  turn  upon  the  mother,  cry- 
ing for  bread.  "  The  place  is  too  strait  for 
us ;  give  place  where  we  can  sell  more."  The 
provision  of  markets  for  the  production  of  an 
ever-increasing  number  of  inhabitants  is  a  lead- 
ing political  problem  of  the  day,  the  solution 
of  which  is  sought  by  methods  commercial  and 
methods  political,  so  essentially  combative,  so 
offensive  and  defensive  in  character,  that  direct 
military  action  would  be  only  a  development 
of  them,  a  direct  consequent ;  not  a  breach  of 
continuity  in  spirit,  however  it  might  be  in 
form.  As  the  interaction  of  commerce  and 
finance  shows  a  unity  in  the  modern  civilized 
world,  so  does  the  struggle  for  new  markets, 
and  for  predominance  in  old,  reveal  the  unsub- 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  i/^y 

dued  diversity.  Here  every  state  is  for  itself ; 
and  in  every  great  state  the  look  for  the  desired 
object  is  outward,  just  as  it  was  in  the  days 
when  England  and  Holland  fought  over  the 
Spice  Islands  and  the  other  worlds  newly 
opening  before  them.  Beyond  the  seas,  now 
as  then,  are  to  be  found  regions  scantily  pop- 
ulated where  can  be  built  up  communities  with 
wants  to  be  supplied  ;  while  elsewhere  are  teem- 
ing populations  who  may  be  led  or  manipulated 
to  recognize  necessities  of  which  they  have  be- 
fore been  ignorant,  and  stimulated  to  provide 
for  them  through  a  higher  development  of  their 
resources,  either  by  themselves,  or,  preferably, 
through  the  exploitation  of  foreigners. 

We  are  yet  but  at  the  beginning  of  this 
marked  movement,  much  as  has  been  done 
in  the  way  of  partition  and  appropriation 
within  the  last  twenty  years.  The  regions  — 
chiefly  in  Africa — which  the  Powers  of  Europe 
have  divided  by  mutual  consent,  if  not  to  mut- 
ual satisfaction,  await  the  gradual  process  of 
utilization  of  their  natural  resources  and  con- 
sequent increase  of  inhabitants,  the  producers 
and  consumers  of  a  commerce  yet  to  be  in  the 
distant   future.     The  degree  and   rate  of  this 


148  Considerations  Governing 

development  must  depend  upon  the  special 
aptitudes  of  the  self-constituted  owners,  whose 
needs  meantime  are  immediate.  Their  eyes 
therefore  turn  necessarily  for  the  moment  to 
quarters  where  the  presence  of  a  population 
already  abundant  provides  at  once,  not  only 
numerous  buyers  and  sellers,  but  the  raw  ma- 
terial of  labor,  by  which,  under  suitable 
direction  and  with  foreign  capital,  the  present 
production  may  be  multiplied.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that,  in  order  further  to  promote 
this  commercial  action,  existing  political  tenure 
is  being  assailed ;  that  the  endeavor  is  to 
supplant  it,  as  hindering  the  commercial,  or 
possibly  the  purely  military  or  political  ambi- 
tions of  the  intruder.  Commercial  enterprise 
is  never  so  secure,  nor  so  untrammelled,  as 
under  its  own  flag;  and  when  the  present 
owner  is  obstructive  by  temperament,  as  China 
is,  the  impulse  to  overbear  its  political  action 
by  display  of  force  tends  to  become  ungovern- 
able. At  all  events  the  fact  is  notorious ;  nor 
can  it  be  seriously  doubted  that  in  several  other 
parts  of  the  globe  aggression  is  only  deterred 
by  the  avowed  or  understood  policy  of  a  power- 
ful opponent,  not  by  the  strength  of  the  present 


The  Disposition  af  Navies  149 

possessor.  This  is  the  significance  of  the  new 
Anglo-Japanese  agreement,  and  also  of  the 
more  venerable  Monroe  Doctrine  of  the  United 
States,  though  that  is  applicable  in  another 
quarter.  The  parties  to  either  of  these  poli- 
cies is  interested  in  the  success  of  the  other. 

It  seems  demonstrable,  therefore,  that  as 
commerce  is  the  engrossing  and  predominant 
interest  of  the  world  to-day,  so,  in  consequence 
of  its  acquired  expansion,  oversea  commerce, 
over-sea  political  acquisition,  and  maritime 
commercial  routes  are  now  the  primary  ob- 
jects of  external  policy  among  nations.  The 
instrument  for  the  maintenance  of  policy  di- 
rected upon  these  objects  is  the  Navy  of  the 
several  States;  for,  whatever  influence  we  at- 
tribute to  moral  ideas,  which  I  have  no  wish 
to  undervalue,  it  is  certain  that,  while  right 
rests  upon  them  for  its  sanction,  it  depends 
upon  force  for  adequate  assertion  against  the 
too  numerous,  individuals  or  communities,  who 
either  disregard  moral  sanctions,  or  reason 
amiss  concerning  them. 

Further,  it  is  evident  that  for  the  moment 
neither  South  America  nor  Africa  is  an  imme- 
diate object  of  far-reaching  commercial  ambi- 


150  Considerations  Governing 

tion,  to  be  compassed  by  political  action. 
Whatever  the  future  may  have  in  store  for 
them,  a  variety  of  incidents  have  relegated 
them  for  the  time  to  a  position  of  secondary 
interest.  Attention  has  centred  upon  the 
Pacific  generally,  and  upon  the  future  of  China 
particularly.  The  present  distribution  of  navies 
indicates  this ;  for  while  largely  a  matter  of 
tradition  and  routine,  nevertheless  the  assign- 
ment of  force  follows  the  changes  of  political 
circumstances,  and  undergoes  gradual  modi- 
fications, which  reflect  the  conscious  or  un- 
conscious sense  of  the  nation  that  things  are 
different.  It  is  not  insignificant  that  the  pre- 
ponderant French  fleet  is  now  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, whereas  it  once  was  in  the  Atlantic 
ports;  and  memories  which  stretch  a  genera- 
tion back  can  appreciate  the  fact  and  the 
meaning  of  the  diminution  of  British  force  on 
the  east  and  west  coasts  of  America,  as  also 
of  the  increase  of  Russian  battleship  force  in 
China  seas.     Interests  have  shifted. 

Directly  connected  with  these  new  centres 
of  interest  in  the  Far  East,  inseparable  from 
them  in  fact  or  in  policy,  are  the  commercial 
routes  which  lead  to  them.     For  the  commerce 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  151 

and  navies  of  Europe  this  route  is  by  the  Med- 
iterranean and  the  Suez  Canal.  This  is  the 
line  of  communication  to  the  objective  of  in- 
terest. The  base  of  all  operation,  political  or 
military,  —  so  far  as  the  two  are  separable,  —  is 
in  the  mother  countries.  These  —  the  base, 
the  objective,  and  the  communications  —  are 
the  conditions  of  the  problem  by  which  the 
distribution  of  naval  force  is  ultimately  to  be 
determined.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however, 
that  while  the  dominant  factor  of  the  three  is 
the  line  of  communication  between  base  and  ob- 
jective, the  precise  point  or  section  of  this  upon 
which  control  rests,  and  on  which  mobile  force 
must  be  directed,  is  not  necessarily  always  the 
same.  The  distribution  of  force  must  have 
regard  to  possible  changes  of  dispositions,  as 
the  conditions  of  a  war  vary. 

Every  war  has  two  aspects,  the  defensive 
and  the  offensive,  to  each  of  which  there  is 
a  corresponding  factor  of  activity.  There  is 
something  to  gain,  the  offensive ;  there  is  some- 
thing to  lose,  the  defensive.  The  ears  of  men, 
especially  of  the  uninstructed,  are  more  readily 
and  sympathetically  open  to  the  demands  of 
the    latter.     It    appeals    to    the    conservatism 


152  Considerations  Governing 

which  is  dominant  in  the  well-to-do,  and  to  the 
widespread  timidity  which  hesitates  to  take  any 
risk  for  the  sake  of  a  probable  though  uncertain 
gain.  The  sentiment  is  entirely  respectable  in 
itself,  and  more  than  respectable  when  its  power 
is  exercised  against  breach  of  the  peace  for  other 
than  the  gravest  motives — for  any  mere  lucre 
of  o-ain.  But  its  limitations  must  be  under- 
stood.  A  sound  defensive  scheme,  sustaining 
the  bases  of  the  national  force,  is  the  founda- 
tion upon  which  war  rests ;  but  who  lays  a 
foundation  without  intending  a  superstructure? 
The  offensive  element  in  warfare  is  the  super- 
structure, the  end  and  aim  for  which  the  de- 
fensive exists,  and  apart  from  which  it  is  to  all 
purposes  of  war  worse  than  useless.  When 
war  has  been  accepted  as  necessary,  success 
means  nothing  short  of  victory;  and  victory 
must  be  sought  by  offensive  measures,  and  by 
them  only  can  be  insured.  "  Being  in,  bear 
it,  that  the  opposer  may  be  ware  of  thee."  No 
mere  defensive  attitude  or  action  avails  to  such 
end.  Whatever  the  particular  mode  of  offen- 
sive action  adopted,  whether  it  be  direct  mili- 
tary attack,  or  the  national  exhaustion  of  the 
opponent  by  cutting  off  the  sources  of  national 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  1 5  3 

well-being,  whatsoever  method  may  be  chosen, 
offence,  injury,  weakening  of  the  foe,  to  anni- 
hilation if  need  be,  must  be  the  guiding  pur- 
pose of  the  belligerent.  Success  will  certainly 
attend  him  who  drives  his  adversary  into  the 
position  of  the  defensive  and  keeps  him  there. 
Offence  therefore  dominates,  but  it  does  not 
exclude.  The  necessity  for  defence  remains 
obligatory,  though  subordinate.  The  two  are 
complementary.  It  is  only  in  the  reversal  of 
roles,  by  which  priority  of  importance  is  as- 
signed to  the  defensive,  that  ultimate  defeat  is 
involved.  Nor  is  this  all.  Though  opposed 
in  idea  and  separable  in  method  of  action,  cir- 
cumstances not  infrequently  have  permitted 
the  union  of  the  two  in  a  single  general  plan 
of  campaign,  which  protects  at  the  same  time 
that  it  attacks.  "  Fitz  James's  blade  was  sword 
and  shield."  Of  this  the  system  of  blockades  by 
the  British  Navy  during  the  Napoleonic  wars 
was  a  marked  example.  Thrust  up  against  the 
ports  of  France,  and  lining  her  coasts,  they 
covered  —  shielded  —  the  operations  of  their 
own  commerce  and  cruisers  in  every  sea; 
while  at  the  same  time,  crossing  swords,  as 
it  were,  with  the  fleets  within,  ever  on  guard. 


154  Consideratio7is  Govenmtg 

ready  to  attack,  should  the  enemy  give  an 
opening  by  quitting  the  shelter  of  his  ports, 
they  frustrated  his  efforts  at  a  combination  of 
his  squadrons  by  which  alone  he  could  hope 
to  reverse  conditions.  All  this  was  defensive ; 
but  the  same  operation  cut  the  sinews  of  the 
enemy's  power  by  depriving  him  of  sea-borne 
commerce,  and  promoted  the  reduction  of  his 
colonies.  Both  these  were  measures  of  offence  ; 
and  both,  it  may  be  added,  were  directed  upon 
the  national  communications,  the  sources  of 
national  well-being.  The  means  was  one,  the 
effect  two-fold. 

It  is  evident  also  that  offensive  action  de- 
pends for  energy  upon  the  security  of  the 
several  places  whence  its  resources  are  drawn. 
These  are  appropriately  called  "  bases,"  for 
they  are  the  foundations  —  more  exactly,  per- 
haps, the  roots  —  severed  from  which  vigor 
yields  to  paralysis.  Still  more  immediately 
disastrous  would  be  the  destruction  or  capture 
of  the  base  itself.  Therefore,  whether  it  be 
the  home  country  in  general,  the  centre  of 
the  national  power,  or  the  narrower  localities 
where  are  concentrated  the  materials  of  war- 
fare  in   a    particular    region,   the  base,    by   its 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  1 5  5 

need  of  protection,  represents  distinctively  the 
defensive  element  in  any  campaign.  It  must 
be  secured  at  all  hazards ;  though,  at  the  same 
time,  be  it  clearly  said,  by  recourse  to  means 
which  shall  least  fetter  the  movements  of  the 
offensive  factor  —  the  mobile  force,  army  or 
navy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  objective  repre- 
sents with  at  least  equal  exclusiveness  the 
offensive  element;  there,  put  it  at  the  least, 
preponderance  over  the  enemy,  not  yet  exist- 
ent, is  to  be  established  by  force.  The  mere 
effort  to  get  from  the  base  to  the  objective  is 
an  offensive  movement ;  but  the  ground  inter- 
vening between  the  two  is  of  more  complex 
character.  Here,  on  the  line  of  communica- 
tions, offence  and  defence  blend.  Here  the 
belligerent  whose  precautions  secure  suitable 
permanent  positions,  the  defensive  element, 
and  to  them  assign  proportionate  mobile  force, 
the  offensive  factor,  sufficient  by  superiority  to 
overpower  his  opponent,  maintains,  by  so  far 
and  insomuch,  his  freedom  and  power  of  action 
at  the  distant  final  objective ;  for  he  controls 
for  his  own  use  the  indispensable  artery 
throuQ^h  which  the  national  life-blood  courses 
to  the  distant  fleet,  and   by   the  same  act  he 


156  Considerations  Gover7ting 

closes  it  to  his  enemy.  Thus  again  offence 
and  defence  meet,  each  contributing  its  due 
share  of  effect,  unified  in  method  and  result  by 
an  accurate  choice  of  the  field  of  exertion,  of 
that  section  of  the  line  of  communications 
where  power  needs  to  be  mainly  exerted. 

In  purely  land  warfare  the  relative  strength 
of  the  opponents  manifests  itself  in  the  length 
of  the  line  of  communications  each  permits  itself; 
the  distance,  that  is,  which  it  ventures  to  ad- 
vance from  its  base  towards  the  enemy.  The 
necessary  aim  of  both  is  superiority  at  the  point 
of  contact,  to  be  maintained  either  by  actual 
preponderance  of  numbers,  or  else  by  a  combi- 
nation of  inferior  numbers  v/ith  advantageous 
position.  The  original  strength  of  each  evi- 
dently affects  the  distance  that  he  can  thus 
advance,  for  the  line  of  communication  behind 
him  must  be  secured  by  part  of  his  forces, 
because  upon  it  he  depends  for  almost  daily 
supplies.  The  weaker  therefore  can  go  least 
distance,  and  may  even  be  compelled  to  remain 
behind  the  home  frontier,  —  a  bare  defensive, 
—  yielding  the  other  the  moral  and  material 
advantage  of  the  offensive.  But  commonly,  in 
land  war,  each   adversary  has  his  own  line  of 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  1 5  7 

communication,  which  is  behind  him  with  re- 
spect to  his  opponent;  each  being  in  a  some- 
what literal  sense  opposite,  as  well  as  opposed, 
to  the  other,  and  the  common  objective,  to  be 
held  by  the  one  or  carried  by  the  other,  lying 
between  them.  The  strategic  aim  of  both  is  to 
menace,  or  even  to  sever  permanently,  the 
other's  communications ;  for  if  they  are  imme- 
diately threatened  he  must  retreat,  and  if  sun- 
dered he  must  surrender.  Either  result  is 
better  obtained  by  this  means  than  by  the 
resort  to  fighting,  for  it  saves  bloodshed,  and 
therefore  economizes  power  for  the  purpose  of 
further  progress. 

Maritime  war  has  its  analogy  to  these  con- 
ditions, but  it  ordinarily  reproduces  them  with 
a  modification  peculiar  to  itself.  In  it  the  bel- 
ligerents are  not  usually  on  opposite  sides  of 
the  common  objective  —  though  they  may  be  so 
—  but  proceed  towards  it  by  lines  that  in  gen- 
eral direction  are  parallel,  or  convergent,  and 
may  even  be  identical.  England  and  France 
lie  side  by  side,  and  have  waged  many  mari- 
time wars ;  but  while  there  have  been  excep- 
tions, as  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  or  when  the 
command  of  the  Channel  was  in  dispute,  the 


158  Considerations  Governing 

general  rule  has  been  that  the  scene  of  opera- 
tions was  far  distant  from  both,  and  that  both 
have  approached  it  by  substantially  the  same 
route.  When  the  prospective  theatre  of  war  is 
reached,  the  fleet  there  depends  partly  upon 
secondary  local  bases  of  supplies,  but  ultimately 
upon  the  home  country,  which  has  continually 
to  renew  the  local  deposits,  sending  stores  for- 
ward from  time  to  time  over  the  same  paths 
that  the  fleets  themselves  travelled.  The  secu- 
rity of  those  sea-roads  is  therefore  essential 
and  the  dependence  of  the  fleets  upon  them 
for  supplies  of  every  kind^ — pre-eminently  of 
coal  — reproduces  the  land  problem  of  commu- 
nications in  a  specialized  form.  The  two  have 
to  contest  the  one  line  of  communications  vital 
to  both.  It  becomes  therefore  itself  an  objec- 
tive, and  all  the  more  important  because  the 
security  of  military  communications  entails  in 
equal  measure  that  of  the  nation's  commerce. 
In  broad  generalization,  the  maritime  line  of 
communications  is  the  ocean  itself,  an  open 
plain,  limited  by  no  necessary  highways,  such 
as  the  land  has  to  redeem  from  the  obstacles 
which  encumber  it,  and  largely  devoid  of  the 
advantages  of  position  that  the  conformation 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  159 

of  ground  may  afford  in  a  shore  battlefield. 
In  so  far  control  depends  upon  superior  num- 
bers only,  and  the  give  and  take  which  history 
records,  where  disparity  has  not  been  great,  has 
gone  far  to  falsify  the  frequent  assertion  that 
the  ocean  acknowledges  but  one  mistress;  but 
as  the  sea-road  draws  near  a  coast,  the  armed 
vessels  that  assail  or  protect  are  facilitated  in 
their  task  if  the  shore  affords  them  harbors 
of  refuge  and  supply.  A  ship  that  has  to  go 
but  fifty  miles  to  reach  her  field  of  operation 
will  do  in  the  course  of  a  year  the  work  of 
several  ships  that  have  to  go  five  hundred. 
Fortified  naval  depots  at  suitable  points  there- 
fore increase  numerical  force  by  multiplying  it, 
quite  as  the  possession  of  strategic  points,  or 
the  lay  of  the  ground  of  a  battlefield,  supply 
numerical  deficiencies. 

Hence  appears  the  singular  strategic  —  and, 
because  strategic,  commercial  —  interest  of  a 
narrow  or  landlocked  sea,  which  is  multiplied 
manifold  when  it  forms  an  essential  link  in  an 
important  maritime  route.  Many  widely  diver- 
gent tracks  may  be  traced  on  the  ocean's  un- 
wrinkled  brow;  but  specifically  the  one  military 
line  of  communications  between  any  two  points 


i6o  Considerations  Governing 

of  Its  surface  is  that  which  is  decisively  the 
shortest.  The  measure  of  force  between  op- 
ponents in  such  a  case  depends  therefore  not 
only  upon  superiority  at  the  objective  point, 
but  upon  control  of  that  particular  line  of 
communications;  for  so  only  can  superiority 
be  maintained.  The  belligerent  who,  for  any 
disadvantage  of  numbers,  or  from  inferiority 
of  strength  as  contrasted  with  the  combined 
numbers  and  position  of  his  opponent,  cannot 
sustain  his  dominant  hold  there  is  already 
worsted. 

To  this  consideration  is  due  the  supreme 
importance  of  the  Mediterranean  in  the  present 
conditions  of  the  communications  and  policies 
of  the  world.  From  the  commercial  point  of 
view  it  is  much  the  shortest,  and  therefore  the 
principal,  sea  route  between  Europe  and  the 
Farther  East.  At  the  present  time  very  nearly 
one-third  of  the  home  trade,  the  exports  and 
imports,  of  Great  Britain  originates  in  or  passes 
through  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  the  single  port 
of  Marseilles  handles  a  similar  proportion  of 
all  the  sea-borne  commerce  of  France.  From 
the  military  standpoint,  the  same  fact  of  short- 
ness,  combined   with  the   number  and    rivalry 


Tlie  Disposition  of  Navies  i6i 

of  national  tenures  established  throughout  its 
area,  constitutes  it  the  most  vital  and  critical 
link  in  an  interior  line  between  two  regions  of 
the  gravest  international  concern.  In  one  of 
these,  in  Europe,  are  situated  the  bases,  the 
home  dominions,  of  the  European  Powers  con- 
cerned, and  in  the  other  the  present  chief 
objective  of  external  interest  to  all  nations  of 
to-day  —  that  Farther  East  and  western  Pacific 
upon  which  so  many  events  have  conspired 
recently  to  fasten  the  anxious  attention  of  the 
world. 

The  Mediterranean  therefore  becomes  neces- 
sarily the  centre  around  which  must  revolve 
the  strategic  distribution  of  European  navies. 
It  does  not  follow,  indeed,  that  the  distribution 
of  peace  reproduces  the  dispositions  for  war;  but 
it  must  look  to  them,  and  rest  upon  the  com- 
prehension of  them.  The  decisive  point  of 
action  in  case  of  war  must  be  recognized  and 
preparation  made  accordingly ;  not  only  by  the 
establishment  of  suitable  positions,  which  is  the 
naval  strategy  of  peace,  but  by  a  distinct  rela- 
tion settled  between  the  numbers  and  distri- 
bution of  vessels  needed  in  war  and  those 
maintained  in  peace.     The  Mediterranean  will 


1 62  Considerations  Governing 

be  either  the  seat  of  one  dominant  control, 
reaching  thence  in  all  directions,  owning  a  sin- 
gle mistress,  or  it  will  be  the  scene  of  continual 
struggle.  Here  offence  and  defence  will  meet 
and  blend  in  their  general  manifestation  of 
mobile  force  and  fortified  stations.  Elsewhere 
the  one  or  the  other  will  have  its  distinct 
sphere  of  predominance.  The  home  waters 
and  their  approaches  will  be  the  scene  of 
national  defence  in  the  strictest  and  most 
exclusive  sense ;  but  it  will  be  defence  that 
exists  for  the  foundation,  upon  which  reposes 
the  struggle  for,  or  the  control  of,  the  Mediter- 
ranean. The  distant  East,  in  whatever  spot 
there  hostilities  may  rage,  will  represent,  will 
be,  the  offensive  sphere ;  but  the  determination 
of  the  result,  in  case  of  prolongation  of  war, 
will  depend  upon  control  of  the  Mediterranean. 
In  the  degree  to  which  that  is  insured  defence 
will  find  the  test  of  its  adequacy,  and  offence 
the  measure  of  its  efficiency. 

In  this  combination  of  the  offensive  and 
defensive  factors  the  Mediterranean  presents 
an  analogy  to  the  military  conditions  of  insu- 
lar states,  such  as  Great  Britain  and  Japan, 
in    which    the    problem    of    national    defence 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  163 

becomes  closely  identified  with  offensive  action. 
Security,  which  is  simply  defence  in  its  com- 
pleted result,  depends  for  them  upon  control 
of  the  sea,  which  can  be  assured  only  by  the 
offensive  action  of  the  national  fleet.  Its  pre- 
dominance over  that  of  the  enemy  is  sword 
and  shield.  It  is  a  singular  advantage  to  have 
the  national  policy  in  the  matter  of  military 
development  and  dispositions  so  far  simplified 
and  unified  as  it  is  by  this  consideration.  It 
much  more  than  compensates  for  the  double 
line  of  communications  open  to  a  continental 
state,  the  two  strings  to  its  bow,  by  its  double 
frontiers  of  sea  and  land  ;  for  with  the  two 
frontiers  there  is  double  exposure  as  well  as 
double  utility.  They  require  two-fold  protective 
action,  dissipating  the  energies  of  the  nation  by 
dividing  them  between  two  distinct  objects,  to 
the  injury  of  both. 

An  insular  state,  which  alone  can  be  purely 
maritime,  therefore  contemplates  war  from  a 
position  of  antecedent  probable  superiority 
from  the  two-fold  concentration  of  its  policy ; 
defence  and  offence  being  closely  identified, 
and  energy,  if  exerted  judiciously,  being  fixed 
upon  the  increase  of  naval  force  to  the  clear 


164  Considerations  Governing 

subordination  of  that  more  narrowly  styled 
military.  The  conditions  tend  to  minimize 
the  division  of  effort  between  offensive  and 
defensive  purpose,  and,  by  greater  comparative 
development  of  the  fleet,  to  supply  a  larger 
margin  of  disposable  numbers  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a  mobile  superiority  at  a  particular 
point  of  the  general  field.  Such  a  decisive 
local  superiority  at  the  critical  point  of  action 
is  the  chief  end  of  the  military  art,  alike  in 
tactics  and  strategy.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  an 
insular  state,  if  attentive  to  the  conditions  that 
should  dictate  its  policy,  is  inevitably  led  to 
possess  a  superiority  in  that  particular  kind  of 
force,  the  mobility  of  which  enables  it  most 
readily  to  project  its  power  to  the  more  distant 
quarters  of  the  earth,  and  also  to  change  its 
point  of  application  at  will  with  unequalled 
rapidity. 

The  general  considerations  that  have  been 
advanced  concern  all  the  great  European  na- 
tions, in  so  far  as  they  look  outside  their  own 
continent,  and  to  maritime  expansion,  for  the 
extension  of  national  influence  and  power ;  but 
the  effect  upon  the  action  of  each  differs  neces- 
sarily   according    to    their   several    conditions. 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  165 

The  problem  of  sea-defence,  for  instance,  relates 
primarily  to  the  protection  of  the  national  com- 
merce everywhere,  and  specifically  as  it  draws 
near  the  home  ports  ;  serious  attack  upon  the 
coast,  or  upon  the  ports  themselves,  being  a 
secondary  consideration,  because  little  likely  to 
befall  a  nation  able  to  extend  its  power  far 
enough  to  sea  to  protect  its  merchant  ships. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  position  of  Ger- 
many is  embarrassed  at  once  by  the  fact  that 
she  has,  as  regards  the  w^orld  at  large,  but  one 
coast-line.  To  and  from  this  all  her  sea  com- 
merce must  go;  either  passing  the  English 
Channel,  flanked  for  three  hundred  miles  by 
France  on  the  one  side  and  England  on  the 
other,  or  else  going  north  about  by  the  Orkneys, 
a  most  inconvenient  circuit,  and  obtaining  but 
imperfect  shelter  from  recourse  to  this  deflected 
route.  Holland,  in  her  ancient  w^ars  with  Eng- 
land, when  the  two  were  fairly  matched  in 
point  of  numbers,  had  dire  experience  of  this 
false  position,  though  her  navy  was  little  inferior 
in  numbers  to  that  of  her  opponent.  This  is 
another  exemplification  of  the  truth  that  dis- 
tance is  a  factor  equivalent  to  a  certain  number 
of  ships.     Sea-defence  for  Germany,  in  case  of 


1 66  Considerations  Governing 

war  with  France  or  England,  means  established 
naval  predominance  at  least  in  the  North  Sea ; 
nor  can  it  be  considered  complete  unless  ex- 
tended through  the  Channel  and  as  far  as 
Great  Britain  will  have  to  project  hers  into 
the  Atlantic.  This  is  Germany's  initial  dis- 
advantage of  position,  to  be  overcome  only 
by  adequate  superiority  of  numbers;  and  it 
receives  little  compensation  from  the  security  of 
her  Baltic  trade,  and  the  facility  for  closing  that 
sea  to  her  enemies.  In  fact.  Great  Britain, 
whose  North  Sea  trade  is  but  one-fourth  of  her 
total,  lies  to  Germany  as  Ireland  does  to  Great 
Britain,  flanking  both  routes  to  the  Atlantic ; 
but  the  great  development  of  the  British  sea- 
coast,  its  numerous  ports  and  ample  internal 
communications,  strengthen  that  element  of 
sea-defence  which  consists  in  abundant  access 
to  harbors  of  refuge. 

For  the  Baltic  Powers,  which  comprise  all 
the  maritime  States  east  of  Germany,  the  com- 
mercial drawback  of  the  Orkney  route  is  a  little 
less  than  for  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  in  that  the 
exit  from  the  Baltic  is  nearly  equidistant  from 
the  north  and  south  extremities  of  England  ; 
nevertheless  the  excess  in  distance  over  the  Chan- 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  167 

nel  route  remains  very  considerable.  The  initial 
naval  disadvantas^e  is  in  no  wise  diminished. 
For  all  the  communities  east  of  the  Straits  of 
Dover  it  remains  true  that  in  war  commerce  is 
paralyzed,  and  all  the  resultant  consequences 
of  impaired  national  strength  entailed,  unless 
decisive  control  of  the  North  Sea  is  established. 
That  effected,  there  is  security  for  commerce  by 
the  northern  passage  ;  but  this  alone  is  mere 
defence.  Offence,  exerted  anywhere  on  the 
globe,  requires  a  surplusage  of  force,  over  that 
required  to  hold  the  North  Sea,  sufficient  to 
extend  and  maintain  itself  west  of  the  British 
Islands.  In  case  of  war  with  either  of  the 
Channel  Powers,  this  means,  as  between  the 
two  opponents,  that  the  eastern  belligerent  has 
to  guard  a  long  line  of  communications,  and 
maintain  distant  positions,  against  an  antagonist 
resting  on  a  central  position,  with  interior  lines, 
able  to  strike  at  choice  at  either  wing  of 
the  enemy's  extended  front.  The  relation 
which  the  English  Channel,  with  its  branch 
the  Irish  Sea,  bears  to  the  North  Sea  and  tlie 
Atlantic  —  that  of  an  interior  position  —  is  the 
same  which  the  Mediterranean  bears  to  the 
Atlantic  and  the  Indian  Sea  ;  nor  is  it  merely 


1 68  Considerations  Governing 

fanciful  to  trace  in  the  passage  round  the  north 
of  Scotland  an  analogy  to  that  by  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope.  It  is  a  reproduction  in  miniature. 
The  conditions  are  similar,  the  scale  different. 
What  the  one  is  to  a  war  whose  scene  is  the 
north  of  Europe,  the  other  is  to  operations  by 
European  Powers  in  Eastern  Asia. 

To  protract  such  a  situation  is  intolerable  to 
the  purse  and  morale  of  the  belligerent  who  has 
the  disadvantage  of  position.  This  of  course 
leads  us  straight  back  to  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  all  naval  war,  namely,  that  defence  is 
insured  only  by  offence,  and  that  the  one  de- 
cisive objective  of  the  offensive  is  the  enemy's 
organized  force,  his  battle-fleet.  Therefore,  in 
the  event  of  a  war  between  one  of  the  Chan- 
nel Powers,  and  one  or  more  of  those  to  the 
eastward,  the  control  of  the  North  Sea  must  be 
at  once  decided.  For  the  eastern  State  it  is  a 
matter  of  obvious  immediate  necessity,  of  com- 
mercial self-preservation.  For  the  western 
State  the  offensive  motive  is  equally  impera- 
tive ;  but  for  Great  Britain  there  is  defensive 
need  as  well.  Her  Empire  imposes  such  a 
development  of  naval  force  as  makes  it  eco- 
nomically impracticable  to  maintain  an  army 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  169 

as  large  as  those  of  the  Continent.  Security 
against  invasion  depends  therefore  upon  the 
fleet.  Postponing  more  distant  interests,  she 
must  here  concentrate  an  indisputable  supe- 
riority. It  is,  however,  inconceivable  that 
against  any  one  Power  Great  Britain  should 
not  be  able  here  to  exert  from  the  first  a  pre- 
ponderance which  would  effectually  cover  all 
her  remoter  possessions.  Only  an  economical 
decadence,  which  would  of  itself  destroy  her 
position  among  nations,  could  bring  her  so  to 
foreg-Q  the  initial  advantage  she  has,  in  the 
fact  that  for  her  offence  and  defence  meet  and 
are  fulfilled  in  one  factor,  the  command  of  the 
sea.  History  has  conclusively  demonstrated 
the  inability  of  a  state  with  even  a  single  con- 
tinental frontier  to  compete  in  naval  develop- 
ment with  one  that  is  insular,  although  of 
smaller  population  and  resources.  A  coalition 
of  Powers  may  indeed  affect  the  balance.  As 
a  rule,  however,  a  single  state  against  a  coali- 
tion holds  the  interior  position,  the  concen- 
trated force ;  and  while  calculation  should 
rightly  take  account  of  possibilities,  it  should 
beware  of  permitting  imagination  too  free  sway 
in  presenting  its  pictures.     Were  the  eastern 


170  Considerations  Governing 

Powers  to  combine  they  might  prevent  Great 
Britain's  use  of  the  North  Sea  for  the  safe 
passage  of  her  merchant  shipping ;  but  even 
so  she  would  but  lose  commercially  the  whole 
of  a  trade,  the  greater  part  of  which  disappears 
by  the  mere  fact  of  war.  Invasion  is  not  pos- 
sible, unless  her  fleet  can  be  wholly  disabled 
from  appearing  in  that  sea.  From  her  geo- 
graphical position,  she  still  holds  her  gates 
open  to  the  outer  world,  which  maintains  three- 
fourths  of  her  commerce  in  peace. 

As  Great  Britain,  however,  turns  her  eyes 
from  the  North  and  Baltic  Seas,  which  in 
respect  to  her  relations  to  the  world  at  large 
may  justly  be  called  her  rear,  she  finds  con- 
ditions confronting  her  similar  to  those  which 
position  entails  upon  her  eastern  neighbors. 
Here,  however,  a  comparison  is  to  be  made. 
The  North  Sea  is  small,  its  coast-line  con- 
tracted, the  entrance  to  the  Baltic  a  mere 
strait.  Naval  preponderance  once  established, 
the  lines  of  transit,  especially  where  they  draw 
near  the  land,  are  easily  watched.  Doubtless, 
access  to  the  British  Islands  from  the  Atlantic, 
if  less  confined  by  geographical  surroundings, 
is  constricted  by  the  very  necessity  of  approach- 


The  Disposition  of  Navies 


ing  at  all ;  but  a  preponderant  fleet  maintained 
by  Great  Britain  to  the  south-west,  in  the  pro- 
longation of  the  Channel,  will  not  only  secure 
merchant  shipping  within  its  own  cruising- 
ground,  but  can  extend  its  support  by  outlying 
cruisers  over  a  great  area  in  every  direction. 
A  fleet  thus  in  local  superiority  imposes  upon 
cruisers  from  the  nearest  possible  enemy  — 
France  —  a  long  circuit  to  reach  the  northern 
approaches  of  the  islands,  where  they  will 
arrive  more  or  less  depleted  of  coal,  and  in 
danger  from  ships  of  their  own  class  resting  on 
the  nearer  ports  of  Scotland  or  Ireland.  Su- 
periority in  numbers  is  here  again  counterbal- 
anced by  advantage  of  position.  Vessels  of 
any  other  country,  south  or  east,  are  evidently 
under  still  greater  drawbacks. 

As  all  the  Atlantic  routes  and  Mediterranean 
trade  converge  upon  the  Channel,  this  must 
be,  as  it  always  has  been,  among  the  most  im- 
portant stations  of  the  British  Navy.  In  the 
general  scheme  its  office  is  essentially  defence. 
It  protects  the  economical  processes  which 
sustain  national  endurance,  and  thus  secures 
the  foundation  on  which  the  vigor  of  war 
rests.     But  its  scope  must  be  sanely  conceived. 


172  Considerations  Governing 

Imaginative  expectation  and  imaginative  alarms 
must  equally  be  avoided ;  for  both  tend  to 
exaggerate  the  development  of  defensive  dispo- 
sitions at  the  expense  of  offensive  power.  En- 
tire immunity  for  commerce  must  not  be 
anticipated,  nor  should  an  occasional  severe 
blow  be  allowed  to  force  from  panic  concessions 
which  calm  reason  rejects.  Inconvenience  and 
injury  are  to  be  expected,  and  must  be  borne 
in  order  that  the  grasp  upon  the  determining 
points  of  war  may  not  be  relaxed.  It  will  be 
the  natural  policy  of  an  enemy  to  intensify 
anxiety  about  the  Channel,  to  retain  or  divert 
thither  force  which  were  better  placed  elsewhere. 
By  the  size  of  her  navy  and  by  her  geographical 
situation  France  is  the  most  formidable  mari- 
time enemy  of  Great  Britain,  and  therefore  sup- 
plies the  test  to  which  British  dispositions  must 
be  brought;  but  it  is  probable  that  in  war,  as 
now  in  peace,  France  must  keep  the  larger  part 
of  her  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  Since  the 
days  of  Napoleon  she  has  given  hostages  to  for- 
tune in  the  acquisition  of  her  possessions  on  the 
African  continent  and  beyond  Suez.  Her  po- 
sition in  the  Mediterranean  has  become  to  her 
not  only  a  matter  of  national  sentiment,  w^iich 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  1 7  3 

it  long  has  been,  but  a  question  of  military 
importance  much  greater  than  when  Corsica 
was  all  she  owned  there.  It  is  most  unlikely 
that  Brest  and  Cherbourg  combined  will  in 
our  day  regain  the  relative  importance  of  the 
former  alone,  a  century  ago. 

In  view  of  this,  and  barring  the  case  of  a 
coalition,  I  conceive  that  the  battle-ships  of  the 
British  Channel  Fleet  would  not  need  to  out- 
number those  of  France  in  the  near  waters  by 
more  than  enough  to  keep  actually  at  sea  a 
force  equal  to  hers.  A  surplus  for  reliefs  would 
constitute  a  reserve  for  superiority;  that  is  all. 
The  great  preponderance  required  is  in  the 
cruisers,  who  are  covered  in  their  operations 
by  the  battle-fleet ;  the  mere  presence  of  the 
latter  with  an  adequate  scouting  system  se- 
cures them  from  molestation.  Two  classes 
of  cruisers  are  needed,  with  distinct  functions; 
those  which  protect  commerce  by  the  strong 
hand  and  constant  movement,  and  those  that 
keep  the  battle-fleet  informed  of  the  enemy's 
actions.  It  is  clear  that  the  close  watchins:  of 
hostile  ports,  an  operation  strictly  tactical,  has 
underojone  marked  chanQ-cs  of  conditions  since 
the  old  days.     The   abiHty  to  go  to  sea  and 


174  Considerations  Governing 

steer  any  course  under  any  conditions  of  wind, 
and  the  possibilities  of  the  torpedo-boat,  exag- 
gerated though  these  probably  have  been  in 
anticipation,  are  the  two  most  decisive  new 
factors.  To  them  are  to  be  added  the  range 
of  coast  guns,  which  keeps  scouts  at  a  much 
greater  distance  than  formerly,  and  the  impos- 
sibility now  of  detecting  intentions  which  once 
might  be  inferred  from  the  conditions  of  masts 
and  sails. 

On  the  other  hand  the  sphere  of  effec- 
tiveness has  been  immensely  increased  for 
the  scout  by  the  power  to  move  at  will,  and 
latterly  by  the  wireless  telegraphy.  With  high 
speed  and  large  numbers,  it  should  be  possible 
to  sweep  the  surroundings  of  any  port  so  thor- 
oughly as  to  make  the  chance  of  undetected 
escape  very  small,  while  the  transmission  of 
the  essential  facts  —  the  enemy's  force  and 
the  direction  taken  —  is  even  more  certain 
than  detection.  A  lookout  ship  to-day  will 
not  see  an  enemy  going  off  south  with  a  fresh 
fair  breeze,  which  is  for  herself  a  head  wind  to 
reach  her  own  fleet  a  hundred  miles  to  the 
northward.  She  may  not  need  even  to  steam 
to  the  main  body ;   but,  telephoning  the  news, 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  175 

she  will  seek  to  keep  the  enemy  in  sight,  gath- 
ering round  her  for  the  same  work  all  of  her 
own  class  within  reach  of  her  electric  voice. 
True,  an  enemy  may  double  on  his  track,  or 
otherwise  ultimately  elude ;  but  the  test  so 
imposed  on  military  sagacity  and  inference  is 
no  greater  than  it  formerly  was.  The  data 
are  different ;  the  problem  of  the  same  class. 
Where  can  he  go  fruitfully.''  A  raid.''  Well, 
a  raid,  above  all  a  maritime  raid,  is  only  a  raid  ; 
a  black  eye,  if  you  will,  but  not  a  bullet  in  the 
heart,  nor  yet  a  broken  leg.  To  join  another 
fleet.?  That  is  sound,  and  demands  action; 
but  the  British  battle-fleet  having  immediate 
notice,  and  a  fair  probability  of  more  informa- 
tion, should  not  be  long  behind.  There  is  at 
all  events  no  perplexity  exceeding  that  with 
which  men  of  former  times  dealt  successfully. 
In  the  same  way,  and  by  the  same  methods,  it 
should  be  possible  to  cover  an  extensive  cir- 
cumference to  seaward  so  effectively  that  a 
merchant  vessel  reaching  any  point  thereof 
would  be  substantially  secure  up  to  the  home 
port. 

The  battle-fleet  would  be  the  tactical  centre 
upon  which  both  systems  of  scouts  would  rest. 


176  Co7isiderations  Governing 

To  close-watch  a  port  to-day  requires  vessels 
swifter  than  the  battle-ships  within,  and 
stronger  in  the  as^o-resfate  than  their  cruiser 
force.  The  former  then  cannot  overtake  to 
capture,  nor  outrun  to  elude;  and  the  latter, 
which  may  overtake,  cannot  drive  off  their 
post,  nor  successfully  fight,  because  inferior 
in  strength.  Add  to  the  qualities  thus  de- 
fined sufificient  numbers  to  watch  by  night 
tiie  arc  of  a  circle  of  five  miles  radius,  of  which 
the  port  is  the  centre,  and  you  have  disposi- 
tions extremely  effective  against  an  enemy's 
getting  away  unperceived.  The  vessels  nearest 
in  are  individually  so  small  that  the  loss 
of  one  by  torpedo  is  militarily  immaterial ; 
moreover,  the  chances  will  by  no  means  all 
be  with  the  torpedo-boat.  The  battle-fleet,  a 
hundred  or  two  miles  distant  it  may  be,  and 
in  a  different  position  every  night,  is  as  safe 
from  torpedo  attack  as  ingenuity  can  place  it. 
Between  it  and  the  inside  scouts  are  the 
armored  cruisers,  faster  than  the  hostile  bat- 
tle-fleet, stronger  than  the  hostile  cruisers. 
These  are  tactical  dispositions  fit  for  to-day; 
and  in  essence  they  reproduce  those  of  St. 
Vincent    before     Brest,    and    his    placing    of 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  177 

Nelson  at  Cadiz  with  an  inshore  squadron,  a 
century  ago.  "  A  squadron  of  frigates  and  cut- 
ters plying  day  and  night  in  the  opening  of  the 
Goulet ;  five  ships-of-the-line  anchored  about 
ten  miles  outside ;  and  outside  of  them  again 
three  of-the-line  under  sail."  The  main  body, 
the  battle-fleet  of  that  time,  was  from  twenty- 
five  to  forty  miles  distant,  —  the  equivalent  in 
time  of  not  less  than  a  hundred  miles  to-day. 
Keeping  in  consideration  these  same  waters, 
the  office  and  function  of  the  Channel  Fleet 
may  be  better  realized  by  regarding  the  battle- 
ships as  the  centre,  from  which  depart  the  dis- 
positions for  watching,  not  only  the  enemy's 
port,  but  also  the  huge  area  to  seaward  which 
it  is  desired  to  patrol  efHciently  for  the  security 
of  the  national  commerce.  Take  a  radius  of 
two  hundred  miles;  to  it  corresponds  a  semi- 
circle of  six  hundred,  all  within  Marconi 
ransre  of  the  centre.  The  battle-fleet  never 
separates.  On  the  far  circumference  move  the 
lighter  and  swifter  cruisers ;  those  least  able  to 
resist,  if  surprised  by  an  enemy,  but  also  the 
best  able  to  escape,  and  the  loss  of  one  of  which 
is  inconsiderable,  as  of  the  inner  cruisers  off" 
the  port.      Between  them  and  the  fleet  are  the 


178  Co7isiderations  Gover^iing 

heavier  cruisers,  somewhat  dispersed,  in  very 
open  order,  but  in  mutual  touch,  with  a  squad- 
ron organization  and  a  plan  of  concentration, 
if  by  mischance  an  enemy's  division  come  upon 
one  of  them  unawares.  Let  us  suppose,  under 
such  a  danger,  they  are  one  hundred  miles  from 
the  central  body.  It  moves  out  at  twelve  miles 
an  hour,  they  in  at  fifteen.  Within  four  hours 
the  force  is  united,  save  the  light  cruisers. 
These,  as  in  all  ages,  must  in  large  measure  look 
out  for  themselves,  and  can  do  so  very  well. 

Granting,  as  required  by  the  hypothesis, 
equality  in  battle-ships  and  a  large  prepon- 
derance in  cruisers,  —  not  an  unreasonable  de- 
mand upon  an  insular  state, —  it  seems  to  me 
that  for  an  essentially  defensive  function  there 
is  here  a  fairly  reliable,  systematized,  working 
disposition.  It  provides  a  semi-circumference 
of  six  hundred  miles,  upon  reaching  any  point 
of  which  a  merchant  ship  is  secure  for  the  rest 
of  her  homeward  journey.  While  maintained, 
the  national  frontier  is  by  so  much  advanced, 
and  the  area  of  greatest  exposure  for  the  mer- 
chant fleet  equally  reduced.  Outside  this, 
cruising  as  formerly  practised  can  extend  very 
far  a  protection,  which,  if  less  in  degree,  is  still 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  1 79 

considerable.  For  this  purpose,  in  my  own 
judgment,  and  I  think  by  the  verdict  of  his- 
tory, dissociated  single  ships  are  less  efficient 
than  cruiser-squadrons,  such  as  were  illustrated 
by  the  deeds  of  Jean  Bart  and  Pellew.  One 
such,  a  half-dozen  strong,  west  of  Finisterre, 
and  another  west  of  Scotland,  each  under  a 
competent  chief  authorized  to  move  at  discre- 
tion over  a  fairly  wide  area,  beyond  the  baili- 
wick of  the  commander-in-chief,  would  keep 
enemies  at  a  respectful  distance  from  much 
more  ground  than  he  actually  occupies;  for 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  opponent's 
imagination  of  danger  is  as  fruitful  as  one's 
own. 

In  conception,  this  scheme  is  purely  defen- 
sive. Incidentally,  if  opportunity  offer  to  in- 
jure the  enemy  it  will  of  course  be  embraced, 
but  the  controlling  object  is  to  remove  the 
danger  to  home  commerce  by  neutralizing  the 
enemy's  fleet.  To  this  end  numbers  and  force 
are  calculated.  This  done,  the  next  step  is  to 
consider  the  Mediterranean  from  the  obvious 
and  inevitable  military  point  of  view  that  it  is 
the  one  and  only  central  position,  the  assured 
control  of  which  gives  an  interior  line  of  opera- 


I  So  Considerations  Goverfii^tg 

tions  from  the  western  coast  of  Europe  to  the 
eastern  waters  of  Asia.  To  have  assured  safety 
to  the  home  seas  and  seaboard  is  little,  except 
as  a  means  to  further  action  ;  for,  if  to  build 
without  a  foundation  is  disastrous,  to  lay 
foundations  and  not  to  be  able  to  build 
is  impotent,  and  that  is  the  case  where  dis- 
proportioned  care  is  given  to  mere  defensive 
arrangements.  The  power  secured  and  stored 
at  home  must  be  continually  transmitted  to 
the  distant  scene  of  operations,  here  assumed, 
on  account  of  the  known  conditions  of  world 
politics,  to  be  the  western  Pacific,  which,  under 
varying  local  designations,  washes  the  shores 
of  the  Farther  East. 

It  has  been  said  that  in  the  Mediterranean, 
as  the  principal  link  in  the  long  chain  of 
communications,  defence  and  offence  blend. 
Moreover,  since  control  here  means  assured 
quickest  transmission  of  reinforcements  and 
supplies  in  either  direction,  it  follows  that, 
while  preponderance  in  battle-ship  force  is 
essential  in  the  Far  East,  where  if  war  occurs 
the  operations  will  be  offensive,  such  predom- 
inance in  the  Mediterranean,  equally  essential 
in  kind,  must  be  much  greater  in  degree.     In 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  i8i 

fact,  the  offensive  fleet  in  the  Eastern  Seas  and 
the  defensive  fleet  in  the  Channel  are  the  two 
wings,  or  flanks,  of  a  long  front  of  operations, 
the  due  security  of  both  of  which  depends  upon 
the  assured  tenure  of  the  central  position. 
Naturally,  therefore,  the  Mediterranean  fleet, 
having  to  support  both,  possibly  even  to  de- 
tach hurriedly  to  one  or  the  other,  has  in  it- 
self that  combination  of  defensive  and  offen- 
sive character  which  ordinarily  inheres  in  sea 
communications  as  such. 

If  this  assertion  be  accepted  in  general  state- 
ment, it  will  be  fortified  by  a  brief  considera- 
tion of  permanent  conditions ;  with  which  it 
is  further  essential  to  associate  as  present  tem- 
porary factors  the  existing  alliances  between 
France  and  Russia,  Great  Britain  and  Japan. 
The  Triple  Alliance,  of  the  renewal  of  which 
we  are  assured,  does  not  contemplate  among 
its  objects  any  one  that  is  directly  affected  by 
the  control  of  the  Mediterranean.  Should  an 
individual  member  engage  in  war  having  its 
scene  there,  it  would  be  as  a  power  untram- 
melled by  this  previous  engagement. 

History  and  physical  conformation  have 
constituted   unique  strategic  conditions  in  the 


iS2  Considerations  Govcr7iing 


Mediterranean.  To  history  is  due  the  exist- 
ing tenure  of  positions,  the  bases,  of  varying 
intrinsic  value,  and  held  with  varying  degrees 
of  power  and  firmness  by  several  nations  in 
several  quarters.  To  examine  these  minutely 
and  w^eigh  their  respective  values  as  an  ele- 
ment of  strategic  effect  would  be  indeed  essen- 
tial to  the  particular  jilanning  of  a  naval  cam- 
paign, or  to  the  proper  determination  of  the 
distribution  of  naval  force,  with  a  view  to  the 
combinations  open  to  one's  self  or  the  enemy; 
but  a  paper  dealing  with  general  conditions 
may  leave  such  detailed  considerations  to  those 
immediately  concerned.  It  must  be  sufficient 
to  note  the  eminently  central  position  of  Malta, 
the  uni(]ue  position  of  Ciibraltar,  and  the  ex- 
ccntric  situation  of  Toulon  relatively  to  the 
great  trade  route.  By  conformation  the  Med- 
iterranean has,  besides  the  artificial  canal,  — 
the  frailest  and  most  doubtful  j^art  of  the  chain, 
—  at  least  three  straits  of  the  utmost  decisive 
importance,  because  there  is  to  them  no  alter- 
native ])assage  by  which  vessels  can  leave  the 
sea,  or  move  from  one  part  of  it  to  another. 
In  the  Caribbean  Sea,  which  is  a  kind  of  Med- 
iterranean, the   multiplicity  of  islands  and  pas- 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  i8 


o 


sages  reduces  many  of  them  to  inconsequence, 
and  qualifies  markedly  the  effect  of  even  the 
most  important;  but,  in  the  Mediterranean, 
the  Dardanelles,  Gibraltar,  and  the  belt  of 
water  separating  the  toe  of  Italy  from  Cape 
Bon  in  Africa,  constitute  three  points  of  transit 
which  cannot  be  evaded.  It  is  true  that  in  the 
last  the  situation  of  the  island  of  Sicily  allows 
vessels  to  go  on  its  either  side ;  but  the  sur- 
rounding conditions  arc  such  that  it  is  scarcely 
possible  for  a  fleet  to  pass  undetected  by  an 
adversary  making  due  use  of  his  scouts. 
These  physical  peculiarities,  conjointly  with 
the  positions  specified,  are  the  permanent  fea- 
tures, which  must  underlie  and  control  all 
strategic  plans  of  Mediterranean  Powers,  among 
whom  Russia  must  be  inferentially  included. 
Geographically,  Great  Britain  is  an  intruder 
in  the  Mediterranean.  Her  presence  there  at 
all,  in  territorial  tenure,  is  distinctively  military. 
This  is  witnessed  also  by  the  character  of  her 
particular  possessions.  Nowhere  docs  the  vital 
energy  of  sea  power  appear  more  conspicu- 
ously, as  self-expansive  and  self-dependent. 
To  its  historical  manifestation  is  due  the  acqui- 
sitions which  make  the  strength  of  her  present 


184  Consider atio7ts  Governing' 

position;  but,  as  in  history,  so  now,  sea  power 
itself  must  continue  to  sustain  that  which  it 
begat.  The  habitual  distribution  of  the  war- 
ships of  the  United  Kingdom  must  provide  for 
a  decisive  predominance  here,  upon  occasion 
arising,  over  any  probable  combination  of 
enemies.  Such  provision  has  \.o  take  account 
not  only  of  the  total  force  of  hostile  divisions 
within  and  without  the  Mediterranean,  but  of 
movements  intended  to  transfer  one  or  more 
from  or  to  that  sea  from  other  scenes  of  opera- 
tions. Prevention  of  these  attempts  is  a  ques- 
tion, not  of  numbers  chiefly,  but  of  position, 
of  stations  assigned,  of  distribution.  Predom- 
inance, to  be  militarily  effectual,  means  not 
only  an  aggregate  superiority  to  the  enemy 
united,  but  ability  to  frustrate,  before  accom- 
plishment, concentrations  which  might  give 
him  a  local  superiority  anywhere.  This  is  a 
question  of  positions  more  even  than  of  num- 
bers. In  the  Mediterranean,  as  the  great 
centre,  these  two  factors  must  receive  such 
mutual  adjustment  as  shall  outweigh  the  com- 
bination of  them  on  the  part  of  the  adversary. 
Where  one  is  defective  the  other  must  be  in- 
creased.    The  need  is  the  more  emphatic  when 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  1S5 

the  nation  itself  is  external  and  distant  from 
the  sea,  while  possible  antagonists,  as  Russia 
and  France,  are  territorially  contiguous ;  for 
it  can  scarcely  be  expected  that  the  Russian 
Black  Sea  fleet  would  not  force  its  way  through 
the  Dardanelles  upon  urgent  occasion. 

Evidently,  too,  Japan  cannot  in  the  near 
future  contribute  directly  to  maintain  Great 
Britain  in  the  Mediterranean.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  declarations  of  Russia  and  France 
make  plain  that,  if  war  arise,  Japan  must  be 
supported  in  the  Far  East  by  her  ally  against 
a  coalition,  the  uncertain  element  of  which  is 
the  force  that  France  will  feel  able  to  spare 
from  her  scattered,  exposed  interests.  Russia 
labors  under  no  such  distraction ;  her  single- 
ness of  eye  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  more 
efficient,  and  by  far  the  larger  part,  of  her  so- 
called  Baltic  fleet  is  now  in  the  waters  of  China. 
In  numbers  and  force  she  has  there  a  sub- 
stantial naval  equality  with  Japan,  but  under 
a  disadvantage  of  position  like  that  of  Great 
Britain  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  being  remote 
from  the  centre  of  her  power,  imperfectly  based, 
as  yet,  upon  local  resources,  and  with  home 
communications  by  the  shortest  route  gravely 


1 86  Considerations  Governing 

uncertain.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
decided  step  she  has  taken  in  the  reinforcement 
of  her  Eastern  Navy,  carries  the  political  in- 
ference that  she  for  the  present  means  to  seek 
her  desired  access  to  unfrozen  waters  in  East- 
ern Asia,  preferably  to  the  Mediterranean  or  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Having  in  view  local  difHculties 
and  antagonistic  interests  elsewhere,  this  con- 
clusion was  probably  inevitable ;  but  its  evident 
acceptance  is  notable. 

For  Great  Britain  it  is  also  most  opportune ; 
and  this  raises  a  further  question,  attractive  to 
speculative  minds,  viz.:  whether  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  agreement  has  had  upon  Russia  a 
stimulating  or  a  deterrent  effect  .f*  If  it  has  in- 
creased her  determination  to  utilize  her  present 
advantages,  as  represented  in  Port  Arthur  and 
its  railroad,  it  would  be  in  the  direct  line  of 
a  sound  British  policy ;  for  it  fixes  the  rea- 
sonable satisfaction  of  Russia's  indisputable 
needs  in  a  region  remote  from  the  greater  in- 
terests of  Great  Britain,  yet  where  attempts 
at  undue  predominance  will  elicit  the  active 
resistance  of  many  competitors,  intent  upon 
their  own  equally  indisputable  rights.  The 
gathering  of  the  eagles  on  the  coasts  of  China 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  187 

is  manifest  to  the  dullest  eye.  But  should  the 
alliance  have  the  contrary  effect  of  checking 
Russian  development  in  that  direction,  her 
irrepressible  tendency  to  the  sea  is  necessarily 
thrown  upon  a  quarter — the  Levant  or  Persia 
—  more  distinctly  ominous,  and  where,  in  the 
last  named  at  least,  Great  Britain  would  find 
no  natural  supporter,  enlisted  by  similarity  of 
interest.  The  concentration  of  Russian  ships 
in  the  East,  taken  in  connection  with  the  gen- 
eral trend  of  events  there,  is,  however,  as  clear 
an  indication  of  policy  as  can  well  be  given. 

In  connection  with  the  substantial  numerical 
equality  of  Japan  and  Russia  is  to  be  taken, 
as  one  of  the  ascertained  existing  conditions, 
instituted  so  recently  as  to  have  a  possi- 
ble political  significance,  the  reorganization 
of  the  French  divisions  beyond  Suez  into  a 
single  command,  and  the  numbers  thereto 
assigned.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  this 
new  disposition  has  been  adopted  without  con- 
sideration of  the  new  combinations  indicated 
by  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty.  It  may  even  be 
in  direct  consequence.  The  relative  strengths 
of  this  extensive  eastern  command  and  of  the 
French    Mediterranean    fleet   should    in    close 


1 88  Consideraiicms  Govciniing 

measure  reflect  the  official  consciousness  of  the 
general  naval  situation,  and  of  the  power  of 
France  to  give  support  to  her  recognized  ally ; 
directly  in  the  East,  and  indirectly  by  military 
influence  exerted  upon  the  Mediterranean. 
Supposing  Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  have  made  provision  for  the  defensive  con- 
trol of  the  approaches  to  her  home  ports,  how 
will  she,  and  how  can  she,  assure  the  joint 
ascendency  of  herself  and  her  ally  in  the  Farther 
East,  the  scene  of  the  offensive,  and  her  own 
single  preponderance  in  the  Mediterranean, 
the  main  link  in  the  communications?  These 
are  the  two  intricate  factors  for  consideration, 
calling  for  plans  and  movements  not  primarily 
defensive  but  offensive  in  scope.  For  France 
and  for  Great  Britain,  as  a  party  to  an  alliance, 
the  question  is  urgent,  "  How  far  can  I  go, 
how  much  spare  from  the  Mediterranean  to 
the  East?  In  assisting  my  ally  there,  unless 
I  bring  him  predominance,  or  at  least  nearly 
an  equality,  I  waste  my  substance,  little  help- 
ing him.  If  paralyzed  in  the  Mediterranean, 
thrown  on  a  mere  defensive,  my  force  in  the 
East  is  practically  cut  off.  Like  a  besieged 
garrison,  it  may  endure  till  relieved ;   but  the 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  189 

situation  is  critical  while  it  lasts,  and   carries 
imminent  possibilities  of  disaster." 

In  approaching  a  military  subject  of  this 
character  it  is  necessary  first  and  for  all  to 
disabuse  the  mind  of  the  idea  that  a  scheme 
can  be  devised,  a  disposition  imagined,  by 
which  all  risk  is  eliminated.  Such  an  attrac- 
tive condition  of  absolute  security,  if  realized, 
would  eliminate  all  war  along  with  its  risks.  A 
British  distribution,  most  proper  for  the  Medi- 
terranean alone,  may  entail  the  danger  that  a 
hostile  body  may  escape  into  the  Atlantic,  may 
unite  with  the  Brest  and  Cherbourg  divisions 
against  the  Channel  Fleet,  and  overwhelm  the 
latter.  True  ;  but  imagination  must  work  both 
ways.  It  may  also  be  that  the  escape  cannot 
but  be  known  at  Gibraltar,  telegraphed  to 
England,  and  the  fleet  warned  betimes  so  that 
the  reserve  ships,  which  give  it  a  superiority  to 
either  detachment  of  the  enemy,  might  join, 
and  that  its  scouts,  stationed  as  previously 
suggested,  would  gain  for  it  the  two  hours  of 
time  needed  to  deal  decisively  with  one  division 
before  the  other  turns  up.  These  probabilities, 
known  to  the  enemy,  affect  his  actions  just  as 
one's  own  risks  move  one's  self.     Listen  to  Nel- 


190  Considerations  Governing 

son  contemplating  just  this  contingency.  "  If 
the  Ferrol  squadron  joins  the  Toulon,  they  will 
much  outnumber  us,  but  in  that  case  I  shall 
never  lose  sight  of  them,  and  Pellew "  (from 
before  Ferrol)  "  will  soon  be  after  them."  But 
he  adds,  confirmatory  of  the  need  of  numerous 
scouts,  then  as  now,  "  I  at  this  moment  want 
ten  frigates  or  sloops,  when  I  believe  neither 
the  Ferrol  or  Toulon  squadron  could  escape 
me."  By  this,  I  understand,  is  clearly  inti- 
mated that  he  could  look  out  both  ways,  in- 
tercept the  first  comer,  frustrate  the  junction, 
and  beat  them  in  detail.  If  not  before  the 
action,  Pellew  would  arrive  in  time  to  repair 
Nelson's  losses  and  restore  equality.  The 
change  in  modern  conditions  would  favor  the 
modern  Pellew  more  than  the  adversary. 

So  again  disturbing  political  possibilities 
must  be  reasonably  viewed.  It  may  be  that 
the  whole  Continent  not  only  dislikes  Great 
Britain,  but  would  willingly  combine  for  her 
military  destruction ;  and  that,  if  war  begin, 
such  a  combination  may  come  to  pass.  It  may 
be;  but  this  at  least  is  certain,  that  interest, 
not  liking,  will  decide  so  grave  a  matter. 
In   the  calculation  of  final  issues,  of  national 


TJie  Disposition  of  Navies  191 

expenditure,  of  profit  and  loss,  of  relative  na- 
tional predominance  resulting  from  a  supposed 
success,  I  incline  to  think  that  Imperial  Feder- 
ation will  be  a  far  less  difficult  achievement  than 
framing  such  a  coalition.  If  the  two  dual  alli- 
ances, the  mutual  opposition  of  which  is  appar- 
ent, come  to  blows,  Germany  may  see  it  to  her 
interest  to  strike  hands  with  Russia  and  France; 
but  it  seems  to  me  it  would  be  so  much  more 
her  interest  to  let  them  exhaust  themselves,  to 
the  relief  of  her  two  flanks,  that  I  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  believe  she  would  not  herself  so  view 
the  question.  There  is  one  qualifying  consid- 
eration. Germany  cannot  but  wish  a  modifica- 
tion in  the  effect  exerted  upon  her  maritime 
routes  by  the  position  of  Great  Britain,  already 
noted.  As  geographical  situation  cannot  be 
changed,  the  only  modification  possible  is  the 
decrease  of  Great  Britain's  power  by  the  les- 
sening of  her  fleet.  But,  grant  that  object 
gained  by  such  coalition,  what  remains.-^  A 
Channel  dominated  by  the  French  Navy  no 
longer  checked  by  the  British ;  whereas  with 
the  latter  as  an  ally  the  Channel  would  be 
almost  as  safe  as  the  Kiel  canal.  If  this  re- 
mark is  sound,  it  is  but  an  illustration  of  the 


192  Considerations  Governing 

choice  of  difficulties  presented  by  attempts  to 
change  permanent  conditions  by  artificial  com- 
binations. As  a  matter  of  fact,  no  single  power 
in  Europe,  save  possibly  Russia,  is  individually 
so  weighty  as  to  see  without  apprehension  the 
effective  elimination  of  any  one  factor  in  the 
present  balance  of  power.  The  combined  posi- 
tion and  numbers  of  Russia  do  give  her  a  great 
defensive  security  in  her  present  tenures. 

Admitting  the  Mediterranean  to  be  distinc- 
tively and  pre-eminently  the  crucial  feature  in 
any  strategic  scheme  that  contemplates  Europe 
and  the  Farther  East  as  the  chief  factors  of 
interest,  the  positions  before  enumerated,  in 
conjunction  with  the  relative  forces  of  the  fleets, 
constitute  the  initial  strategic  situation.  As- 
suming, as  is  very  possible,  that  the  decisive 
predominance,  local  or  general,  desired  by  either 
party,  does  not  yet  exist,  the  attempt  of  each 
must  be  to  reach  some  preponderance  by  play- 
ing the  game  of  war ;  by  such  applied  pressure 
or  strategic  movements  as  shall  procure  a  deci- 
sive momentary  preponderance  in  some  quarter, 
the  due  use  of  which,  by  the  injury  done  the 
enemy,  shall  establish  a  permanent  and  decisive 
superiority.     This  is  the  one  object  of  war  sci- 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  193 

entifically  —  or  better,  artistically  — ■  considered. 
The  nation  that  begins  with  the  stronger  fleet 
should  initiate  some  offensive  action,  with  the 
object  of  compelling  the  enemy  to  fight.  This 
the  latter  cannot  do,  unless  already  in  adequate 
strength  at  some  one  point,  except  by  under- 
takinor  to  combine  his  divided  forces  so  as  to 
effect  a  concentration  in  some  quarter.  The 
movements  necessary  to  accomplish  this  are 
the  opportunity  of  the  offensive,  to  strike  the 
converging  divisions  before  their  junction  gives 
the  desired  local  superiority.  Herein  is  the 
skill ;  herein  also  the  chance,  the  unexpected, 
the  risk,  which  the  best  authorities  tell  us  are 
inseparable  from  war,  and  constitute  much  of 
its  opportunity  as  of  its  danger. 

How  shall  the  superior  fleet  exercise  the 
needed  compulsion  ?  Ships  cannot  invade  ter- 
ritory, unless  there  be  unprotected  navigable 
rivers.  The  stronger  navy  therefore  cannot 
carry  war  beyond  the  sea-coast,  home  to  the 
heart  of  the  enemy,  unless  indeed  its  nation  in 
addition  to  controlling  the  sea,  can  transport 
an  overpowering  force  of  troops.  Of  this  the 
Transvaal  war  offers  an  illustration.  Possibly, 
a  disabling  blow  to  the    British    fleet  by  the 

13 


194  Considerations  Governing 

navy  of  one  of  the  great  continental  armies 
might  present  a  somewhat  similar  instance  ;  but 
when  the  British  fleet  is  thus  enfeebled,  Great 
Britain  will  be  exposed  to  the  conditions  which 
it  must  be  her  own  first  effort,  with  her  supreme 
navy,  to  impose  on  an  opponent.  Under  such 
circumstances,  there  will  be  no  need  for  an 
enemy  to  land  an  invading  host  on  British  soil. 
The  interception  of  commerce  at  a  half-dozen 
of  the  principal  ports  will  do  the  work  as  surely, 
if  less  directly.  Similarly,  while  the  British 
Navy  is  what  it  is,  the  destruction  of  an  enemy's 
commerce,  not  only  by  scattered  cruisers  at 
sea,  but  by  a  systematized,  coherent  effort 
directed  against  his  ports  and  coasts,  both 
home  and  colonial,  must  be  the  means  of  in- 
flicting such  distress  and  loss  as  shall  compel 
his  fleet  to  fight;  or,  if  it  still  refuse,  shall  sap 
endurance  by  suffering  and  extenuation. 

To  effect  this  requires  a  battle-fleet  superior 
in  the  aggregate  to  the  one  immediately  op- 
posed to  it  by  at  least  so  many  ships  as  shall 
suffice  to  allow  a  constant  system  of  reliefs. 
The  battle-fleet  is  the  solid  nucleus  of  power. 
From  it  radiates  the  system  of  cruisers  by 
which    the    trade    blockade   is    maintained    in 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  195 

technical,  and  as  far  as  may  be,  in  actual,  effi- 
ciency. In  case  of  hostilities  with  France,  for 
example,  the  blockade  of  a  principal  commer- 
cial port,  like  Havre  or  Marseille,  may  be  sus- 
tained in  local  efficiency  by  cruisers  ;  but  the 
security  of  these,  and  consequently  the  main- 
tenance of  the  blockade,  will  depend  upon  such 
proximity  of  the  battle-fleet  as  will  prevent  the 
French  divisions  at  Cherbourg,  Brest,  or  Toulon, 
from  attacking  them,  except  at  great  risk  of 
being  compelled  to  an  engagement  which  it  is 
presumably  the  specific  aim  of  the  British  fleet 
to  force.  "  Not  blockade  but  battle  is  my  aim," 
said  Nelson :  "  on  the  sea  alone  we  hope  to 
realize  the  hopes  and  expectations  of  our  coun- 
try." A  successful  battle  in  any  one  quarter 
clears  up  the  whole  situation ;  that  is,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  results  obtained.  This  qualifi- 
cation is  always  to  be  borne  in  mind  by  a 
victorious  admiral;  for  the  general  relief  to  his 
nation  will  correspond  to  the  use  made  by  him 
of  the  particular  advantage  gained.  More  or 
fewer  of  his  ships  will  be  liberated  from  their 
previous  tasks,  and  can  reinforce  the  station 
where  the  most  assured  predominance  is  desired. 
This  by  our  analysis  is  the  Mediterranean. 


196  Considerations  Governing 

History  has  more  than  once  shown  how 
severe  a  compulsion  may  be  exerted  over  an 
extensive  coast  by  proper  dispositions.  Where 
a  formidable,  though  inferior,  navy  lies  in  the 
ports  of  the  blockaded  state,  the  position  and 
management  of  the  battle-fleet,  on  either  side, 
is  the  critical  military  problem.  The  task  of  the 
cruisers  is  simple,  if  arduous ;  to  keep  near  the 
port  assigned  them,  to  hold  their  ground  against 
equals,  to  escape  capture  by  superior  force.  The 
battle-fleet  must  be  so  placed  as  effectually  to 
cover  the  cruisers  from  the  enemy's  fleet,  with- 
out unduly  exposing  itself ;  above  all  to  torpedo 
attack.  It  must  be  on  hand,  not  only  to  fight, 
but  to  chase  to  advantage,  to  make  strategic 
movements,  perhaps  extensive  in  range,  at  short 
notice.  War  is  a  business  of  positions.  Its  posi- 
tion, suitably  chosen,  by  supporting  the  cruiser 
force,  covers  the  approaches  of  the  national  com- 
merce, and  also  maintains  both  the  commercial 
blockade  and  the  close  watch  of  the  military 
ports.  It  may  be  noted  that  the  commer- 
cial blockade  is  offensive  in  design,  to  injure 
the  enemy  and  compel  him  to  fight,  while 
the  other  specified  functions  of  the  vessels 
are  defensive.     We  therefore  have  here  again 


The  Dispositio7i  of  Navies  197 

a  combination  of  the  two  purposes  in  a  single 
disposition. 

For  some  time  to  come  nations  distinctively 
European  must  depend  upon  the  Mediterra- 
nean as  their  principal  military  route  to  the 
Far  East.  In  the  present  condition  of  the 
Siberian  railroad,  Russia  shares  this  common 
lot.  While  the  other  States  have  no  land  route 
whatever,  hers  is  still  so  imperfect  as  not  to 
constitute  a  valid  substitute.  Moreover,  what- 
ever resources  of  moderate  bulk  may  be  locally 
accumulated, —  coal,  provisions,  ammunition, 
and  stores  of  various  kinds,  —  reinforcements 
of  vessels,  or  reliefs  to  ships  disabled  by  service 
or  in  battle  can  go  only  by  sea.  Guns  beyond 
a  certain  calibre  are  in  like  case.  Every  con- 
sideration emphasizes  the  importance  of  the 
Mediterranean.  To  it  the  Red  Sea  is  simply 
an  annex,  the  military  status  of  which  will  be 
determined  by  that  of  its  greater  neighbor, 
qualified  in  some  measure  by  the  tenure  of 
Egypt  and  Aden. 

On  the  farther  side  of  the  isthmus,  the  naval 
operations  throughout  Eastern  seas  will  depend 
for  sustained  vigor  upon  contact  militarily 
maintained     with     the     Mediterranean,     and 


1 98  Considerations  Governing 

through  that  with  home.  In  these  days  of 
cables,  the  decisive  importance  of  Malta  to 
India,  recognized  by  Nelson  and  his  contem- 
poraries, is  affirmed  with  quadruple  force  of 
the  sea  in  which  Malta  is  perhaps  the  most 
conspicuously  important  naval  position.  Rein- 
forcements sent  by  the  Cape,  whether  west  or 
east,  can  always  be  anticipated  at  either  end  of 
the  road  by  the  Power  which  holds  the  interior 
line. 

As  regards  special  dispositions  for  the  East- 
ern seas,  embracing  under  that  name  all  from 
Suez  to  Japan,  the  same  factors  —  numbers  and 
position  —  dictate  distribution.  To  a  central 
position,  if  such  there  be,  must  be  assigned 
numbers  adequate  to  immediate  superiority,  in 
order  to  control  commercial  routes,  and  to 
operate  against  the  enemy  whose  approximate 
force  and  position  are  known.  Such  assign- 
ment keeps  in  view,  necessarily,  the  possibilities 
of  receiving  reinforcements  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean, or  having  to  send  them  to  China.  Cey- 
lon, for  example,  if  otherwise  suitable,  is  nearly 
midway  between  Suez  and  Hong-Kong;  in 
round  numbers,  3000  miles  from  each.  Such 
a   position    favors    a  force    of    battle-ships    as 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  199 

an  advanced  squadron  from  the  Mediterranean, 
and  would  be  a  provision  against  a  mishap  at 
the  canal  interrupting  reinforcements  eastward. 
Position,  with  its  two  functions  of  distance  and 
resources;  there  is  nothing  more  prominent 
than  these  in  Napoleon's  analysis  of  a  military 
situation.  Numbers  go,  as  it  were,  without 
saying.  Where  the  power  was  his  he  multiplied 
them  ;  but  he  always  remembered  that  position 
multiplies  spontaneously.  He  who  has  but 
half-way  to  go  does  double  work.  This  is  the 
privilege  of  central  position. 

The  question  of  the  Eastern  seas  introduces 
naturally  the  consideration  of  what  the  great 
self-governing  colonies  can  do,  not  only  for 
their  own  immediate  security,  and  that  of  their 
trade,  but  for  the  general  fabric  of  Imperial 
naval  action,  in  the  coherence  of  which  they 
will  find  far  greater  assurance  than  in  merely 
local  effort.  The  prime  naval  considerations 
for  them  are  that  the  British  Channel  Fleet 
should  adequately  protect  the  commerce  and 
shores  of  the  British  Islands,  and  that  the 
Mediterranean  Fleet  should  insure  uninter- 
rupted transit  for  trade  and  for  reinforcements. 
These   effected  and   maintained,  there  will   be 


200  Considerations  Governing 

no  danger  to  their  territory;  and  little  to  their 
trade  except  from  single  cruisers,  which  will 
have  a  precarious  subsistence  as  compared 
with  their  own,  based  upon  large  self-support- 
ing political  communities.  Australasia,  how- 
ever, can  undoubtedly  supply  a  very  important 
factor,  that  will  go  far  to  fortify  the  whole 
British  position  in  the  Far  East.  A  continent 
in  itself,  with  a  thriving  population,  and  willing, 
apparently,  to  contribute  to  the  general  naval 
welfare,  let  it  frame  its  schemes  and  base  its 
estimates  on  sound  lines,  both  naval  and  im- 
perial; naval,  by  allowing  due  weight  to  battle 
force;  imperial,  by  contemplating  the  whole, 
and  recognizing  that  local  safety  is  not  always 
best  found  in  local  precaution.  There  is  a 
military  sense,  in  which  it  is  true  that  he  who 
loses  his  life  shall  save  it. 

In  the  Eastern  seas,  Australia  and  China 
mark  the  extremities  of  two  long  lines,  the 
junction  of  which  is  near  India ;  let  us  say,  for 
sake  of  specificness,  Ceylon.  They  are  off- 
shoots, each,  of  one  branch,  the  root  of  which 
under  present  conditions,  is  the  English  Chan- 
nel, and  the  trunk  the  Mediterranean.  Now  it 
is  the  nature  of  extremities  to  be  exposed.    To 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  201 

this  our  feet,  hands,  and  ears  bear  witness,  as 
does  the  military  aphorism  about  salients ;  but 
while  local  protection  has  its  value  in  these 
several  cases,  the  general  vigor  and  sustenance 
of  the  oro-anism  as  a  whole  is  the  truer  de- 
pendence.  To  apply  this  simile:  it  appears 
to  me  that  the  waters  from  Suez  eastward 
should  be  regarded  as  a  military  whole,  vitally 
connected  with  the  system  to  the  westward, 
but  liable  to  temporary  interruption  at  the 
Canal,  against  which  precaution  must  be  had. 
This  recognizes  at  once  the  usual  dependence 
upon  the  Channel  and  the  Mediterranean,  and 
the  coincident  necessity  of  providing  for  inde- 
pendent existence  on  emergency.  In  the  na- 
ture of  things  there  must  be  a  big  detachment 
east  of  Suez ;  the  chance  of  its  being  momen- 
tarily cut  off  there  is  not  so  bad  as  its  being 
stalled  on  the  other  side,  dependent  on  the 
Cape  route  to  reach  the  scene.  But  for  the 
same  reason  that  the  Mediterranean  and  Malta 
are  strategically  eminent,  because  central,  (as  is 
likewise  the  Channel  with  reference  to  the 
North  Sea  and  Atlantic),  the  permanent  stra- 
tegic centre  of  the  Eastern  seas  is  not  by 
position  in,  China,  nor  yet  in  Australia.     It  is 


202  Considerations  Governing 

to  be  found  rather  at  a  point  which,  approxi- 
mately equidistant  from  both,  is  also  equi- 
distant from  the  Mediterranean  and  the  East. 
Permanent,  I  say;  not  as  ignoring  that  the 
force  which  there  finds  its  centre  may  have 
to  remove,  and  long  to  remain,  at  one  extrem- 
ity or  another  of  the  many  radii  thence  issu- 
ing, but  because  there  it  is  best  placed  to 
move  in  the  shortest  time  in  any  one  of  the 
several  directions.  That  from  the  same  centre 
it  best  protects  the  general  commercial  inter- 
ests is  evident  from  an  examination  of  the 
maps  and  of  commercial  returns. 

Whether  the  essential  unity  of  scope  in  naval 
action  east  of  Suez  should  receive  recognition 
by  embracing  Australia,  China,  and  India, 
under  one  general  command,  with  local  sub- 
ordinates, is  a  question  administrative  as  well 
as  strategic.  As  military  policy  it  has  a  good 
side;  for  commanders  previously  independent 
do  not  always  accept  ungrudgingly  the  intrusion 
of  a  superior  because  of  emergency  of  war. 
Military  sensitiveness  cannot  prudently  be  left 
out  of  calculations.  There  would  be  benefit 
also  in  emphasizing  in  public  consciousness  the 
essential  unity  of  militar}' considerations,  which 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  203 

should  dominate  the  dispositions  of  the  fleet. 
Non-professional  —  and  even  military  —  minds 
need  the  habit  of  regarding  local  and  general 
interests  in  their  true  relations  and  proportions. 
Unless  such  correct  appreciation  exist,  it  is 
hard  to  silence  the  clamor  for  a  simple  local 
security,  which  is  apparent  but  not  real,  because 
founded  on  a  subdivision  and  dissemination  of 
force  essentially  contrary  to  sound  military 
principle.  What  Australasia  needs  is  not  her 
petty  fraction  of  the  Imperial  navy,  a  squadron 
assigned  to  her  in  perpetual  presence,  but  an 
organization  of  naval  force  which  constitutes  a 
firm  grasp  of  the  universal  naval  situation. 
Thus  danger  is  kept  remote ;  but,  if  it  should 
approach,  there  is  insured  within  reaching  dis- 
tance an  adequate  force  to  repel  it  betimes. 
There  may,  however,  be  fairly  demanded  the 
guarantee  for  the  fleet's  action,  in  a  develop- 
ment of  local  dock-yard  facilities  and  other 
resources  which  shall  insure  its  maintenance  in 
full  efficiency  if  it  have  to  come. 

In  this  essential  principle  other  colonies 
should  acquiesce.  The  essence  of  the  matter 
is  that  local  security  does  not  necessarily,  nor 
usually,  depend  upon  the  constant  local  presence 


204  Considerations  Governing 

of  a  protector,  ship  or  squadron,  but  upon  gen- 
eral dispositions.  As  was  said  to  and  of  Rod- 
ney, "  Unless  men  take  the  great  line,  as  you 
do,  and  consider  the  King's  whole  dominions 
as  under  their  care,  the  enemy  must  find  us 
unprepared  somewhere.  It  is  impossible  to 
have  a  superior  fleet  in  every  part." 

It  is  impossible ;  and  it  is  unnecessary,  grant- 
ing the  aggregate  superiority  at  which  Great 
Britain  now  aims.  In  the  question  of  the  dis- 
position of  force  three  principal  elements  are 
distinguishable  in  the  permanent  factors  which 
we  classify  under  the  general  head  of  "  posi- 
tion." These  are,  the  recognition  of  central 
positions,  of  interior  lines  —  which  means, 
briefly,  shorter  lines  —  and  provision  of  abun- 
dant local  dock-yard  equipment  in  its  widest 
sense.  These  furnish  the  broad  outline,  the 
skeleton  of  the  arrangement.  They  consti- 
tute, so  to  say,  the  qualitative  result  of  the 
analysis  which  underlies  the  whole  calcula- 
tion. Add  to  it  the  quantitative  estimate  of 
the  interests  at  stake,  the  dangers  at  hand, 
the  advantages  of  position,  in  the  several 
quarters,  and  you  reach  the  assignment  of 
numbers,    which    shall    make    the    dry    bones 


The  Disposition  of  Navies  205 

live  with  all  the  energy  of  flesh  and  blood  in  a 
healthy  body  ;  where  each  member  is  supported, 
not  by  a  local  congestion  of  vitality,  but  by  the 
vigor  of  the  central  organs  which  circulate 
nourishment  to  each  in  proportion  to  its 
needs. 


THE    PERSIAN    GULF    AND 
INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 


THE    PERSIAN    GULF    AND 
INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 

Jmie,  1903. 

THE  American  whom  above  all  others 
his  countrymen  delight  to  honor,  more 
even  to-day  than  a  century  ago,  as  his  sober 
wisdom  and  unselfish  patriotism  stand  in 
stronger  relief  on  the  clear  horizon  of  the  past, 
when  he  took  leave  of  public  life,  cautioned 
his  fellow-citizens  of  that  day  against  "  perma- 
nent inveterate  antipathies  against  particular 
nations."  In  uttering  this  warning,  to  which 
he  added  certain  obvious  corollaries  as  to  the 
effect  of  prejudice,  sympathetic  as  well  as  anti- 
pathetic, upon  action,  Washington  had  vividly 
in  mind  American  conditions,  both  present 
and  past,  of  which  he  had  had  bitter  official 
experience.  His  own  people  had  then  divided, 
and  was  still  farther  dividing:,  in  sentiment  and 
utterance,  upon  lines  of  sympathy  for  and 
against    Great    Britain    and    France.       Impas- 

14 


2IO  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

sioned  feeling  and  fervent  speech  were  doing 
the  deadly  work  he  deplored,  in  setting  man 
against  man,  and  to  some  extent  section 
against  section,  upon  issues  which  were  at 
least  not  purely  of  American  interest.  Harm- 
ful at  any  time,  such  an  opposition  of  mis- 
placed emotions  was  peculiarly  dangerous  then, 
when  the  still  recent  union  under  the  Consti- 
tution of  1 789  had  not  yet  had  time  to  obliter- 
ate the  colonial  habits  of  thought,  to  which  the 
common  term  "  American "  loomed  far  less 
large,  and  was  far  less  dear,  than  the  local 
appellations  of  the  several  States.  This  in- 
spired Washington's  further  very  serious  and, 
to  use  his  own  word,  "  affectionate  "  counsels 
against  the  spirit  of  faction  and  disunion, 
which,  though  not  confined  to  our  political 
communit}^  presented  special  perils  to  one  but 
lately  organized. 

Nor  was  it  only  against  immediate  instances 
of  inveterate  national  antipathies  that  Wash- 
ington uttered  his  warning.  These  served 
him  merely  as  pointed  illustrations.  He  based 
his  counsels,  as  advice  to  be  sound  must  ever 
be  based,  upon  permanent  general  principles. 
International  relations,   he  said,  were  not  de- 


International  Relations  211 

termined,  and  should  not  be  determined,  by 
sympathy,  but  by  justice  and  by  interest.  Jus- 
tice of  course  first.  However  onerous  and 
unsatisfactory,  ''let  existing  engagements  be 
observed  in  their  genuine  sense."  Beyond  this, 
"  keep  constantly  in  view  that  't  is  folly  in  one 
nation  to  look  for  disinterested  favors  from 
another;  that  it  must  pay  with  a  portion  of 
its  independence  for  whatever  it  may  accept 
under  that  character;  that  by  acceptance  it 
may  place  itself  in  the  condition  of  having 
given  equivalent  for  nominal  favors,  and  yet 
of  being  reproached  with  ingratitude  for  not 
giving  more." 

Here  again,  in  this  slightly  veiled  allusion 
to  the  French  alliance,  was  indicated  the  in- 
trusion of  bias  into  international  relations. 
The  help  extended  by  France  to  the  American 
struggle  for  independence  was  indeed  real ; 
but  as  a  favor,  though  given  that  coloring,  it 
was  purely  nominal.  Yet  upon  it,  so  regarded, 
were  based  extravagant  claims,  not  only  for 
American  sympathy,  but  for  American  active 
support  in  the  early  days  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution. Sight  was  lost  of  the  notorious  fact, 
that,  however  disinterested  the  action  of  indi- 


2 1 2  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

vidual  Frenchmen,  the  French  government, 
with  proper  regard  to  the  interests  of  its  own 
nation,  had  simply  utihzed  the  revolt  of  the 
colonies  to  renew  its  old  struggle  with  Great 
Britain  under  favorable  conditions,  A  large 
number  of  Americans,  treasuring  the  then 
recent  occasions  of  bitter  hostility  to  Great 
Britain,  responded  vehemently;  another  numer- 
ous party,  alienated  by  republican  excesses  in 
France,  and  seeing  a  truer  ideal  of  liberty  in 
British  institutions,  recoiled  with  equal  vigor. 
At  a  moment  when  everv  consideration  of  ex- 
pediency  dictated  political  detachment,  to  the 
intensification  of  national  life,  by  pruning 
superfluous  activitives  and  concentrating  vital 
force  upon  internal  consolidation  and  develop- 
ment, a  vast  motive  power  of  passion  and 
prejudice  was  aroused,  misdirecting  national 
energy  into  channels  where  it  not  merely  ran 
to  waste  but  corroded  the  foundations  of  the 
Union,  On  one  side  and  the  other,  the  ideals 
of  national  duty  and  policy  became  confused 
with  the  names  of  foreign  peoples,  leading  to 
a  bitterness  of  antagonism  that  prolonged 
through  a  generation  the  immaturity  of  the 
affection   uniting   the   States;  maintaining  an 


International  Relations  2 1 3 

internal  weakness  which  manifested  itself  re- 
currently with  each  fresh  cause  of  variance, 
and  entailed  continued  feebleness  of  external 
influence  until  it  disappeared  forever  in  the 
asfonies  of  civil  war. 

It  will  doubtless  be  argued  that  there  is  now 
general  recognition  that  reasoned  interest, 
controlled  by  justice,  is  the  true  regulator  of 
state  policy.  Possibly ;  but  does  practice 
coincide?  Is  national  calmness  or  harmony 
undisturbed,  national  force  unweakened,  by 
sympathies  and  antipathies  which,  however 
otherwise  justified,  have  no  proper  place  in 
perturbing  international  conduct  1  The  foster- 
ing of  an  internal  spirit  of  faction  is  not  the 
only  evil  effect  on  national  judgment  that  may 
arise  from  extra-national  repulsions  or  attrac- 
tions. The  immediate  evil  of  disruption,  wliich 
then  threatened  the  United  States,  is  indeed 
not  imminent  for  political  communities  of  long- 
standing consolidation ;  but  even  into  them 
prepossession  indulged  for  or  against  other 
peoples,  as  such,  introduces  a  motive  which 
is  to  national  efficiency  what  a  morbid  growth 
is  to  the  health  of  the  body.  The  functions 
are   vitiated,   vision    impaired,   and   movement 


2  14  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

undecided  or  misdirected ;  perhaps  both.  A 
tendency  arises  to  seek  the  solution  of  diffi- 
culties in  artificial  and  sometimes  complicated 
international  arrangements,  contemplating  an 
indefinite  future,  instead  of  in  simple  national 
procedure  meeting  each  new  situation  as  it 
develops,  governed  by  a  settled  general  national 
policy.  The  latter  course  may  at  times  incur 
the  reproach  of  inconsistency  through  the  in- 
evitable necessity  of  conforming  particular 
measures  to  unforeseen  emergencies ;  but  it 
may  none  the  less  remain  most  truly  consistent 
in  its  fixed  regard  to  a  few  evident  leading 
conditions  for  v.hich  permanency  may  be  pre- 
dicated. Washington,  a  man  wise  with  the 
wisdom  that  comes  of  observation  in  practical 
life,  phrased  this  for  his  countrymen,  in  the 
connection  already  quoted,  in  the  words,  "  Con- 
sulting the  natural  course  of  things,  forcing 
nothing;"  or,  as  an  American  experienced  in 
political  campaigning  once  said  to  me,  "  Never 
contrive  an  opportunity." 

Nothing  is  more  fruitful  of  that  frequent 
charge  of  bad  faith  among  nations  than  the 
attempt  to  substitute  the  artificial  for  the 
natural.     When  subsequent  experience  shows 


International  Relations  215 

that  interest  has  been  elaborately  sacrificed 
because  imperfectly  comprehended  or  wholly 
misunderstood,  popular  revulsion  ultimately 
exerts  over  rulers  an  influence  that  is  compul- 
sive in  proportion  to  the  urgency  of  the  situa- 
tion. It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  a 
nation,  as  such,  has  premeditated  bad  faith,  or 
wilfully  accepts  it.  Nations  are  not  cynical, 
though  individual  statesmen  have  been.  There 
need  be  no  attempt  to  justify  breach  of  en- 
gagement ;  but  it  is  a  very  partial  view  of  facts 
not  to  reco2:nize  that  the  oreater  fault  lies  with 
those  who  made  a  situation  which  could  not 
be  perpetuated,  because  contrary  to  the  nature 
of  things.  Such  action  should  be  accepted  as 
a  warning  that  international  arrangements  can 
be  regarded  as  sound  only  when  they  conform 
to  substantial  conditions,  relatively  at  least 
permanent.  If  this  caution  be  observed,  na- 
tional policy  may  through  long  periods  be  as 
enduring  as  national  characteristics  admit- 
tedly are.  National  character  abides,  though 
nations  under  impulse  are  often  inconstant. 
So  may  national  policy,  though  on  occasion 
fluctuating,  or  even  vacillating,  be  really  con- 
stant;  but  to  be  so   it   must  conform   to   the 


2 1 6  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

nature  of  things,  consulting  —  not  resisting  — 
their  course. 

If  this  be  so  as  regards  general  policy,  it  fol- 
lows that  successive  questions,  as  they  arise, 
should  be  viewed  in  their  relation  to  that  gen- 
eral policy,  which  it  must  be  assumed  is  con- 
sciously realized  in  its  broad  outlines  by  the 
governments  of  the  day.  Of  such  questions 
the  prospective  status  of  Persia  and  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  now  forms  one,  in  the  consideration 
of  two  or  three  of  the  great  world  powers.  In 
their  regard  to  it,  and  to  the  various  interests 
or  enterprises  centring  around  it,  how  far  are 
they  guided  by  the  natural  tendency  of  things? 
How  far  are  they  seeking  to  interject  artificial 
arrangements,  forced  ambitions  ?  What  is  to 
be  said,  from  this  point  of  view,  of  the  pro- 
posed activities,  the  various  theories  of  action, 
suggested  political  compromises,  that  here  find 
their  origin  ?  As  the  phrase  "  world  politics  " 
more  and  more  expresses  a  reality  of  these  lat- 
ter days,  the  more  necessary  does  it  become  to 
consider  each  of  the  several  centres  of  interest 
as  not  separate,  but  having  relations  to  the 
whole ;  as  contributory  to  a  general  balance 
of  constitution,   to  the   health   of  which   it   is 


International  Relations  2 1 7 

essential    to    work    according    to    nature,    not 
contrary  to  it. 

In  the  general  economy  of  the  world,  irre- 
spective of  political  tenures,  present  or  pos- 
sible, the  Persian  Gulf  is  one  terminus  of  a 
prospective  interoceanic  railroad.  The  track 
of  this,  as  determined  by  typographical  con- 
siderations, will  take  in  great  part  a  course 
over  which,  at  one  period  and  another  of  his- 
tory, commerce  between  the  East  and  West  has 
travelled.  Though  itself  artificial,  it  will  follow 
a  road  so  far  conforming  to  the  nature  of  things 
that  it  has  earned  in  the  past  the  name  of  the 
Highway  of  Nations.  The  railroad  will  be  one 
link,  as  the  Persian  Gulf  is  another,  in  a  chain 
of  communication  between  East  and  West, 
alternative  to  the  all-water  route  by  the  Suez 
Canal  and  the  Red  Sea.  This  new  line  will 
have  over  the  one  now  existing  the  advantage, 
which  rail  travel  always  has  over  that  by  water, 
of  greater  specific  rapidity.  It  will  therefore 
serve  particularly  for  the  transport  of  passen- 
gers, mails,  and  lighter  freights.  On  the  other 
hand,  for  bulk  of  transport,  meaning  thereby 
not  merely  articles  singly  of  great  weight  or 
size,  but  the  aggregate  amounts  of  freight  that 


2i8  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

can   be  carried   in  a  given   time,  water  will  al- 
ways possess  an  immense  and  irreversible  ad- 
vantage over  land  transport  for  equal  distances. 
This  follows  directly  from  the  fact  that  a  rail- 
road  is  essentially   narrow.       Even   with   four 
tracks,  it  admits  of  but  two  trains  proceeding 
abreast  in  the  same  direction  ;  whereas  natural 
water  ways  as  a  rule  permit  ships,  individually 
of  greater  capacity  than  any  single  train,  to  go 
forward  in  numbers  practically  unlimited.     A 
water  route  is,  as  it  were,  a  road  with  number- 
less tracks.     For  these  reasons,  and  on  account 
of  the  first  cost   of  construction,  water  trans- 
port    has    a    lasting     comparative    cheapness, 
which  so  far  as  can  be  foreseen  will  secure  to 
it  forever   a  commercial   superiority  over   that 
by  land.     It  is  also,  for  large  quantities,  much 
more  rapid  ;  for,  though  a  train  can  carry  its 
proper  load  faster  than  a  vessel  can,  the  closely 
restricted   number  of  trains   that  can   proceed 
at  once,  as  compared  to  the  numerous  vessels, 
enables  the  latter  in  a  given  time,  practically 
simultaneously,  to  deliver  a  bulk  of  material 
utterly  beyond  the  power  of  the  road. 

Commercially,  therefore,  the  railroad  system, 
or  systems,  and  their  branches,  which  shall  find 


International  Relations  2 1 9 

their  terminus  at  the  Persian  Gulf,  begin  at  a 
great  disadvantage  towards  the  Suez  route,  con- 
sidered as  a  hne  of  commercial  communication 
between  two  seas,  or  between  the  two  conti- 
nents, Asia  and  Europe.  This,  the  broad 
general  result,  is,  however,  only  one  aspect  of 
the  relations  to  world  politics.  A  railroad,  as 
all  know,  develops  the  country  through  which 
it  passes.  This  means  that  it  there  increases 
existing  interests,  and  creates  new  ones.  Of 
these  it,  and  through  it  its  owners,  become  the 
fostering  and  controlling  centre.  Because  of 
this  effect,  railroads  possess  a  marked  local 
commercial  influence;  and  commercial  influ- 
ence, especially  in  these  days,  and  in  regions 
where  government  is  weak  or  remiss,  readily 
becomes  political.  It  is  in  measure  compelled 
to  political  action,  to  protect  its  varied  interests. 
Furthermore,  railroads  serve  to  expedite  not 
only  the  movement  of  commerce  but  the  move- 
ment of  troops.  They  have  therefore  military 
significance,  as  well  as  commercial  and  politi- 
cal. This  is  a  commonplace,  upon  which  it  is 
needless  to  insist  beyond  recalling  that  it  in- 
heres in  all  railroads  as  such,  and  therefore  in 
the  one   under  consideration.      Finally,   while 


2  20  The  Persian  Gtilf  and 

all  parts  of  a  commercial  route,  by  land  or  by 
sea,  have  a  certain  value,  supreme  importance 
is  accumulated  at  the  termini,  the  points  of 
arrival  or  of  departure.  The  operations  of 
commerce,  —  receipt,  distribution,  or  transship- 
ment, —  are  there  multiplied  many  fold.  This 
concentration  makes  them  singularly  the  ob- 
jects of  forcible  interference,  and  consequently 
attributes  to  them  an  importance  which  is 
military  or  naval,  according  to  the  locality. 
This  at  present  is  the  particular  bearing  of 
the  Persian  Gulf  upon  world  politics.  It  is 
closely  analogous  to  that  of  Port  Arthur,  which 
has  preceded  it  so  shortly  as  not  yet  to  be 
fairly  out  of  sight,  as  a  matter  of  international 
heartburnings.  Upon  the  control  of  it  will 
rest  the  functioning  of  the  prospective  rail- 
road itself,  regarded  either  as  a  through  line 
of  communication,  or  as  a  maintainer  of  local 
industries  by  the  access  it  affords  them  to 
wider  markets.  Not  only  the  prosperity  of 
the  railroad  itself  is  at  stake.  The  commer- 
cial interests  that  depend  upon  it,  those  of  the 
country  through  which  it  runs  and  to  which  it 
immediately  ministers,  and  those  of  many  other 
regions,  as    producers   or   consumers,  are    in- 


International  Relations  221 

volved   in  the  political  and  military  status  of 
the  Persian  Gulf. 

Whose  affair  then  is  this,  intrinsically  so  im- 
portant? Not  that  of  all  the  world,  for  though 
all  the  world  may  be  interested,  more  or  less, 
directly  or  indirectly,  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  it  is  everybody's  particular  responsibility. 
By  established  rule  and  justice,  the  determina- 
tion belongs  primarily  to  those  immediately  on 
the  spot,  in  actual  possession.  Unhappily,  the 
powers  that  border  the  Persian  Gulf,  Persia 
itself,  Turkey,  and  some  minor  Arabian  com- 
munities, are  unable  to  give  either  the  commer- 
cial or  the  military  security  that  the  situation 
will  require.  Under  their  tutelage  alone,  with- 
out stronger  foundations  underlying,  stability 
cannot  be  maintained,  either  by  equilibrium  or 
by  predominance.  In  such  circumstances,  and 
when  occasion  arises,  the  responsibility  natu- 
rally devolves,  as  for  other  derelicts  of  fortune, 
upon  the  next  of  kin,  the  nearest  in  place  or 
interest.  If  they,  too,  fail,  then  the  more  re- 
motely concerned  derive  both  claim  and  duty. 
The  general  welfare  of  the  world,  as  that  of 
particular  communities,  will  be  most  surely 
advanced   by   each   one   doing   that    which   he 


2  22  The  Persian  Gnlf  and 

finds  to  his  hand  to  do,  whether  by  direct 
charge  received  from  due  authority,  or  by  in- 
heritance, or  from  the  mere  fact  of  neighbor- 
hood, which  has  given  to  the  word  "  neighbor  " 
that  consecrated  association,  with  the  sound  of 
which  we  are  all  familiar,  though  we  too  nar- 
rowly conceive  the  range  of  its  privilege  and 
its  duty. 

From  the  fact  of  propinquity,  of  geographi- 
cal nearness,  or  of  direct  political  interest,  it  is 
easy  to  see  that  Great  Britain  and  Russia  are 
the  two  States  which  from  existing  circum- 
stances are  most  immediately  and  deeply  con- 
cerned;  nor,  when  the  several  circumstances 
are  closely  analyzed  and  duly  weighed,  does 
there  to  my  mind  seem  room  to  doubt  that  to 
the  former  falls  first  to  say  whether  she  will 
discharge  the  duty,  or  let  it  go  to  another. 
Let  there  be  here  interposed,  however,  the 
word  of  caution,  before  quoted,  concerning  the 
natural  course  of  things,  lest  I  should  seem 
fairly  chargeable  with  the  disposition,  unwise 
as  well  as  unjust,  to  favor  needless  or  prema- 
ture intervention.  It  may  well  to-day  be  a 
duty  not  to  do  that  which  to-morrow  will  find 
incumbent.     Opportunity  is  not  to  be  created, 


International  Relations  223 

but  to  be  awaited  till  it  appear  in  the  form  of 
necessity,  or  at  the  least  of  clear  and  justifiable 
expediency.  Consulting  the  natural  order  of 
things,  forcing  nothing,  means  at  least  invin- 
cible patience  as  well  as  sleepless  vigilance; 
and  vigilance  includes  necessarily  readiness, 
for  he  only  is  truly  awake  who  is  careful  to 
prepare. 

I  have  said  that  an  analysis  of  the  circum- 
stances shows  that  Great  Britain,  in  the  evi- 
dent failure  of  Turkey  and  Persia,  is  the 
nation  first  —  that  is,  most  —  concerned.  She 
is  so  not  only  in  her  own  right  and  that  of  her 
own  people,  but  in  the  yet  more  binding  one 
of  imperial  obligation  to  a  great  and  politically 
helpless  ward  of  the  Empire ;  to  India  and  its 
teeming  population.  In  her  own  right  and 
duty  she  is,  as  regards  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  order,  in  actual  possession,  hav- 
ing discharged  this  office  to  the  Gulf  for  several 
generations.  Doubtless,  here  as  in  Egypt,  now 
that  the  constructive  work  has  been  done,  she 
might  find  others  who  would  willingly  relieve 
her  of  the  burden  of  maintenance;  but  as  re- 
gards such  transfer,  the  decision  of  acceptance 
would  rest,  by  general  custom,  with  the  present 


224  ^'^^  Persiaji  Gtilf  and 

possessor.  To  her  the  question  is  one  not 
merely  of  convenience,  but  of  duty,  arising 
from  and  closely  involved  with  existing  con- 
ditions, which  are  the  more  imperative  because 
they  are  plants  of  mature  growth,  with  roots 
deep  struck  and  closely  intertwined  in  the  soil 
of  a  past  history. 

These  conditions  are  doubtless  manifold,  but 
in  last  analysis  they  are  substantially  three. 
First,  her  security  in  India,  which  would  be 
materially  affected  by  an  adverse  change  in 
political  control  of  the  Gulf;  secondly,  the 
safety  of  the  great  sea  route,  commercial  and 
military,  to  India  and  the  farther  East,  on  which 
British  shipping  is  still  actually  the  chief  trav- 
eller, though  with  a  notable  comparative  dim- 
inution that  demands  national  attention;  and, 
thirdly,  the  economic  and  commercial  welfare 
of  India,  which  can  act  politically  only  through 
the  Empire,  a  dependence  which  greatly  en- 
hances obligation.  The  control  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  by  a  foreign  State  of  considerable  naval 
potentiality,  a  "fleet  in  being"  there,  based  upon 
a  strong  military  port,  would  reproduce  the  re- 
lations of  Cadiz,  Gibraltar,  and  Malta  to  the 
Mediterranean.     It  would  flank  all  the  routes 


International  Relations  225 

to  the  farther  East,  to  India,  and  to  Australia, 
the  last  two  actually  internal  to  the  Empire, 
regarded  as  a  political  system ;  and  although 
at  present  Great  Britain  unquestionably  could 
check  such  a  fleet,  so  placed,  by  a  division  of 
her  own,  it  might  well  require  a  detachment 
large  enough  to  affect  seriously  the  general 
strength  of  her  naval  position.  On  the  other 
hand,  India,  considered  in  regard  to  her  par- 
ticular necessities,  apart  from  the  general  in- 
terests of  the  Empire,  may  justly  demand  that 
there  be  secured  to  her  untrammelled  inter- 
course with  Mesopotamia  and  Persia.  She 
has  a  fair  claim  also  to  any  incidental  ad- 
vantage attendant  upon  the  through  land 
communication  that  can  be  assured  by  polit- 
ical foresight,  obtaining  a  position  favorable 
to  the  negotiations  of  the  future.  It  is  noto- 
rious, for  instance,  that  most  nations,  and 
Russia  pre-eminently,  adopt  a  highly  protec- 
tive or  exclusive  policy  towards  foreign  in- 
dustries. Applied  to  what  is  now  Persia,  this 
would  be  a  direct  injury  to  India,  which,  even 
under  the  present  backward  conditions  of  the 
inhabitants  and  of  communications,  carries  on 
a  large  part    of    the    Persian    trade,  as   might 

IS 


2  26  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

naturally  be  expected  from  the  nearness  of  the 
two  countries.  The  same  is  doubtless  true  of 
her  relations  with  Mesopotamia,  though  the 
absence  of  reliable  customs  returns  prevents 
positive  statements.  For  securing  these  nat- 
ural rights  of  India,  British  naval  predomi- 
nance in  the  Gulf,  unfettered  by  bases  there 
belonging  to  possibly  hostile  foreign  powers, 
would  be  a  political  factor  of  considerable  in- 
fluence ;  but  it  is  incompatible  with  the  estab- 
lishment of  foreign  arsenals. 

Further,  purely  naval  control  is  for  this 
purpose  a  very  imperfect  instrument,  unless 
supported  and  reinforced  by  the  shores  on 
which  it  acts.  It  is  necessary  therefore  to 
attach  the  inhabitants  to  the  same  interests 
by  the  extension  and  consolidation  of  com- 
mercial relations,  the  promotion  of  which  con- 
sequently should  be  the  aim  of  the  government. 
The  acquisition  of  territory  is  one  thing,  which 
may  properly  be  rejected  as  probably  inexpe- 
dient; and  certainly  unjust  when  not  impera- 
tive. It  is  quite  another  matter  to  secure 
popular  confidence  and  support  by  mutual  use- 
fulness. Whatever  the  merits  of  free  trade  as 
a  system,  suited    to    these   or   those    national 


International  Relations  227 

circumstances,  it  probably  carries  with  it  a 
defect  of  its  qualities  in  inducing  too  great 
apathy  towards  the  exertion  of  governmental 
action  in  trade  matters.  Non-interference, 
laissez-faire,  may  easily  degenerate  from  a  con- 
servative principle  to  an  indolent  attitude  of 
mind,  and  then  it  is  politically  vicious.  The 
universal  existence  and  the  nature  of  a  consular 
service  testify  to  the  close  relationship  between 
trade  and  government,  a  relationship  that  is 
in  some  measure  at  least  one  of  mutual  de- 
pendence. A  certain  forecast  of  the  future, 
a  preparation  of  the  way  by  smoothing  of  ob- 
stacles, a  discernment  of  opportunity,  —  which 
is  quite  different  from  creating  it,  —  a  recog- 
nition of  the  natural  course  of  things  at  the 
instant  when  it  may  be  taken  at  the  flood, 
these  are  natural  functions  of  a  competent 
consular  body.  To  it  belongs  also  the  estab- 
lishment of  international  relations  through  the 
medium  of  personal  intercourse,  so  strongly 
operative  in  public  matters  even  in  states  of 
European  civilization,  among  statesmen  whose 
business  is  to  look  below  the  surface,  and 
beyond  the  individual,  to  the  substantial  and 
permanent  issues  at  stake.     Much  more  is  it 


2  28  The  Persian  Gulf  aiid 

influential  among  peoples  where  statesmanship 
is  chiefly  a  matter  of  personal  interest  or  bias, 
consequently  short  sighted  and  unstable,  and 
where  local  confidence  and  prestige  are  domi- 
nant factors  in  sustaining  policy.  There  the 
flag,  if  illustrated  in  a  well-organized  consular 
service,  may  well  be  the  forerunner  of  trade 
as  well  as  its  necessary  complement. 

At  the  present  time  the  trade  of  Persia  is 
divided  chiefly  between  Great  Britain  and  India 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Russia  on  the  other. 
As  would  be  expected  from  their  relative  posi- 
tions, the  northern  part  falls  to  Russia,  the 
southern  to  her  principal  rival  in  Asia.  The 
one  therefore  is  essentially  a  land  trade,  the 
other  maritime.  From  these  respective  char- 
acteristics, the  one  naturally  induces  govern- 
mental intervention,  to  promote  the  facility  of 
communications,  to  which  the  land  by  its  varied 
and  refractory  surface  presents  continual  ob- 
stacles. The  other  finds  its  royal  highway  of 
the  sea  ever  clear  and  open,  a  condition  which 
ministers  to  the  natural  conservatism  and  ac- 
quired principle  of  non-interference  which  dis- 
tinguish Great  Britain.  By  the  disposition 
of  all  living  things  to  grow,  the  spheres  of  the 


International  Relations  229 

two  tend  continually  to  approach.  The  mo- 
ment of  contact  may  well  be  indefinitely  dis- 
tant, but  the  circumstances  which  shall  attend 
its  arrival  are  already  forming ;  and  when  it 
comes  it  may  be,  as  now  in  China,  the  signal  of 
an  antagonism,  the  result  of  which  will  depend 
upon  the  facts  of  political  position  on  the  one 
side  or  the  other.  Russia  not  unnaturally 
looks  to  her  continuous  territory  and  popula- 
tion, behind  the  scene  of  possible  contest,  as 
the  assurance  of  her  own  permanent  predom- 
inance and  eventual  exclusive  influence.  It 
may  be  so;  but  not  necessarily  until  a  future 
so  far  distant  as  to  be  utterly  beyond  the  range 
of.  our  possible  vision,  and  between  which  and 
us  lie  many  chapters  of  unknowable  changes. 
If  confronted  by  a  solid  political  organism, 
resting  immediately  upon  commercial  interests, 
and  ultimately  upon  naval  control  of  the  Gulf 
and  the  armed  forces  of  Great  Britain,  backed 
by  her  colonies  and  India,  it  must  be  long 
before  the  northern  impulse  can  overcome  the 
resistance.  The  physical  difficulties  of  the 
land  route  contrasted  with  the  level  path  of 
the  sea,  the  narrowness  of  rail  carriage  as  com- 
pared  with   the  broad   highway  of   the  ocean, 


230  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

more  than  compensate  for  the  apparent  shorter 
distance  and  delusive  continuity  of  the  land. 
The  enercries  of  Russia  also  must  Ions:  be 
absorbed  by  other  necessary  pre-occupations, 
notably  the  far  superior  importance  of  de- 
veloped and  consolidated  access,  by  Siberia 
and  Manchuria,  to  North  China  seas  and  the 
Pacific,  the  great  immediate  centres  of  world 
interest.  There  is  therefore  no  need  to  hasten 
things  in  their  natural  course,  but  equally  there 
is  no  justification  for  neglecting  to  note  and 
improve  them ;  to  quote  Washington  again, 
"  diffusing  and  diversifying  by  gentle  means 
the  streams  of  commerce,"  which  will  gradually 
nurse  the  future  into  vigorous  life. 

Both  Persia  and  China  are  being  swept  irre- 
sistibly into  the  general  movement  of  the  world, 
from  which  they  have  so  long  stood  apart. 
Both  have  a  momentous  future  of  uncertain 
issue,  but  that  of  China  is  evidently  more 
immediately  imminent.  This  is  the  natural 
course  which  things  are  at  present  following. 
Persia  has  still  a  time  of  waiting.  The  indi- 
cations also  are  that  Russia,  consciously  or 
intuitively,  thus  reads  the  conditions.  By  far- 
sighted  sagacity,   or  through  continued  yield- 


Interiiatio7tal  Relations  231 

ings  to  the  successive  leadings  of  the  moment, 
she  has  now  extended  her  great  effort  towards 
sustained  communication  with  ever-open  water 
to  the  farther  East  The  Siberian  railroad,  by 
which  she  hopes  to  assure  it,  passes  through 
territory  that  is  wholly  her  own  by  ancient 
tenure;  while  through  recent  generations 
she  has  prepared  its  security  by  her  steady 
progress  southward  in  Central  Asia  and  Tur- 
kestan. The  establishment  of  orderly  gov- 
ernment in  those  regions  relieves  the  flank 
of  the  route  from  predatory  dangers,  which 
under  the  feeble  adminstration  of  Turkey  will 
constitute  one  of  the  elements  of  difficulty  for 
the  projected  railroad  in  the  Euphrates  valley. 
The  Siberian  road  throughout  its  whole  course 
is  unassailable  by  any  external  power,  until 
within  a  very  short  distance  of  the  coast  ter- 
minus. Its  military  safety  being  thus  absolute, 
its  maintenance,  and  the  development  of  its 
carrying  power,  essential  to  the  Russian  posi- 
tion in  the  farther  East,  are  questions  simply 
of  money.  Money,  however,  will  be  needed  in 
such  quantities  that  the  imperative  require- 
ments must  postpone  further  effective  move- 
ment to  the  southward  or  westward  ;  for  effec- 


232  The  Persian  Gulf  a7id 

tive  movement  means  developed  communica- 
tions, consolidated  and  sustained.  These  are 
expensive,  and  in  sound  policy  should  not  be 
attempted  on  a  grand  scale  in  two  directions 
at  the  same  time ;  unless  indeed  the  resources 
in  money  and  labor  are  so  great  as  to  justify 
their  dissemination.  That  this  is  not  the  case 
the  notorious  condition  of  the  Siberian  road 
sives  reason  to  believe. 

Water  communication  with  the  external 
world,  through  an  unimpeded  seaboard  of  her 
own,  is  Russia's  greatest  present  want.  For 
this  object,  to  what  extent  would  slie  benefit 
commercially  by  access  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
as  compared  with  the  China  seas?  Putting 
out  of  consideration  China  itself,  with  the 
nearer  shores  of  the  Pacific,  as  to  which  the 
better  situation  of  Manchuria  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned, Russia  is  there  much  closer  also  to  the 
Americas  and  to  the  entire  Pacific.  Australia 
is  substantially  equidistant  from  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  from  Port  Arthur;  the  balance 
favoring  the  latter.  Only  Southern  Asia  and 
Africa  can  be  said  to  be  nearer  to  the  Gulf. 
Europe  and  Atlantic  America  are  now  reached, 
and   ever  must   be   reached,   commercially,  by 


International  Relations  233 

Russia,  from  the  Black  Sea  or  the  Baltic. 
From  the  standpoint  of  military  advantage,  a 
Russian  naval  division  in  the  Persian  Gulf, 
although  unquestionably  a  menace  to  the  trade 
route  from  Suez  to  the  East,  would  be  most 
ex-centrically  placed  as  regards  all  Russia's 
greatest  interests.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that 
I  have  elsewhere  said  that  the  good  of  Russia 
presents  no  motive  for  Great  Britain  to  con- 
cede a  position  so  extremely  injurious  to  her- 
self and  her  dependencies. 

The  question  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  of 
South  Persia  in  connection  with  it,  though  not 
yet  immediately  urgent,  is  clearly  visible  upon 
the  horizon  of  the  distant  future.  It  becomes, 
therefore,  and  in  so  far,  a  matter  for  present 
reflection,  the  guiding  principle  of  which  should 
be  its  relation  to  India,  and  to  the  farther  East. 
This  again  is  governed  by  the  strategic  con- 
sideration already  presented  in  the  remark  that 
movement,  advance,  to  be  effective  and  sus- 
tained, requires  communications  to  be  coherent 
and  consolidated.  The  Russian  communica- 
tion by  land,  though  still  inadequately  devel- 
oped, is  thus  secure,  militarily.  Throughout 
its  length  there  exists  no  near-by  point  held 


2  34  ^^^  Persian  Gulf  and 

by  an  enemy  able  to  interrupt  it  by  a  serious 
blow.  The  significance  of  such  a  condition 
will  be  realized  forcibly  by  contrasting  it  with 
the  military  exposure  of  another  great  trans- 
continental line,  the  Canadian  Pacific.  In  the 
farther  East  Great  Britain,  like  Russia,  holds 
an  advanced  position,  chiefly  commercial,  but 
consequently  military  also,  the  communications 
of  which  are  by  water.  These  have  not,  and 
probably  never  can  have,  any  military  security 
comparable  to  that  of  the  Siberian  railway. 
Their  safety  must  depend  upon  sustained  ex- 
ertion of  mobile  force,  resting  upon  secure 
bases,  ready  for  instant  and  constant  action. 
It  is  needless  to  insist  upon  the  difficulty  of 
such  a  situation ;  it  has  been  made  the  subject 
of  recent  and  abundant  comment.  But  if  thus 
onerous  now,  all  the  more  reason  that  the 
burden  should  not  be  increased  by  the  gratu- 
itous step  of  consenting,  upon  any  terms  of 
treaty,  any  forced  infringement  of  the  natural 
condition  of  things,  to  the  establishment  of 
a  new  source  of  danger  analogous  to  those 
already  existing  in  Cadiz,  Toulon,  the  Darda- 
nelles, and  so  on.  Concession  in  the  Persian 
Gulf,  whether  by  positive  formal  arrangement, 


International  Relations  235 

or  by  simple  neglect  of  the  local  commercial 
interests  which  now  underlie  political  and  mili- 
tary control,  will  imperil  Great  Britain's  naval 
situation  in  the  farther  East,  her  political  posi- 
tion in  India,  her  commercial  interests  in  both, 
and  the  imperial  tie  between  herself  and 
Australasia. 

So  far  from  yielding  here,  it  appears  to  me 
that  the  signs  of  the  times,  as  outlined  above, 
point  seriously  to  the  advisability  of  concentrat- 
ing attention,  preparation  of  the  understanding 
at  least,  upon  that  portion  of  the  Suez  route 
to  the  farther  East  which  lies  between  Aden 
and  Singapore.  In  this  the  Persian  Gulf  is  a 
very  prominent  consideration.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  material  preparation  should  far  fore- 
stall imminent  necessity ;  but  the  preparation  of 
thought  which  we  call  recognition,  and  appre- 
ciation, costs  the  Treasury  nothing,  and  saves 
it  much  by  the  quiet  anticipation  of  contin- 
gencies, and  provision  against  them.  It  tends 
to  prevent  inopportune  concessions,  and  the 
negligences  which  arise  from  ignorance  of 
facts,  or  failure  to  comprehend  their  relations 
to  one  another.  The  South  African  War  and 
the  twenty  preceding  years  give  recent  warn- 


236  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

ing.  Foreign  affairs,  as  well  as  military,  need 
their  general  staff.  Besides  its  bearing  upon 
the  Suez  route,  the  Gulf  has  a  very  special 
relation  to  the  Euphrates  valley,  and  any  road 
passing  through  it  from  the  Levant ;  and  this 
relation  is  shared  by  South  Persia,  because  of 
the  political  effect  of  its  tenure  upon  the  con- 
trol of  the  Gulf.  There  is  here  concentrated 
therefore  commercial  and  political  influence 
upon  both  of  the  two  routes,  that  by  land  and 
that  by  water,  from  the  Mediterranean  to  India 
and  to  the  East  beyond.  There  is  no  occasion 
in  the  nature  of  things  that  Great  Britain,  either 
by  concession  or  compulsion,  should  share  with 
another  State  the  control  which  she  now  has 
here ;  but  in  order  to  retain  it  she  needs  not 
only  to  keep  the  particular  protective  relations 
already  established  with  minor  local  rulers,  but 
further  to  develop  and  fortify  her  commercial 
interests  and  political  prestige  in  South  Persia 
and  adjacent  Mesopotamia.  This  means  not 
only,  nor  chiefly,  increase  of  exchange  of  pro- 
ducts. It  means  also  partnership,  public  or 
private,  in  the  system  of  communications,  anal- 
ogous in  idea,  and  if  need  be  even  in  extent, 
to  Disraeli's  purchase  of  the  Suez  canal  shares. 


International  Relations  237 

The  attitude  of  the  United  States  Government 
towards  the  projected  Panama  Canal  affords  a 
further  su^sestive  illustration.  As  towards 
the  farther  East,  South  Persia  is  in  fact  the 
logical  next  step  beyond  Egypt ;  though  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  connection  therewith 
is  to  be  the  same.  Correlative  to  this  com- 
mercial and  political  progress,  goes  the  neces- 
sity of  local  provision  for  naval  activity  when 
required.  The  middle  East,  if  I  may  adopt 
a  term  which  I  have  not  seen,  will  some  day 
need  its  Malta,  as  well  as  its  Gibraltar;  it 
does  not  follow  that  either  will  be  in  the  Gulf. 
Naval  force  has  the  quality  of  mobility  which 
carries  with  it  the  privilege  of  temporary  ab- 
sences ;  but  it  needs  to  find  on  every  scene  of 
operation  established  bases  of  refit,  of  supply, 
and,  in  case  of  disaster,  of  security.  The 
British  Navy  should  have  the  facility  to  con- 
centrate in  force,  if  occasion  arise,  about  Aden, 
India,  and  the  Gulf. 

In  summary :  Relatively  to  Europe  the  far- 
ther East  is  an  advanced  post  of  international 
activities,  of  very  great  and  immediate  impor- 
tance;  but  from  the  military  point  of  view,  to 
which  as  yet  commercial  security  has  to  be  re- 


238  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

ferred,  the  question  of  communications,  of  the 
routes  of  travel,  underlies  all  others  and  must 
be  kept  carefully  and  predominantly  in  mind. 
Russia  has  her  own  road,  by  land,  unshared 
with  any  other.  To  the  rest  of  Europe,  and 
to  Russia  when  she  chooses,  there  exists  now 
the  sea  route  by  Suez,  which  is,  and  probably 
must  remain,  supreme  to  all  others.  Alterna- 
tive to  it,  in  part  of  the  way,  the  future  will 
doubtless  bring  railways.  These,  however,  on 
account  of  the  greater  cheapness  of  water  car- 
riage, will  pretty  surely  do  their  principal 
through  business  in  expediting  special  transit 
between  the  two  seas  —  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Indian  Ocean.  They  will  in  this  respect 
maintain  merely  an  express  and  fast  freight 
traffic.  Between  them  and  the  Suez  route 
there  will  be  the  perennial  conflict  between 
land  and  water  transport,  between  natural  and 
artificial  conditions,  in  which  the  victory  is 
likely  to  rest,  as  heretofore,  with  nature's  own 
highway,  the  sea.  But,  however  that  prove,  the 
beginning  and  the  end,  the  termini,  of  both 
routes,  land  and  sea,  so  far  as  they  compete, 
will  be  substantially  the  same:  the  Levant  Sea, 
the  Straits  of  Bab-el- Mandeb  and  the  Persian 


International  Relations  239 

Gulf.  It  is  too  much  to  ask  of  international 
compliancy  that  Europe  should  accept  the 
single  control  of  both  terminal  regions  by  the 
same  State,  especially  where  no  defined  claim 
now  exists,  as  is  the  case  in  Levantine  Turkey; 
but  equally,  where  a  single  government  can 
show  a  long  prescription  of  useful  action,  of 
predominant  influence,  and  of  political  primacy 
locally  recognized  in  important  quarters,  as 
Great  Britain  can,  there  is  no  reason  why  she 
should  be  expected  to  abandon  these  advan- 
tages, except  as  the  result  of  war,  if  a  rival 
think  that  result  will  repay  the  cost. 

There  is  not  to  be  seen  in  the  nature  of 
things  any  evidence,  or  any  tendency,  which 
indicates  the  probability  that  Great  Britain 
may  be  forced  to  yield  to  compulsion,  actual 
or  threatened,  concessions  of  present  right 
which  it  is  inexpedient  that  she  should  grant 
voluntarily.  It  is  upon  such  probability,  con- 
ceived to  be  imminent,  that  are  based  pro- 
posals of  arrangement,  or  compromise,  that  I 
cannot  but  think  excessively  artificial,  and 
disregardful  of  permanent  conditions.  They 
surmise,  as  a  necessary  postulate,  hostile  com- 
binations of  two  or  more  States,  against  which, 


240  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

by  a  curious  intellectual  prepossession,  no  prob- 
able counterpoise  is  discernible.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  founded  upon  present  territorial  posi- 
tions, there  is  in  the  nature  of  things  no  real, 
no  enduring,  antagonism  concerning  the  Per- 
sian Gulf,  except  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia.  It  is  not  to  the  interest  of  any  third 
State  to  interfere  between  these  two,  or  to  dis- 
turb —  much  less  to  destroy  —  the  local  bal- 
ance of  power  which  now  exists  between  them 
and  can  probably  be  maintained.  As  regards 
its  particular  interests,  the  hands  of  any  third 
State  will  be  not  more,  but  less,  free,  should 
that  balance  yield  to  the  decisive  predominance 
of  one  of  the  two  throughout  the  regions  in- 
volved. Nor  can  a  third  State  expect  to  re- 
store equilibrium,  if  lost,  by  itself  taking  the 
place  of  the  one  that  has  gone  under.  It  is 
only  necessary  to  consider  the  solidity,  extent, 
and  Ions:  standing:,  of  the  local  control  now 
wielded  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  together 
with  the  land  power  of  the  one  and  the  sea 
power  of  the  other,  to  see  the  hopelessness  of 
any  substitute  for  either  in  its  own  sphere. 
The  two  systems  are  not  dead,  but  living ;  not 
machines,  but  organisms;  not  merely  founded, 


International  Relations  24 1 

but  rooted,  in  past  history  and  present  condi- 
tions. What  the  rest  of  the  world  needs,  what 
world  politics  requires,  is  that  here,  as  in  Asia 
immediately  to  the  eastward,  there  should  be 
political  and  military  equipoise,  not  predomi- 
nance. The  interests  of  other  States  are  eco- 
nomical ;  freedom  of  transit  and  of  trafific,  the 
open  door.  The  very  problem  now  troubling 
nations  in  the  Levant  and  China  is  how  to 
establish,  —  and  only  afterwards  to  maintain, 
—  conditions  which  are  already  established 
and  have  now  only  to  be  maintained  about 
the  land  approaches  to  the   Persian  Gulf. 

There  is  therefore,  no  sound  inducement  for 
another  State  to  waste  strength  here.  It  can 
be  used  better  elsewhere.  When  substantial 
equilibrium  thus  exists,  a  slight  effort  will 
suffice  to  obtain  from  either  party  a  considera- 
tion which  in  the  case  of  distinct  predomi- 
nance, or  exclusive  tenure,  might  require  a 
full  display  of  national  power.  Doubtless, 
many  in  Great  Britain,  and  also  in  America, 
are  convinced  that  one  third  State,  the  German 
Empire,  is  restlessly  intent,  not  only  upon 
economical  and  maritime  development,  which 

is  not  to  be  contested  by  other  than  econom- 

16 


242  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

ical  weapons,  but  also  upon  self-assertive  ag- 
gression with  a  view  to  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment in  more  than  one  part  of  the  world ;  and 
notably  in  this  particular  quarter.  A  conces- 
sion has  been  granted  to  German  capitalists  to 
extend  the  railway,  which  now  ends  at  Konieh, 
to  Bagdad,  passing  through  the  Euphrates  val- 
ley. The  necessary  outlet  to  this  is  the  Persian 
Gulf.  Such  concession,  when  realized  in  con- 
struction, carries  with  it  a  national  investment, 
an  economical  interest,  which,  though  in  private 
ownership,  inevitably  entails  political  interest. 
It  justifies  public  backing  by  its  own  govern- 
ment, in  countries  where,  as  in  Turkey,  private 
right  is  secure  only  when  it  has  national  force 
behind  it.  It  is  for  this  very  reason  that  Great 
Britain,  having  already  political  interest  in  the 
Persian  Gulf,  should  encourage  British  capital 
to  develop  communications  thence  with  the  in- 
terior in  Persia  and  in  Mesopotamia,  as  strength- 
ening her  political  claim  to  consideration,  and 
excluding  that  of  possible  antagonists.  The 
German  road  would  thus  find  its  terminus  in 
a  British  system;  a  not  unusual  international 
relation.  German  enterprise  has  in  anticipation 
established  German   political  hold   upon  Asia 


Inter7iational  Relations  243 

Minor  and  Mesopotamia.  As  expectation 
passes  into  realization  Germany  will  acquire 
local  political  importance  and  influence ;  a 
right,  sanctioned  by  the  rules  of  intercourse 
with  Oriental  nations,  to  have  her  voice  heard 
in  many  local  matters,  as  affecting  the  interests 
of  her  subjects  who  are  thus  engaged  in  devel- 
oping the  country. 

What  effect  will  this  have  upon  Germany's 
political  and  military  position,  relatively  to 
Russia  and  Great  Britain,  which,  from  near- 
ness or  from  the  commercial  ubiquity  of  their 
citizens,  are  also  politically  interested?  Under 
present  conditions  Germany,  whose  nearest  port 
is  in  the  North  Sea,  has  assumed  a  political 
burden  at  a  point  from  which  she  is  far  more 
remote  than  Russia,  and  her  sea  approach  to 
which  is  before  the  face  of  the  much  greater 
navy  of  Great  Britain.  There  is  in  this  nothing 
to  prevent  the  just  assertion  of  her  right,  no 
necessary  cause  of  quarrel,  —  far  from  it ;  but 
also  there  is  nothing  menacing.  Germany  has 
simply  introduced  another  factor  into  a  problem 
as  yet  unsolved,  that  of  the  ultimate  political 
status  of  several  provinces  of  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire,—  Asia   Minor,  Syria,   and  Mesopotamia. 


244  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

As  I  have  elsewhere  said,  I  believe  that  her 
appearance  there  is  a  step  towards  a  right 
final  solution;  that  from  the  necessary  com- 
mon interest  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
in  the  Suez  route  to  the  farther  East,  be- 
cause the  commerce  of  both  depends  upon 
its  security,  the  two  cannot  but  work  together 
to  secure  here  a  political  development  which 
will  consolidate  their  respective  naval  posi- 
tions in  the   Levant. 

This  seems  to  me  an  absolute  permanent 
condition,  consistent  with  a  certain  amount  of 
mutual  jealousy  and  political  wrangling,  and 
with  unlimited  commercial  rivalry,  but  never- 
theless determinative  of  substantial  co-opera- 
tion. The  mass  of  Russia  is  so  vast,  her 
ambitions  so  pronounced,  and  she  is  so  near 
at  hand,  that  the  Suez  route  needs  precisely 
that  kind  of  protection  against  her  which 
Russia  herself  has  given  to  the  Siberian  road 
by  the  regularization  of  the  provinces  south  of 
it.  Whatever  the  particular  form  local  admin- 
istration may  ultimately  assume,  it  is  impera- 
tive upon  the  Teutonic  States  to  see  that  their 
water  route  to  the  East  is  not  imperilled  by 
naval  stations  flanking  it,  whether  in  the  Le- 


International  Relations  245 

vant  or  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  Being  them- 
selves far  distant,  dependent  upon  naval  power 
simply,  it  is  essential  that  they  constitute  a  polit- 
ical pre-occupation  favorable  to  themselves  in 
the  Asian  provinces  of  Turkey  and  in  Southern 
Persia.  In  Egypt  and  in  Aden  Great  Britain 
has  already  done  much.  Germany,  in  building 
a  Mesopotamian  railway,  the  continuation  of 
that  already  working  in  Asia  Minor,  contrib- 
utes to  the  same  end.  That  Russia  looks  upon 
the  enterprise  with  disfavor  is  a  testimony, 
conscious  or  unconscious,  to  its  tendency. 

These  also  seem  to  me  permanent  consid- 
erations. Not  less  so,  having  reference  to  the 
anxiety  felt  by  some  in  Great  Britain  as  to 
the  intentions  of  Germany,  is  the  general  situ- 
ation of  the  latter  in  European  politics.  There 
is  certainly  an  impression  in  America,  which 
I  share,  that  Great  Britain  for  various  reasons 
has  been  tending  to  lose  ground  in  economical 
and  commercial  matters.  Whether  this  be  a 
passing  phase,  or  a  symptom  of  more  serious 
trouble,  time  must  show.  Should  it  prove  per- 
manent, and  Germany  at  the  same  time  gain 
upon  her  continuously,  as  for  some  years  past 
she  has  been  doing,  the  relative  positions  of 


246  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

the  two  as  sea  powers  may  be  seriously  modi- 
fied. The  danger  appears  to  exist;  and  if  so 
the  watchmen  of  the  British  press  should  cry 
aloud  and  spare  not  until  all  classes  of  their 
community  realize  it  in  its  fundamental  signifi- 
cance. Military  precautions,  and  the  condi- 
tions upon  which  they  rest,  have  been  the  main 
motive  of  this  paper;  but  these,  while  they 
have  their  own  great  and  peremptory  impor- 
tance, cannot  in  our  day,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  instructed  statesmanship,  office-holding 
or  other,  be  considered  as  primary.  War  has 
ceased  to  be  the  natural,  or  even  normal,  con- 
dition of  nations,  and  military  considerations 
are  simply  accessory  and  subordinate  to  the 
other  greater  interests,  economical  and  com- 
mercial, which  they  assure  and  so  subserve. 
In  this  article  itself,  turning  as  it  does  on  mili- 
tary discussion,  the  starting  point  and  founda- 
tion is  the  necessity  to  secure  commerce,  by 
political  measures  conducive  to  military,  or 
naval,  strength.  This  order  is  that  of  actual 
relative  importance  to  the  nation  of  the  three 
elements  —  commercial,  political,  military. 

It  is   evident,  however,  that  these   primary 
matters,  although  they  underlie  this  argument, 


International  Relations  247 

are  otherwise  outside  it.  For  the  rest,  as 
regards  the  general  military  strength,  and  in 
particular  the  sea  power,  of  the  two  countries, 
nothing  can  overthrow  the  one  permanent 
advantage  that  Great  Britain  enjoys  in  being 
insular.  Germany,  should  she  realize  her  ut- 
most ambitions,  even  expanding  to  the  Med- 
iterranean, must  remain  a  continental  State, 
in  immediate  contact  with  powerful  rivals. 
Historically,  no  nation  hitherto  has  been  able 
under  such  conditions  to  establish  a  supreme 
sea  power.  Of  this  France  is  the  historical 
example.  On  the  other  hand,  regarded  in  her- 
self alone,  apart  from  rivals,  Germany  cannot, 
as  the  United  States  could  not,  exert  the  in- 
tense internal  effort  now  required  for  political 
consolidation  and  economical  development  co- 
incidently  with  an  equal  expansive  effort.  The 
one  may  succeed  the  other,  as  in  our  case  and 
in  that  of  Great  Britain,  where  the  expansion 
of  the  eighteenth  century  followed  and  de- 
pended on  the  unifying  action  of  the  seven- 
teenth; but,  until  internal  coherence  is  secured, 
external  expansion  cannot  adequately  progress. 
One  weakens  the  other.  Though  correlative, 
they  are  not  co-operative. 


248  The  Persian  Gulf  and 

The  ambition  of  Germany  so  to  develop  her 
fleet  as  to  secure  commercial  transit  of  the 
North  Sea,  which  washes  her  entire  maritime 
frontier,  is  a  national  aspiration  in  itself  de- 
serving of  entire  sympathy.  Towards  all  other 
States  except  Great  Britain  it  is  within  the 
compass  of  reasonable  expectation.  As  towards 
Great  Britain  it  is,  under  present  economical 
conditions,  impossible  ;  for  Great  Britain,  being 
insular,  must  maintain  continuously  supreme 
the  navy  upon  which  her  all  depends,  and 
moreover,  as  I  pointed  out  in  a  recent  paper, 
by  geographical  position  she  lies  across  and 
flanks  every  sea  route  by  which  Germany 
reaches  the  outer  world.  This  condition  is 
permanent,  removable  only  by  the  friendship 
or  destruction  of  the  British  power.  Of  the 
two  the  friendship  will  be  the  cheaper  and  more 
efflcacious;  for  it  is  needed  not  in  home  waters 
only  but  in  those  distant  regions  which  we  have 
been  considering.  The  naval  power  of  Great 
Britain  is  just  as  real  a  factor  in  the  future  of 
Germany  in  the  distant  East  as  every  thinking 
American  must  recognize  it  to  be  in  our  own 
external  policy.  That  such  a  force  should  be 
paid  for,  and  must  necessarily  be  maintained, 


International  Relations  249 

by  another  people,  whose  every  interest  will 
prompt  them  to  use  it  in  the  general  lines  of 
our  own  advantage,  is  a  political  consideration 
as  valuable  as  it  is  essentially  permanent.  In 
the  matter  of  exertion  of  force  it  accords  abso- 
lutely with  the  nature  of  things.  As  for  eco- 
nomical rivalry,  let  it  be  confined  to  its  own 
methods,  eschewing  force. 

In  saying  these  things  I  may  seem  to  ignore 
the  bitter  temper,  openly  and  even  outra- 
geously shown  by  the  German  people  towards 
Great  Britain  in  these  last  three  years.  I  do 
not  forget  it.  Human  nature  being  what  it 
is,  the  dangerous  effect  of  such  conditions 
upon  international  relations  is  undeniable.  It 
is  ever  present  to  my  reflections  upon  the 
political  future.  The  exhibition  is  utterly  de- 
plorable, for  it  can  serve  no  good  end,  and  if 
it  continue  will  prevent  a  co-operation  among 
the  three  Teutonic  States  which  all  need,  but 
Germany  most  of  all ;  for  the  respective  ex- 
ternal interests  of  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  —  together  with  Japan  —  have  so  much 
in  common,  and  so  little  that  is  antagonistic, 
that  substantial,  though  informal,  co-operation 
is  inevitable. 


250  The  Persian  Gnlf  a7id 

This  hostility  constitutes  an  element  in  the 
political  situation  which  should  be  taken  into 
account,  and  carefully  watched.  Nevertheless, 
the  permanent  conditions,  above  summarized, 
will  through  a  future  beyond  our  possible  pres- 
ent foresight  retain  Germany  in  a  position  of 
naval  numerical  inferiority  to  Great  Britain, 
as  regards  both  mobile  force  and  the  essential 
naval  stations  which  the  latter  has  acquired 
during  two  centuries  of  maritime  activity. 
These  conditions,  by  their  inevitable  logic, 
ought  ultimately  to  overcome  a  sentiment  which 
has  no  good  ground  for  existence,  and  which 
betrays  the  national  interest.  Should  it,  how- 
ever, endure,  the  permanent  facts  are  too  strong 
for  it  to  do  more  than  dash  harmlessly  against 
them.  Awaiting  either  event,  may  not  the 
people  of  Great  Britain  on  their  part,  without 
relaxing  vigilance  or  ignoring  truths,  accept 
Washington's  warning,  which  we  Americans 
at  least  have  by  no  means  outgrown,  against 
"  permanent  inveterate  antipathies  against  par- 
ticular nations."  They  have  cause  for  anger ; 
but  anger  disturbs  the  judgment,  and  I  think 
in  some  measure  is  doing  so  in  this  instance. 
This  particular  antipathy  is  yet  young,  let  it 


International  Relations  251 

not  harden  into  maturity.  In  the  great  politi- 
cal questions  which  for  some  time  to  come  will 
concentrate  the  external  regard  of  nations  and 
statesmen,  the  natural  desires  of  Russia,  rea- 
sonable and  unreasonable,  are  contrary  to  those 
of  Germany  as  well  as  of  Great  Britain.  It  is 
to  her  clear  interest  that  they  remain  alienated. 
Such  conditions  should  on  the  one  hand  prompt 
an  earnest  effort  for  a  balanced  and  concilia- 
tory adjustment  on  all  sides;  but  on  the  other, 
their  essential  permanence,  if  it  be  as  I  think, 
demands  a  recognition  which  would  show  itself 
in  the  extrusion  of  everything  resembling  pas- 
sion, and  in  the  settlement  of  national  purpose 
on  the  firm  ground  of  essential  facts,  instead 
of  the  uncertain  foundation  of  any  artificial 
agreement  which  contravenes  them. 


THE    MILITARY    RULE    OF 
OBEDIENCE 


THE    MILITARY    RULE    OF 
OBEDIENCE 

January,  1902. 

THE  military  duty  of  obedience  may  be  re- 
garded either  as  a  rule  or  a  principle,  for 
it  is  both.  The  rule  derives  from  the  principle. 
It  is  the  principle  defined  in  precise  and  man- 
datory terms,  as  a  law  is  the  expression  of  the 
general  will  of  the  community,  formulated  by 
the  Legislature  for  the  governance  and  control 
of  individuals.  The  difificulty  of  such  formula- 
tion, however,  as  that  of  definition  generally,  is 
well  known,  and  has  found  proverbial  recogni- 
tion in  phrases  indicating  that  statutes,  even 
when  framed  with  great  care  by  experienced 
hands,  are  very  liable  to  offer  loop-holes  through 
which  the  observance  of  them  may  be  escaped. 
It  is  no  less  difficult  to  define  the  military  rule  of 
obedience,  without  on  the  one  hand  constitut- 
ing fetters,  which  would  neutralize  intelligence 
and  palsy  individuality  in  a  sphere  and  at  in- 


256         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

stants  where  both  are  pre-eminently  needed,  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  permitting  a  Hcense  which 
in  practice  would  degenerate  into  anarchy.  It 
is  not  a  sufficient  solution  to  so  knotty  and 
dangerous  a  question  to  damn  obedience  to 
orders,  as  a  rugged  veteran  will  occasionally  be 
heard  to  suggest ;  while,  on  the  other  extreme, 
the  saying  of  that  eminent  disciplinarian.  Lord 
St.  Vincent,  "  The  whole  of  discipline  is  con- 
tained in  the  word  'obedience,'"  though  safer  in 
practice,  is  perhaps  too  absolute  in  its  assertion. 
The  matter  at  stake  is  too  intricate  for  such 
Gordian  solutions.  It  is  also  too  important  at 
once  to  the  individual  officer  and  to  the  nation, 
the  conduct  of  whose  armed  forces  may  at  crit- 
ical moments  depend  upon  a  correct  under- 
standing. In  many  instances,  perhaps  in  the 
large  majority,  the  propriety  of  literal  obediencf; 
is  plainly  evident;  in  a  few  the  inexpediency, 
folly,  or  impossibility  of  such  compliance  is  for 
obvious  reasons  equally  clear;  but  there  never- 
theless remain  a  number  of  cases,  not  merely 
possible,  but  copiously  exemplified  by  history, 
which  present  serious  difficulty.  In  these  an 
officer  finds  himself  confronted  with  condi- 
tions that  make  a  large  demand  upon  his  moral 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        257 

courage  as  well  as  upon  his  judgment.  His 
judgment  then  can  be  safely  guided,  and  his 
resolution  supported,  only  by  a  mastery  of  prin- 
ciples. No  mere  rule  will  here  suffice.  Mili- 
tary obedience  when  in  subordinate  post,  and 
military  initiative  when  in  independent  com- 
mand, untrammelled  by  orders  and  free  to  fol- 
low the  guidance  of  one's  own  judgment,  are 
both  governed  by  principles,  the  appreciation 
of  which  is  the  only  sure  light  to  one's  foot- 
steps. To  them  recurrence  must  be  had  in 
doubtful  positions,  where  precise  precedent  and 
formal  definition  are  wanting;  in  short,  when 
rules,  however  good  in  general  use,  fail  to  apply. 
It  does  not  hence  follow  that  rules,  terse  and 
positive  embodiments  of  principles,  such  as 
that  of  obedience,  are  mostly  useless  because 
essentially  narrow  and  unelastic.  That  all 
rules  have  exceptions  is  proverbial ;  and  mili- 
tary rules  are  probably  more  liable  to  exceptions 
than  most  others,  because  of  the  emergency 
that  characterizes  war  and  the  vast  variety  of 
situations  to  which  a  rule  has  to  be  adapted. 
No  one  proposes  on  these  accounts  to  disre- 
gard rules  utterly.  It  is  evident,  hovv^ever, 
that  an  officer  who  undertakes  to  violate  the 

17 


258         The  Military  Rtile  of  Obedience 

fundamental  rule  of  obedience,  upon  the  strict 
observance  of  which  depends  in  general  the 
success  of  combined  operations,  and  who  sub- 
stitutes his  own  initiative  for  the  directions  of 
his  superior,  assumes  a  risk  which  urgently 
imposes  a  comprehension  of  the  principles, 
upon  which  respectively  rest  both  the  rule  of 
obedience  and  the  rules  of  war. 

It  may  be  asserted,  as  perhaps  the  most  ten- 
able general  definition  of  the  principle  upon 
which  the  rule  of  obedience  rests,  that  the 
spirit  of  obedience,  as  distinguished  from  its 
letter,  consists  in  faithfully  forwarding  the 
general  object  to  which  the  ofl[icer's  particular 
command  is  contributing.  This  finds  expres- 
sion in  the  well-known  directive  maxim,  "  March 
to  the  sound  of  the  guns."  In  doubtful  cases, 
however,  —  and  by  doubtful  I  mean  cases  where 
action  other  than  that  prescribed  in  the  orders 
seems  expedient,  —  liberty  of  judgment  is  con- 
ditioned by  the  officer's  acquaintance  with  the 
plans  of  his  superior.  If  his  knowledge  is  im- 
perfect, or  altogether  lacking,  the  doing  that 
which  at  the  moment  seems  wise  to  himself 
may  be  to  defeat  a  much  more  important  ob- 
ject, or  to  dissolve   the  bonds  of  a  combined 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        259 

movement  to  which  his  co-operation  is  essen- 
tial. If,  under  such  circumstances  of  igno- 
rance, resting  only  upon  his  own  sagacity  or 
surmises,  he  errs  either  in  his  reading  of  his 
commander's  general  purpose,  or  in  his  de- 
cision as  to  his  own  action,  and  through  such 
error  disobeys,  he  cannot  complain  if  he  re- 
ceive censure  or  punishment.  He  has  violated 
a  recognized  rule  without  adequate  reason. 
The  rectitude  of  his  intentions  may  clear  him 
of  moral  blame,  though  not  necessarily  even  so; 
for  the  duty  of  obedience  is  not  merely  military, 
but  moral.  It  is  not  an  arbitrary  rule,  but  one 
essential  and  fundamental ;  the  expression  of  a 
principle  without  which  military  organization 
would  go  to  pieces,  and  military  success  be  impos- 
sible. Consequently,  even  where  the  individual 
purpose  may  be  demonstrably  honest,  not  wil- 
ful, blame  adheres  and  punishment  may  follow, 
according  to  the  measure  of  the  delinquency, 
though  that  be  due  to  nothing  worse  than  per- 
sonal incompetency.  Does  this  seem  hard 
measure  1  It  may  be  replied,  in  what  pursuit 
is  this  not  so?  What  is  the  profession,  physi- 
cian, lawyer,  or  Wall  Street,  in  which  a  trans- 
gression  of  instructions   by   an   inferior,   or  a 


2  6o         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

departure  from  recognized  methods,  when  not 
justified  by  the  conditions,  escapes  punishment, 
either  at  the  hand  of  events  or  of  his  employer? 
Is  "  I  thought  so,"  or  "  I  did  my  best,"  accepted 
there  as  an  excuse  for  disobedience  ? 

In  the  question  of  miHtary  obedience  there 
is  therefore  involved  both  a  rule  and  a  prin- 
ciple. In  dealing  with  the  matter  I  shall  have 
to  consider  both,  but  I  have  advisedly  chosen 
the  rule  for  the  heading  of  this  article;  for,  as 
I  have  said  before,  the  rule  has  the  force  of  a 
law,  a  law  positive  in  existing  enactment,  and 
a  law  traditional  in  the  settled  practice  of  the 
military  professions,  as  well  as  in  numerous 
precedents  established  by  competent  author- 
ities. To  go  behind  a  law  to  the  principle 
underlying  it,  to  recognize  a  higher  law  than 
the  law  explicit,  is  a  very  delicate  matter  for  a 
man  in  any  position ;  and  it  is  therefore  the 
rule  of  obedience,  rather  than  the  general  prin- 
ciple upon  which  it  rests,  that  most  closely 
touches  an  officer  in  military  responsibility. 
Under  what  conditions  is  it  permissible  to  dis- 
regard orders,  or,  even  more  positively,  to  act 
contrary  to  them.f*  What  is  the  real  test  of 
propriety,  which  differentiates  one  act  of  dis- 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience         261 

obedience  from  another  of  the  same  apparent 
character  ?  Is  one's  own  sense  of  right,  one's 
own  good  intention,  the  justifying  factor? 
What  judge,  however,  in  such  a  case  is  com- 
petent to  penetrate  through  the  faulty  act,  if 
such  it  be,  to  the  hidden  good  purpose  of  the 
heart?  What  claim  have  military  men  to  ex- 
emption from  the  general  rule  of  law,  that  in- 
tention, which  cannot  be  seen,  must  be  inferred 
from  attendant  circumstances,  which  can  ?  If 
conduct,  upon  an  impartial  review  of  the  con- 
ditions at  the  moment  of  action,  is  shown  to 
be  palpably  wrong,  by  what  right  can  alleged 
intention,  "error  of  judgment "  as  it  is  styled, 
be  invoked  to  justify  an  offender  ?  Is  there  no 
such  thing  as  malpractice,  professionally  guilty, 
though  possibly  morally  innocent  ?  Is  profes- 
sional incompetence,  translated  into  action  and 
injurious  to  others,  never  worse  than  an  error 
of  judgment  ?  Mistakes,  doubtless,  all  men  are 
liable  to;  the  fact  is  proverbial;  but  the  justi- 
fication of  a  decision  proved  by  the  event  to  be 
mistaken  rests  not  upon  the  intention  of  the  per- 
son making  it,  but  upon  a  judicial  review  of  the 
circumstances  surrounding  the  decision,  which 
shall  prove  that,  under  the  conditions  known 


262         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

at  the  moment,  it  was  correct,  or  at  least  the 
most  favored  by  probabilities.  If  this  be 
true,  as  I  hold  it  is,  in  the  case  even  of  a  man 
in  independent  command,  much  more  is  the 
responsibility  weighty  when  action,  intrinsi- 
cally faulty,  is  taken  in  disobedience  of  orders. 
The  mere  enunciation  of  the  queries  in  the 
last  paragraph  will  suggest  to  most  that  we 
have  here  before  us  no  simple  question  of  yea 
and  nay.  In  fact,  no  clear-cut  absolute  reply, 
no  vade  mecum  for  pocket  use,  can  be  furnished 
defining  just  when  and  how,  in  all  cases,  a  man 
is  justified  in  disobedience,  nor  even  when  he 
is  justified  by  blind  obedience ;  although  the 
balance  of  professional  judgment  must  always 
incline  in  favor  of  the  latter  alternative. 
When  a  doubt  arises,  as  it  frequently  does, 
between  strict  compliance  with  an  order  and 
the  disregard  of  it,  in  whole  or  in  part,  the 
officer  is  called  upon  to  decide  a  question  of  pro- 
fessional conduct.  Personal  judgment  neces- 
sarily enters  as  a  factor,  but  only  one  of  many; 
and,  to  be  trusted,  it  needs  to  be  judgment 
illuminated  by  professional  knowledge  and  for- 
tified by  reflection.  Short  of  that,  it  is  not  a 
safe  counsellor,  and  has  no  claim  to  consider- 


The  Military  Rtik  of  Obedience        26 


a 


ation  if  cited  before  a  court  of  final  appeal. 
The  officer  at  the  moment  should  consider 
himself,  as  he  in  fact  is,  a  judge  deciding  upon 
a  case  liable  to  be  called  up  to  a  superior  court, 
before  which  his  conclusion  has  no  claim  to 
respect  because  it  is  his  personal  opinion,  but 
only  so  far  as  it  is  supported  by  the  evidence 
before  him.  There  is,  of  course,  the  necessary 
reservation  that  the  final  judgment  upon  him- 
self, for  his  professional  conduct  as  involved  in 
his  decision,  will  be  rendered  upon  the  facts 
accessible  to  him,  and  not  upon  those  not  then 
to  be  known,  though  afterwards  apparent. 

Unless  qualified  by  these  grave  consider- 
ations, the  phrase  "error  of  judgment,"  so 
facilely  used,  is  misleading  to  popular  under- 
standing. Not  only  so ;  it  is  pregnant  of 
serious  consequences  to  the  issues  of  war  and 
to  individuals  influenced  by  it.  It  is  necessary 
to  realize  that  some  errors  of  judgment  are 
inexcusable,  because  inconsistent  with  recog- 
nized standards ;  and  that  disobedience  of 
orders  is  on  its  face  a  fault,  a  disregard  of  a 
settled  standard,  of  an  established  rule,  of  such 
general  application  that  upon  the  person  who 
commits  it  rests  the  burden   of  proving  that 


264         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

the  circumstances  commanded  his  action.  The 
presumption,  in  the  case  of  disobedience,  is  not 
innocence,  but  guilt.  Mere  rule  though  it  be, 
in  its  narrow  construction  and  rigid  framework, 
the  rule  of  implicit  and  entire  obedience  rests 
upon  reasons  so  sound  that  its  infringement 
in  action  can  rarely  be  condoned,  when  not 
thoroughly  approved.  Nothing  can  be  more 
disastrous  than  to  trifle  with  the  corner  stone, 
upon  which  rests  the  structure  of  coherent, 
unified  action.  The  admission  into  the  mili- 
tary mind  of  anything  approaching  irreverence 
for  the  spirit  of  military  obedience,  or  levity 
as  regards  the  letter  of  the  rule  in  which  it 
is  embodied,  is  the  begetter  of  confusion,  and 
that,  in  turn,  is  the  forerunner  of  defeat.  To 
sit  loose  to  this  oblis^ation  weakens  the  sense 
of  responsibility,  upon  the  due  realization  of 
which  rests  not  merely  literal  obedience,  but 
intelligent  and  deserving  disobedience  in  the 
occasional  circumstances  which  call  for  that. 
The  recognition  of  responsibility  by  the  indi- 
vidual, the  consciousness  that  serious  regard  to 
it  is  governing  his  determinations,  is  the  best 
mxOral  equipment  that  a  man  can  have  to  en- 
able  him   to   sustain   the   burden   of  violating 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience         265 

instructions,  deliberately  undertaken  upon  his 
own  judgment.  It  is  the  mens  conscia  recti 
in  a  serious  problem  of  action. 

The  mental  equipment  is  another  matter, 
but  it,  as  well  as  the  moral,  are  necessary  to 
full  professional  competency  for  such  occasions. 
Upon  the  hypothesis  now  before  us,  the  rule, 
absolute  in  general,  seems  not  to  apply.  To 
meet  the  difficulty  with  sound  discretion,  on 
which  to  base  the  defence  of  his  action  what- 
ever its  issue  may  prove,  the  officer  will  need 
an  adequate  realization  of  all  the  conditions 
before  him,  and  a  power  of  appreciating  the 
military  situation  as  thus  constituted.  This 
power  depends  in  part  upon  native  aptitude; 
but  it  requires  also  a  knowledge  of  the  practice 
of  war,  a  broad  and  ripened  acquaintance  with 
the  principles  and  precedents  controlling  the 
conduct  of  military  operations,  which  is  by  no 
means  so  widely  diffused  as  may,  perhaps,  be 
thought.  Without  this,  disobedience  is  a  haz- 
ardous undertaking;  but,  when  so  equipped, 
an  officer  may  with  considerable  confidence 
permit  himself  to  depart  from  the  letter  of  his 
instructions  in  order  to  fulfil  their  spirit.  Con- 
fidence, I  say  deliberately;  for  in  the  majority 


266         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

of  such  instances  he  will  receive  intelligent 
and  generous  consideration. 

In  such  instances  it  is  not  just  that  the  pro- 
priety of  the  act  should  be  judged  by  the 
event;  and  it  is  not  true  that  it  will  be,  as  a 
cheap  sneer  would  have  it.  Success  undoubt- 
edly often  covers  mistakes ;  for  human  nature 
is  on  the  whole  generous,  or  at  least  good- 
tempered.  It  is  willing  to  forgive  faults  which 
it  can  afford  to  forget;  but  failure  does  not 
with  any  equal  certainty  entail  condemna- 
tion, for  again  mankind  is  generous,  and  no- 
where more  so  than  in  dealing  with  military 
men.  Even  though  mishap  ensue,  where  an 
officer  can  show  preponderant  military  reasons 
for  departure  from  orders,  he  can  anticipate 
from  his  superiors  intelligent  comprehension 
and  acquittal,  which  the  public  will  confirm 
on  their  finding ;  but,  while  this  is  so,  let  none 
be  rash  enough  to  anticipate  immunity  on  the 
score  of  error  of  judgment,  when  it  can  be 
demonstrated  that  with  the  data  before  him  a 
man  who  knew  his  business  would  have  de- 
cided  otherwise. 

Actions  that  fly  in  the  face  of  ascertainable 
fact,  or   of  well-settled  military  principles,  are 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        267 

not  to  be  excused  as  merely  errors  of  judg- 
ment. They  are  something  more,  and  worse. 
A  man  is  just  as  much  responsible  for  an  error 
of  judgment  which  results  from  his  own  neglect 
to  inform  himself,  or  his  lack  of  professional 
knowledge,  as  he  is  for  any  other  misdoing. 
What  is  amiss  here  is  not  judgment,  but  con- 
duct. Such  errors  when  they  take  shape  in 
action,  whether  of  commission  or  omission,  are 
misconduct.  They  have  a  standing,  as  acts, 
external  to  and  independent  of  the  person  com- 
mitting them,  just  as  murder  has  a  standing  as 
a  crime  quite  independent  of  its  association 
with  the  individual  criminal.     As  killing  is  not 

O 

always  murder,  but  depends  for  its  character 
upon  the  attendant  circumstances,  so  a  par- 
ticular unfortunate  military  movement  is  not 
always  misconduct.  Circumstances  may  be 
proved  to  justify  it.  In  neither  case,  however, 
is  it  the  judgment  of  the  person  concerned  that 
determines  conduct  to  have  been  good  or  bad. 
It  is  the  circumstances,  passed  upon  by  judges 
other  than  himself,  and  referred  to  recognized 
standards.  Personal  defects  may  be  considered 
in  extenuation,  or  they  may  not;  their  title  to 
indulgence  is  small  where  they  are  due  to  per- 


268         The  Military  Riile  of  Obedience 

sonal  fault  or  neglect,  present  or  in  the  past, 
or  to  professional  incompetency. 

If  so  much  as  is  here  claimed  be  allowed  to 
the  military  duty  of  obedience,  it  is  desirable 
to  pass  in  review  the  considerations  from  which 
such  weighty  obligations  are  supposed  to  de- 
rive. Tradition  and  acceptance,  in  most  men 
irreflective,  have  built  up  an  imposing  fabric 
of  power,  cemented  by  the  habit  of  rigid,  and 
in  the  last  resort  of  even  blind,  submission  to 
superior  authority,  which,  in  exhibition  and  ex- 
ercise, is  directly  and  immediately  personal, 
though  legal  in  derivation.  It  will  be  useful 
to  test  the  foundations  upon  which  this  struc- 
ture rests,  and  the  necessity,  in  order  to  main- 
tain it,  of  a  moral  code  so  foreign  to  the 
customary  personal  independence  of  the  gen- 
eral citizen.  Or,  if  a  more  vital  simile  be 
desired  for  an  organization  so  instinct  with 
life  and  regulated  movement  as  a  well-consti- 
tuted military  body,  let  us  seek  the  root,  the 
energizing  power  of  which  has  evolved,  de- 
veloped, and  continues  to  quicken,  military 
efficiency  in  all  its  ramifications,  whether  in 
administrative  methods  or  in  the  principles 
governing  the  conduct  of  war  in  open   cam- 


The  Military  Rzile  of  Obedience         269 

paign.  What  we  here  possess  we  have  through 
tradition.     Can  it  give  an  account  of  itself? 

The  value  of  tradition  to  the  social  body  is 
immense.  The  veneration  for  practices,  or  for 
authority,  consecrated  by  long  acceptance,  has 
a  reserve  of  strength  which  cannot  be  speedily 
obtained  by  any  novel  device.  Respect  for  the 
old  customs  is  planted  deep  in  the  hearts,  as 
well  as  in  the  intelligence,  of  all  inheritors  of 
English-speaking  polity.  From  the  very  rea- 
son of  this  profound  influence  over  men,  tra- 
ditions need  from  time  to  time  to  be  brouo:ht 
to  the  touchstone,  by  reference  to  principle,  in 
order  to  know  whether  they  are  still  accordant 
with  the  ideas  in  which  their  origin  is  found  ; 
or  whether,  the  ideas  themselves  being  already 
outgrown,  the  tradition  no  longer  represents  a 
living  present,  but  only  a  dead  past.  Is  the 
duty  of  military  obedience  in  either  of  these 
cases.?  Does  the  tradition,  set  forth  by  the 
rule,  still  embody  the  essential  spirit  of  the 
principle  once  involved }  Is  the  principle  it- 
self still  alive  and  applicable  as  of  old  ? 

The  question  is  far  from  needless,  for  the 
contest  between  the  letter  and  the  spirit  is 
constant  here,  as   in   many  spheres   of  action. 


2  70         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  on  shore,  among 
soldiers,  the  letter  has  tended  to  have  the  up- 
per hand,  and  with  seamen  the  spirit,  due  prob- 
ably to  the  more  frequent  removal  of  the  latter 
from  the  presence  of  an  immediate  superior, 
throwing  them  thus  upon  their  own  initiative. 
Naval  biography  and  history,  and  military  his- 
tory as  far  as  my  limited  reading  goes,  seem  to 
support  this  opinion.  No  man  wrestled  with 
the  question  more  vigorously  than  Nelson ; 
none  found  greater  exasperation  than  he  did 
in  the  too  often  successful  opposition  of  the 
letter  to  the  demands  of  his  impetuous  spirit 
for  co-operation,  addressed  to  men  over  whom' 
he  had  not  immediate  control ;  none  was  more 
generous  in  his  attitude  to  subordinates  who 
overrode  or  overpassed  his  own  orders,  pro- 
vided he  saw  in  their  acts  the  intelligent  and 
honest  will  to  forward  his  purposes.  Obedi- 
ence he  certainly  required ;  but  he  recognized 
that,  given  a  capable  and  zealous  man,  better 
work  would  usually  be  had  by  permitting  a 
certain  elasticity  of  initiative,  provided  it  was 
accompanied  by  accurate  knowledge  of  his 
general  wishes.  These  he  was  always  most 
careful    to  impart;  in    nothing   was   he    more 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        271 

precise  or  particular.  If  he  allowed  large  lib- 
erty in  the  letter,  he  expected  close  observance 
of,  nay,  rather,  participation  in,  the  spirit  of  his 
ideas.  He  was  not  tolerant  of  incapacity,  nor 
would  he  for  a  moment  bear  wilful  disregard  of 
his  plans.  When  considerations  of  high  policy 
entertained  by  himself  were  crossed  by  Sidney 
Smith,  his  language  became  peremptory.  "  As 
this  is  in  strict  opposition  to  my  opinion^  which 
is  7iever  to  suffer  any  one  individual  Frenchman 
to  quit  Egypt,  I  strictly  charge  and  command 
you  never  to  give  any  French  ship  or  man  leave 
to  quit  Egypt."  The  italics  are  his  own ;  and 
he  adds  again,  as  though  distrustful  still :  "  You 
are  to  put  my  orders  in  force,  not  on  any  pre- 
tence to  permit  a  single  Frenchman  to  leave 
Egypt."  The  seventy  of  the  tone  sufificiently 
proves  his  disposition  to  enforce  the  strictest 
rule,  where  necessary  to  control  individuals ; 
but  a  more  liberal  reliance  upon  principle,  in 
preference  to  rule,  was  his  habit.  None,  it 
may  be  added,  illustrated  more  copiously  than 
he,  when  a  junior,  the  obedience  of  the  spirit 
and  the  disobedience  of  the  letter.  His  prac- 
tice was  in  this  consistent  in  all  stages  of  his 
career.     Unfortunately,  the  example  may  tempt 


272         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedie7ice 

smaller  men  to  follow  where  their  heads  are 
not  steady  enough  to  keep  their  feet. 

Of  course,  thinking  and  feeling  thus,  he  gave 
frequent  expression  to  his  views,  and  these, 
coming  from  a  man  of  his  military  genius,  are 
often  very  illuminative.  There  is  one  such 
that  is  singularly  applicable  to  our  present 
purpose,  of  searching  for  the  underlying  prin- 
ciple which  governs  the  duty  and  observance 
of  obedience,  and  determines  its  absolute  neces- 
sity to  all  military  action.  "  I  find  few  think 
as  I  do,  but  to  obey  orders  is  all  perfection. 
What  would  my  superiors  direct,  did  they 
know  what  is  passing  under  my  nose.?  To 
serve  my  King  and  to  destroy  the  French  I 
consider  as  the  great  order  of  all,  from  which 
little  ones  spring,  and  if  one  of  these  little  ones 
militate  against  it,  I  go  back  to  obey  the  great 
order." 

Carefully  analyzed,  there  is  much  that  is 
instructive  in  these  words.  First  of  all,  it  will 
be  observed  that  the  obedience  commended  is 
that  of  the  spirit,  compliant  with  general  known 
views.  Again,  justification  of  local  disobedi- 
ence also  rests  upon  this  compliance  with  the 
spirit,  applied  to  the  attendant  circumstances. 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        273 

This  tacitly  admits,  of  course,  that  the  circum- 
stances must  be  adequate  in  order  to  justify 
disobedience.  It  is,  however,  deeply  significant 
and  monitory  that  the  particular  sentences 
quoted  were  elicited  by  censure  from  the  Ad- 
miralty for  disobedience,  in  the  only  instance, 
among  many  similar  liberties  of  action,  in 
which  Nelson  failed  to  establish  that  circum- 
stances did  warrant,  or  rather  did  require,  him 
to  traverse  his  instructions.  Even  he,  in  the 
very  height  of  his  glory,  with  reputation,  capa- 
city, and  zeal,  all  established  beyond  question, 
could  not  trifle  with  literal  obedience,  on  the 
strength  of  his  own  judgment,  where,  upon 
a  calm  review  of  all  the  facts,  the  circumstances 
failed  to  justify  him.  He  himself,  in  the  ex- 
asperation of  self-vindication,  fell  into  the  facile 
perversion  of  thought,  concerning  error  of 
judgment.  "  I  am  so  confident  of  the  upright- 
ness of  '}ny  intention,  that,  with  all  respect,  I 
submit  myself  to  the  judgment  of  my  supe- 
riors." "  Although  a  military  tribunal  may 
think  me  criminal,  the  world  will  approve  my 
conduct." 

What   Nelson   here   meant  by  "the  world" 

may  be  doubtful ;  but  it  is  impossible  that  the 

18 


274         "^^^^  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

verdict  of  history  to-day  will  not  affirm  the 
propriety  of  the  Admiralty's  rebuke  a  century 
ago.  The  facts,  briefly  stated,  were  these. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  whole  Medi- 
terranean had  sent  orders  to  Nelson,  his  subor- 
dinate, to  detach  a  certain  part  of  his  force 
from  Naples  to  Minorca,  which  he  considered 
endangered.  Nelson,  anticipating  the  case, 
had  argued,  to  quote  his  own  words,  "  Should 
such  an  order  come,  it  would  be  a  cause  for 
some  consideration  whether  Minorca  is  to  be 
risked,  or  the  two  kingdoms  of  Naples  and 
Sicily.  I  rather  think  my  decision  would  be 
to  risk  the  former;"  and  he  deliberately  dis- 
obeyed, resting  on  this  opinion  of  his  own. 
His  error,  however  induced,  is  clear  enough. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  was  charged  with 
the  safety  of  the  whole  field,  Naples  as  well  as 
Minorca,  with  many  other  cases  needless  to 
specify.  It  was  his  business,  and  his  responsi- 
bility, to  co-ordinate  all  in  a  general  plan  of 
offence  and  defence;  in  order  to  carry  out 
which  he  had  need  to  count  upon  the  certain 
movement  of  all  parts  of  his  command  in  obedi- 
ence to  his  directions.  Refusal  in  any  one 
part  might   throw  all   out  of  gear.      Nelson's 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        275 

particular  district,  was,  simply  and  broadly,  Na- 
ples and  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Within 
these  limits  he  had  full  discretion,  subject  to 
the  general  orders  of  his  superior,  and  his 
information  as  to  his  policy;  but  when  he 
undertook  to  act  upon  his  own  estimate  of  the 
relative  value  of  Minorca  and  Naples,  he  went 
outside  the  trust  and  the  powers  committed 
to  him,  and  invaded  the  province  which  be- 
longed to  the  Commander-in-Chief  alone.  His 
erroneous  judgment,  or  as  he  styles  it,  "  The 
uprightness  of  my  intentions,"  being  translated 
into  overt  act,  became  misconduct,  and  as  such 
was  censured  by  the  Admiralty.  "  Their  Lord- 
ships do  not  see  sufficient  reason  to  justify 
your  having  disobeyed  the  orders  you  had  re- 
ceived from  your  commanding  officer,  or  hav- 
ing left  Minorca  exposed  to  the  risk  of  being 
attacked  without  having  any  naval  force  to 
protect  it." 

It  is  perhaps  expedient  to  observe,  as  tend- 
ing to  confirm  a  general  truth  which  cannot  be 
too  seriously  insisted  upon,  that  this  unwar- 
rantable action  was  something  more  than  a 
breach  of  necessary  discipline,  by  a  man  of  too 
assured   position   and  importance   to   be  sum- 


276         The  Military  Rtile  of  Obedience 

marily  treated,  and  who  therefore  should  have 
been  doubly  careful  of  the  strict  propriety  of 
his  course.  It  was  also  most  unfair  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  in  its  possible  conse- 
quences. In  case  of  mishap,  the  public,  less 
clear-sighted  ordinarily  than  the  administration, 
because  more  easily  moved  by  appearances, 
would  have  sought  the  first  victim  of  its  dis- 
pleasure in  the  superior,  who  had  not  the  same 
support  of  past  brilliant  achievement  to  fall 
back  on  that  Nelson  had.  Nor  can  it,  I  think, 
upon  a  more  detailed  examination  of  the  cir- 
cumstances than  is  here  expedient,  be  doubted 
that  very  serious  national  disaster  was  possible, 
though  actually  no  harm  resulted  from  this 
breach  of  discipline. 

A  previous  instance  of  disobedience  on  the 
part  of  a  junior  admiral,  less  than  three  years 
before,  met  with  very  different  measure.  Lord 
St.  Vincent,  then  Sir  John  Jervis,  commanded 
the  British  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  in  1796. 
Scarcity  of  provisions  compelled  him  to  order 
one  of  his  lieutenants,  Rear- Admiral  Mann,  to 
take  half  a  dozen  ships-of-the-line  to  Gibraltar, 
there  to  fill  up,  and  to  rejoin  him  in  Corsica 
as  soon  as  possible.     On  his  way  down,  about 


The  Military  Riile  of  Obcdie^ice        277 

October  i,  Mann  met  and  was  chased  by  a 
Spanish  fleet  of  nineteen  sail,  on  their  way  to 
Toulon  to  join  the  French  navy  there;  Spain 
having  very  lately  declared  war.  He  escaped, 
and  reached  Gibraltar;  but  on  arrival  there 
called  a  council  of  war,  and  upon  its  advice 
determined  not  to  carry  out  his  orders  to  re- 
join Jervis.  Instead,  dominated  by  the  fear 
of  possible  consequences,  which  governed  his 
judgment,  he  took  his  division  to  England. 
An  error  of  judgment.'*  Yes,  according  to 
the  common  phrase,  which  the  present  writer 
accepted  from  unchallenged  tradition,  until 
forced  by  reflection  to  recognize  that  "  error 
of  judgment"  was  being  invoked  to  cover 
many  acts,  very  different  in  their  military 
character. 

Mark  the  result.  Because  the  junction  of 
the  Spanish  navy  to  the  French  gravely  im- 
perilled Jervis  with  fifteen  ships  in  Corsica, 
Mann  judged  expedient  to  leave  him  in  the 
lurch,  instead  of  obeying  his  orders  and  taking 
back  the  seven  he  had  with  him.  Jervis,  in 
perplexed  uncertainty,  hung  on  till  the  last 
moment,  diminishing  the  rations  of  his  men 
to   one-third  of  the  daily  allowance,  doubting 


278         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

and  wondering,  unwilling  to  depart  lest  he 
should  expose  Mann's  seven,  as  Mann  was  ex- 
posing his  fifteen.  He  was,  besides,  confident 
that,  if  the  junction  were  effected  in  Corsica, 
twenty-two  ships,  such  as  he  would  then  have, 
would  "  make  their  way "  through  the  out- 
numbering Spaniards  "  in  every  direction  ;  " 
that  is,  "  would  cut  them  to  pieces."  So  much 
for  the  opportunity  lost,  as  Jervis  judged  it; 
in  which  agreed  the  opinion  of  Nelson,  who 
was  with  him.  We  have  also  the  sober  meas- 
ured judgment  of  Colling  wood  on  the  same 
occasion.  "  We  waited  with  the  utmost  im- 
patience for  Admiral  Mann,  whose  junction 
at  one  time  seemed  absolutely  necessary  to  our 
safety."  As  for  Mann,  the  Admiralty  showed 
their  appreciation  of  his  judgment  by  steps 
which  proved  that  they  considered  his  conduct 
at  fault.  A  cutting  rebuke  was  administered. 
"  Their  lordships  feel  the  greatest  regret  that 
you  should  have  been  induced  to  return  to 
England  with  the  squadron  under  your  orders, 
under  the  circumstances  in  which  you  were 
placed."  "  The  circumstances "  which  gov- 
erned his  judgment  did  not  justify  his  conduct. 
He  was  deprived  at  once  of  his  command,  and 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        279 

appears  never  to  have  been   employed  afloat 
again. 

Occurring  in  so  high  quarters,  and  being  on 
so  large  a  scale,  these  instances  show  more 
forcibly  than  usual  what  the  necessity  is,  what 
the  root,  whence  spring  the  principle,  the  rule, 
and  the  duty  —  all  three  —  of  military  obedi- 
ence. Where  many  wills  have  to  act  to  one 
end,  unity  of  effort,  effective  co-operation, 
needs  not  only  to  exist,  but  to  be  guaranteed 
by  the  strongest  possible  sanctions.  The  many 
wills  need  to  become  one  will ;  the  many 
persons,  in  many  quarters,  simply  the  rep- 
resentatives, in  the  best  sense,  of  the  one 
person,  in  whom  the  united  action  of  the  whole 
finds  source  and  energy.  Lord  St.  Vincent's 
maxim,  "  The  whole  of  discipline  is  contained 
in  the  one  word  '  obedience, '  "  may  be  correctly 
paraphrased,  "  The  whole  of  military  action  is 
contained  in  the  one  word  'unity.'"  Obedience 
and  unity  are  only  different  manifestations  of 
the  same  principle.  The  one  is  the  principle 
in  will,  the  other  in  act.  The  one  characterizes 
the  conduct  of  persons,  the  other  the  conduct 
of  operations.  Obedience  ensures  that  the 
members  of  the  military  body,  often  far  apart, 


28o         The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience 

will  obey  the  one  commander  with  the  accuracy 
and  vieor  with  which  the  muscles  of  an  athlete 
obey  his  will. 

In  the  conduct  of  war,  what  is  concentration, 
the  necessity  of  which  is  universally  granted, 
but  essential  unity?  When,  for  purposes  of 
the  war,  concentration  yields  momentarily  to 
expansion,  then  all  the  movements  and  dis- 
positions of  the  forces  must  be  governed  by 
reference  to  easy  concentration,  to  unity  of 
action.  The  moment  this  consideration  is 
violated,  unity  is  sacrificed,  and  conduct  has 
become  misconduct;  nor  does  it  matter,  in 
justification  of  a  plain  violation  of  principle, 
that  the  misconduct  is  due  to  an  error  of  judg- 
ment. If  circumstances  knowable  at  the  time 
justify,  judgment  has  not  been  at  fault;  if  they 
do  not,  the  man  should  have  known  better. 
This  necessity  to  keep  unity  in  view  is  ex- 
pressed by  one  of  Napoleon's  pithy  phrases : 
"  The  art  of  war  consists  in  proper  distribu- 
tions, to  disseminate  in  order  to  exist,  and  to 
concentrate  in  order  to  fight."  Again  he  says, 
"  War  is  a  business  of  positions,"  and  he  illus- 
trates the  maxim  by  an  example  of  positions 
of  dissemination,  so  taken  that  the  scattered 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        281 

bodies  can  with  certainty  and  in  the  briefest 
period  unite  at  a  common  centre,  in  case  of 
threatened  attack,  or  for  an  intended  move- 
ment of  offence. 

In  all  this  there  is,  of  course,  much  that 
finds  close  analogies  in  civil  life,  and  no  doubt 
much  light  might  be  thrown  on  the  rule  of 
military  obedience  by  a  comparative  examina- 
tion of  other  callings.  But  the  peculiarity  of 
war,  for  which  alone  the  military  professions 
exist,  to  meet  or  to  avert  it,  is  that  men  are  in 
the  constant  presence  of  power  actively  and 
malevolently  intent  upon  injuring  them,  by  any 
means  of  surprise  or  superiority  of  force  that 
can  be  contrived.  Therefore  the  need  to  have 
every  moment  in  hand,  and  upon  occasion 
to  exert,  all  the  means  at  one's  command,  to 
counteract  the  enemy,  to  overthrow  his  de- 
signs, to  crush  himself,  to  do  so  with  the  ut- 
most speed  and  certainty,  weighs  heavier  in 
war  than  in  more  tranquil  pursuits.  War  is 
face  to  face  continually,  not  with  misfortune 
only  but  with  catastrophe;  and  that  not  of 
gradual  approach  or  partial,  but  sudden  and 
irremediable. 

For  these  weighty  reasons,  all  available  re- 


282         The  Military  Rtcle  of  Obedience 

sources  to  forestall  such  result,  and  to  destroy 
the  enemy  upon  whom  it  depends,  need  to  be 
utilized  and  put  forth  in  the  most  effective  and 
promptest  manner.  This  means  that  exertions 
in  all  parts  must  be  instant  upon  the  word  of 
command,  and  in  unison;  united  in  movement 
and  united  in  weight.  Velocity  and  weight 
are  the  factors  of  momentum  in  armed  colli- 
sion as  in  any  other,  and  both  the  rapidity  and 
the  force  of  an  intended  blow  depend  upon 
unity  of  impulse  and  simultaneous  impact,  in 
bodies  of  men  as  well  as  in  projectiles.  What 
else  is  the  conceded  value  of  movement  in 
mass  than  concentrated  movement,  the  weight 
of  several  bodies  effectively  joined  into  one } 
To  frame  the  plan,  to  initiate  and  control  the 
movement,  to  give  to  it  direction,  combination, 
and  impulse,  to  sustain  its  energy,  is  the  duty 
of  one  man,  upon  whom  in  the  last  analysis 
depends  the  unity  of  thought  and  act  which 
inspires  and  vivifies  the  whole ;  but  the  trans- 
mission of  the  impulse  and  energy  throughout 
the  mass,  so  that  the  oneness  of  the  head  is 
realized  in  the  unity  of  the  whole,  is  ensured 
by  the  military  rule  of  obedience,  and  by  that 
only.     Obedience  is  the  cement  of  the  struc- 


The  Military  Rule  of  Obedience        28 


a 


ture;  or,  more  worthily  understood  in  the  spirit, 
apart  from  which  a  word  is  but  dead,  it  is  the 
life-blood  of  the  organism.  In  short,  the  rule 
of  obedience  is  simply  the  expression  of  that 
one  among  the  military  virtues  upon  which  all 
the  others  depend,  in  order  that  the  exertion  of 
their  powers  may  not  breed  confusion,  which  is 
the  precursor  of  disaster,  but  may  accomplish 
decisive  results,  approaching  perfection  in  pro- 
portion as  co-operation  has  been  exact. 


ADMIRAL    SAMPSON 


ADMIRAL    SAMPSON 

May,  1902. 

AS  a  matter  of  mere  retrospect,  there  can 
be  few  officers  now  in  the  navy  whose 
recollections  of  the  late  Admiral  Sampson  go 
back  as  far  as  my  own.  Although  a  few 
months  his  junior  in  age,  I  belonged  to  the 
class  at  the  Naval  Academy  which  was  two 
years  ahead  of  his ;  and  consequently,  at  the 
time  of  his  entrance,  I  was  able  to  regard  new- 
comers with  something  of  that  feeling  of  de- 
tached superiority  which  is  apt  to  characterize 
the  attitude  of  older  collegians  toward  fresh- 
men. Whatever  of  distinction  between  the 
two  exists  in  the  nature  of  things  is,  of  course, 
emphasized  at  a  military  school,  where  the 
want  of  uniform  and  difference  of  carriage 
betray  at  a  glance  any  affectation  of  com- 
posure, with  which  a  stranger  may  try  to  con- 
ceal the  fact  that  he  is  in  an  unaccustomed 
position  and  knows  it.  At  that  date — 1857 
—  the  body  of  midshipmen,  as  they  were  then 


288  Admiral  Sampson 

styled,  were  organized  for  purposes  of  drill 
and  messing  on  the  same  basis  as  the  ship's 
company  of  a  naval  vessel  of  the  day,  in  small 
groups  of  sixteen  to  twenty  in  number,  called 
gun's  crews.  To  each  of  these  was  assigned, 
in  the  battery  which  figured  as  a  ship's  deck, 
a  gun  of  the  type  then  common  in  the  navy,  a 
thirty-two  pounder;  and  at  the  head  of  each 
were  two  captains,  called  first  and  second, 
taken  from  the  two  older  classes.  I  was 
second  captain  of  the  gun  to  which  Sampson 
was  assigned,  and  my  earliest  sight  of  him  was 
toward  the  end  of  September,  when  the  whole 
Academy  assembled  for  the  first  muster  of  the 
year,  the  conspicuous  incident  of  the  all-round 
shakedown  with  which  the  annual  course  began. 
It  is,  perhaps,  characteristic  of  the  person- 
ality of  the  man,  that  even  then,  under  all  the 
awkward  disadvantage  of  a  novice,  he  made 
such  an  impression  upon  me  that  I  can  at 
this  moment  see  his  face  as  I  did  then,  and 
as  vividly.  Memory  plays  strange  tricks ;  and 
her  methods  of  selecting  what  she  is  pleased 
to  retain  defy  systematization,  or  unqualified 
approval.  The  trivial  sticks,  the  important 
escapes ;  at  least  we  often  so  estimate  its  ac- 


Admiral  Sampson  289 

tion.  In  this  case  I  do  not  mean  in  the  least 
to  convey  the  idea  that  I  then  recognized,  con- 
sciously, that  the  person  before  me  was  one  of 
superior  intellect  or  character,  marked  though 
Sampson  afterward  proved  to  be  in  both  those 
respects.  Nevertheless,  I  do  find  it  noticeable, 
in  the  light  of  his  subsequent  career,  that  he, 
and  he  alone,  of  all  the  youths  then  about  me, 
has  left  an  abiding  remembrance.  I  had  a 
hard  wrestle  with  my  recollections  a  few  days 
ago  to  recall  who  was  the  first  captain  of  that 
crew.  I  got  him  at  last;  but  memory  is  ob- 
stinate in  refusing  me  the  names  or  faces  of 
the  men  who  sat  on  my  right  and  left  hand  at 
mess  during  the  eight  following  months  which 
made  the  academic  year  of  study.  Sampson 
alone  of  the  whole  group  has  stuck. 

Although  I  did  not  then,  nor  for  long  after- 
ward, analyze  the  reason  for  this  arrest  of  atten- 
tion, which  forced  memory  to  take  hold  and 
pigeon-hole  a  portrait  for  future  reference,  I 
incline  to  think  that  it  was  due  to  the  unusual 
inquisitive  interest  he  showed  in  all  that  was 
going  on.  This  trait  was  carried  into  his  sub- 
sequent professional  life  as  a  whole.  It  was 
the  necessary  complement  to  his  very  excep- 

19 


290  Admiral  Sampson 

tional  intellectual  capacity,  without  which  his 
natural  abilities  might  have  been  wasted,  as 
have  been  those  of  so  many  other  gifted  men 
in  all  callings.  The  average  raw  boy,  in  his 
then  position  of  entrance  to  the  Academy, 
yields  passively,  and  with  a  certain  sense  of 
subjection,  to  the  impulse  of  those  above  him. 
He  does  what  he  is  told,  asks  no  questions,  and 
gradually  learns  by  familiarity  what  he  has  to 
know  and  to  do.  Commonly,  too,  he  acts  thus 
through  life.  He  goes  through  his  round,  do- 
ing his  duty;  for,  if  he  learns  nothing  else,  that 
at  least  the  navy  drives  thoroughly  home,  and 
from  that  lesson  the  personnel  of  the  service 
becomes  the  thoroughly  reliable  instrument  it 
always  has  proved  on  demand.  For  average 
results  the  motive  is  sufficient.  But  the  desire 
for  personal  advancement  is  stifled  by  the  rule 
of  promotion  by  seniority;  and  consequently 
the  only  stimulus  in  peace,  to  exertion  beyond 
the  simple  line  of  duty,  is  the  influence  of  a 
lively  interest  in  matters  professional  for  their 
own  sake.  This  creates  initiative  and  sustains 
energy,  thus  becoming  a  productive  force  for 
personal  improvement,  as  well  as  for  naval  prog- 
ress.    This  Sampson  had,   and  to  it  he  owed 


Admiral  Sampson  291 

the  advance  and  eminence  which  constitute 
the  self-made  man.  Yet  he  was  entirely  with- 
out the  aggressive  self-assertion  which  is  often 
the  unpleasant  accompaniment  of  those  who 
realize  that  they  owe  their  fortunes  to  them- 
selves. There  was  in  him  an  inherent  mod- 
esty and  simplicity,  through  which  there 
transpired  no  evidence  of  consciousness  that 
he  had  made  himself  more  than  others.  In 
all  my  intercourse  with  him  he  never  gave  any 
indication  of  knowing  that  he  was  a  man  of 
mark ;  and  as  he  rested  contentedly  in  the 
sense  of  duty  done,  for  its  own  sake  and  its 
own  interest,  so  he  never  sought  other  ap- 
proval than  his  own.  He  had  none  of  the 
tricks  of  the  popularity  hunter,  and  he  suffered 
for  it. 

In  the  very  small  beginnings  of  his  introduc- 
tion to  naval  life,  at  our  first  meeting,  Samp- 
son began  as  he  afterwards  continued  ;  putting 
me  through  a  searching  series  of  questions 
concerning  the  matters  around  him.  He 
clearly,  if  unconsciously,  intended  not  to  wait 
till  knowledge  came  to  him  of  itself,  if  he  could 
compel  it  to  hasten.  I  should  not  call  him 
handsome,  as   I   remember  him   then,  though 


292  Admiral  Sampson 

the  elements  of  the  singular  good  looks  that 
he  possessed  in  early  manhood  were  all  there 

—  an  unusually  fine  complexion,  delicate,  reg- 
ular features,  and  brown  eyes  remarkable  both 
in  shape  and  color.  The  .smooth,  round  face 
struck  me  as  over  small,  and  the  beauty  which 
in  his  prime  was  thoroughly  masculine,  seemed 
then  wanting  in  strength  —  a  singular  misread- 
ing.    He  had  just  about  as  much  — or  as  little 

—  carriage  and  bearing  as  the  ordinary  country 
lad  of  his  age,  emphasized  by  a  loose  mixed 
suit,  ready-made  and  ill-fitting.  He  owed, 
therefore,  nothing  to  adventitious  external  cir- 
cumstances. The  figure,  which  soon  after 
broadened  and  gathered  erectness  and  firm- 
ness, gave  then  an  impression  of  slightness 
amounting  to  fragility,  which  was  pathetically 
recalled  to  me  by  the  shrunken  aspect  notice- 
able after  the  Spanish  War,  when  prolonged 
frail  health  and  incipient  decay  had  wasted 
the  vigorous  frame  I  had  once  known,  and 
set  on  him  the  mark  of  death's  approach.  I 
remember  also  that  his  manner  in  questioning 
was  not  only  interested,  but  eager,  affecting  the 
play  of  the  face ;  in  this  differing  from  the  im- 
pression  usually  conveyed  by  him  in   mature 


Admiral  Sampson  293 

life,  which  was  one  of  too  great  quiescence. 
This  was  really  an  evidence  of  temperamental 
calmness,  of  self-composure,  not  of  indifference, 
for  he  was  susceptible  of  strong  feeling,  and  at 
times  exhibited  it ;  but  commonly  his  features, 
though  little  open  to  criticism  otherwise,  were 
too  statuesque  and  unemotional. 

To  one  with  a  prophet's  eye,  the  conjunction 
of  the  raw  country  lad  who  was  questioning  me 
with  the  scene  surrounding  him  would  have 
constituted  an  artistic  epitome  of  our  naval 
history,  past  and  future.  The  material  of  naval 
war  was  then  on  the  eve  of  an  epoch  of  transi- 
tion, in  which  he  was  to  play  a  part  so  promi- 
nent as  to  associate  him  continuously  with  its 
entire  progress.  The  guns  and  carriages  among 
which  we  stood,  and  the  implements  with 
which  they  were  served,  differed  little  in  size 
and  nothing  in  method  from  those  with  which 
the  War  of  181 2  had  been  fought.  There  was 
then  being  introduced  a  new  class  of  cannon, 
resembling  the  old  in  type,  but  exaggerated  in 
size  and  improved  in  manufacture,  with  some 
scientifically  calculated  modifications  in  form, 
and  with  new  methods  of  handling.  The  partic- 
ular effective  feature  of  these,  however,  was  the 


294  Admiral  Sampson 

throwing  of  explosive  shells  instead  of  solid  shot. 
With  them  mainly  the  Civil  War  was  to  be 
fought;  but  their  designer,  the  most  prominent 
ordnance  officer  then  in  the  navy,  still  rejected 
the  project  of  rifling  great  guns,  as  being  need- 
less for  sea  warfare.  "  Those  who  mean  fight- 
ing," he  was  reported  to  have  said,  "  will  come 
within  smooth-bore  range ; "  an  unconscious 
plagiarism  upon  Nelson,  who  was  indifferent 
to  improvements  in  sighting,  on  the  avowed 
ground  that  it  was  better  to  go  so  near  the 
enemy  that  you  could  not  miss.  The  other 
considerations  which  compelled  the  accept- 
ance of  the  rifle,  —  notably  sustained  velocity 
and  penetrative  force,  —  were  then  little  ac- 
counted of ;  for  the  armoring  of  ships  was 
in  an  uncertain  infancy.  The  turret  system, 
soon  to  play  so  great  a  part,  was  yet  a  germ 
in  the  thought  of  its  inventor,  unknown  to  the 
professional  world. 

It  will  easily  be  understood  that  after  our 
first  interview  the  difference  of  classes  be- 
tween us  prevented  any  growth  of  intimacy, 
beyond  the  occasional  and  entirely  routine 
association  of  the  drill  ground ;  and  there,  as 
silence  was  the  rule  for  all    except    necessary 


Admiral  Sampson  295 

orders,  acquaintance  could  scarcely  make  fur- 
ther way.  We  saw  little  or  nothing  of  each 
other,  save  in  the  most  casual  manner,  up  to 
the  time  of  my  graduation  in  1859.  He  re- 
mained until  186 1,  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War,  when  he  graduated  in  due  course;  the 
war  not  having  the  effect  upon  his  class,  which 
it  did  on  some  that  followed,  of  shortening 
their  time  at  the  Academy  in  response  to  the 
urgent  demand  of  the  service  for  more  young 
officers.  His  career  throuohout  was  in  scholar- 
ship  most  distinguished ;  giving,  withal,  that 
assurance  of  force  of  character  as  well  as  in- 
tellectual capacity  which  led  to  his  long  iden- 
tification with  the  Academy  in  after  years. 
First  as  an  assistant,  afterwards  as  the  head 
of  one  of  the  scientific  departments,  ultimately 
as  superintendent,  no  naval  officer  has  been 
more  broadly  associated  with  it,  or  made  a 
more  marked  impression.  He  declined  de- 
cisively, however,  to  entertain  a  proposal  made 
to  him,  to  remain  as  permanent  head  of  the 
department  which  he  successfully  administered 
from  time  to  time.  There  was  much  that  was 
tempting  in  an  offer,  which  would  substitute, 
for  the  family  partings    incidental  to  a   naval 


296  Admiral  Sampson 

career,  a  comfortable  fixed  home  and  steady 
congenial  employment ;  but  in  speaking  of  it 
to  me  he  alleQ:ed  his  unwillingrness  to  be  sev- 
ered  from  immediate  association  with  the  pro- 
fession of  his  education  and  friendships.  As 
it  was,  his  constant  returns  to  the  same  sphere 
of  duty  were,  like  his  other  conspicuous  em- 
ployments, one  part  of  the  unexpressed  tribute, 
the  tribute  in  act  rather  than  word,  which  the 
service  paid  to  his  merits.  Not  that  words 
were  wanting;  but  men  spoke  them  among 
themselves,  rather  than  to  him  or  to  the  pub- 
lic. The  professional  recognition  which  fol- 
lowed him,  and  still  follows,  was  largely 
silent ;  but  I  believe  it  was,  and  is,  as  com- 
petent and  instructed  as  it  is  positive  and  even 
enthusiastic. 

Of  this  I  am,  perhaps,  the  better  judge,  in 
that  my  own  personal  knowledge  of  him  is 
chiefly  at  second  hand,  not  direct.  I  am  rather 
a  witness  to  general  reputation  than  an  eye- 
witness of  conduct  or  character.  Thoug^h  I 
knew  him  well,  and  met  him  often,  and  so  had 
occasion  by  experience  to  corroborate  the  gen- 
eral estimate,  we  were  rarely  associated,  and 
never  closely.     Intimacy  never  existed  between 


A  dmiral  Sampson  297 

us,  and  there  was  no  chance  for  me  thus  to 
form  that  prepossession  of  esteem  which  I  had 
ample  occasion  to  note  among  those  who  had 
seen  him  in  active  service.  Officers  who 
had  been  under  his  command  afloat  spoke  of 
him  with  a  warmth  of  admiration  and  confi- 
dence, the  sincerity  of  which  was  too  obvious 
for  doubt.  To  those  wlio,  like  myself,  learned  in 
this  way  how  he  was  regarded  by  the  men  who 
had  been  best  situated  to  observe  him,  there 
was  little  surprise  at  the  eminent  character- 
istics shown  by  him  during  the  late  war;  nor 
had  there  been  antecedently  any  fear  whether 
the  Navy  Department  was  exercising  sound 
judgment  and  discretion  in  selecting  him  for 
the  position  he  held.  His  very  remarkable 
fitness  for  particular  duties,  which  had  to  be 
discharged  on  shore,  had  kept  him  decidedly 
below  the  average  in  the  amount  of  what  is 
technically  rated  as  "  sea-service ; "  but  that 
which  he  did  left  no  apprehension  among  those 
who  saw  him  that  the  habit  of  the  student  or 
administrator  had  swamped  the  faculties  of  the 
sea  officer.  He  was  to  add  another  example 
to  the  list  of  those  who  have  proved  by  their 
deeds,  that  the  professional  capacity  of  the  sea- 


298  Admiral  Sampson 

man  is  at  least  as  much  a  matter  of  intelligence 
as  of  uninterrupted  practice,  and  that,  once 
acquired,  it  is  very  like  other  habits,  easily 
resumed  after  intermission,  and  quickly  re- 
stored when  a  little  rusty. 

Prominent  among  the  aptitudes  of  the  com- 
petent commander,  however,  are  certain  moral 
faculties  which  are  not  acquired  by  practice, 
though  they  may  by  it  be  improved  and  en- 
larged ;  gifts  from  Nature,  who  in  such  matters 
knows  nothing  of  impartiality.  It  was  upon 
these  traits  in  Sampson  that  men  seemed  in- 
stinctively to  dwell,  and  by  them  chiefly  to  be 
impressed.  Their  estimates  were  not  reached 
as  a  matter  of  analysis,  but  were  received  by 
incidental  familiarity  and  daily  observation  of 
the  man.  As  I  met  his  reputation  from  time 
to  time  in  conversation  with  men,  in  their  opin- 
ions and  anecdotes,  as  I  knew  him  by  what 
they  thought  and  quoted  about  him,  there 
formed  gradually  in  my  mind  a  conception  of 
his  professional  character  which  the  event  has 
proved  to  be  substantially  correct.  The  more 
naval  history  and  biography  are  read,  the  more 
do  they  confirm  to  us  the  assurance  that  in 
successful  leaders  there  are   certain  essential 


Admiral  Sampson  299 

qualities,  the  absence  of  which  in  a  particular 
man  may  remain  long  undetected,  like  a  flaw 
beneath  the  surface  of  metal,  but  under  strain 
is  suddenly  revealed,  to  the  disappointment 
and  dismay  of  those  who  had  hopes  of  him. 
No  one  has  phrased  this  experience  better  than 
Lord  St.  Vincent,  in  the  words,  "  Responsibility 
is  the  test  of  a  man's  courage."  Not  that 
many  men  who  here  fail  are  not  brave  enough 
physically;  but  that,  for  those  who  emerge 
unbroken  from  this  trial,  there  remains  none 
severer.  It  is  the  extreme  proof  of  endurance, 
active  and  passive.  A  frequent  and  familiar 
indication  of  succumbing  under  it  is  the  ina- 
bility to  sleep,  which  has  been  the  prelude  of 
many  failures. 

It  was  upon  this  characteristic,  and  upon 
the  qualities  accessory  to  it,  that  there  was 
consensus  of  opinion  in  Sampson's  case.  How- 
ever differing  otherwise  in  details,  all  agreed  in 
the  conclusion  that  upon  him  responsibility  sat 
easily ;  that  anxiety  did  not  overrun  the  due 
bounds  of  reasonable,  though  watchful,  pre- 
caution ;  that  he  could  rest  with  quiet  mind 
in  the  certainty  that  all  had  been  done  which 
reason  could  prescribe,  untroubled  by  fears  of 


300  Admiral  Sampson 

improbable,  though  not  impossible,  eventuali- 
ties. To  this  is  closely  allied  the  very  essen- 
tial power  to  take  necessary  risk  for  adequate 
ends,  a  thing  almost  impossible  to  a  man  upon 
whom  responsibility  weighs  unduly.  This  was 
finely,  though  unconsciously,  illustrated  in  his 
orders  for  the  blockade  of  Santiago.  "  The 
end  to  be  attained  justifies  the  risk  of  torpedo 
attack,  and  that  risk  must  be  taken.  The 
escape  of  the  Spanish  squadron  at  this  junc- 
ture would  be  a  serious  blow  to  our  prestige, 
and  to  a  speedy  end  of  the  war."  To  one  who 
has  listened,  as  I  have,  to  one  of  his  gallant 
captains  telling,  in  laughing  earnest,  the  num- 
ber of  torpedo-boats  imagination  discovered  in 
one  of  the  early  nights  of  the  Havana  blockade, 
these  words  mean  more  than  they  will,  perhaps, 
convey  to  a  layman.  It  is  in  this  danger,  in 
its  anxiety  even  more  than  in  its  actuality,  —  in 
its  moral  effect,  —  that  the  naval  profession 
recognizes  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties  of  a 
modern  blockade.  A  distinguished  British 
admiral  has  said  that  he  believed  but  a  small 
proportion  of  captains  could  long  endure  the 
nightly  strain.  Sampson  assumed  it  without 
hesitation,  though  not  without  assiduous  pre- 


Admiral  Sampson  301 

caution,  as  is  shown  by  the  numerous  orders 
issued  by  him  to  perfect  the  methods.  The 
danger  was  shared  by  many ;  the  responsibility 
of  the  means,  which  effectually  prevented  the 
enemy  from  coming  out  by  night,  and  so  con- 
fusing the  movements  of  our  squadron,  was  his 
alone. 

It  is  evident  that  this  professional  faculty 
was  part  of  his  natural  equipment,  and  it  mani- 
fested itself  in  his  personal  daily  life.  In  con- 
versation, ordinarily,  there  was  nothing  more 
noticeable  than  a  certain  impassivity  of  manner 
that  was  readily  mistaken  for  indifference  or 
lack  of  response.  This  at  times  gave  offence, 
particularly  in  his  later  years,  when  bodily 
weakness  imparted  lassitude  to  his  speech. 
But  when  consulting  him  on  a  matter  of  inter- 
est to  another,  one  found  that  he  had  carefully 
followed  what  was  said,  giving  both  thought 
and  sympathy  to  the  discussion;  while  in  mat- 
ters that  primarily  concerned  himself  he  was 
in  all  outward  semblance,  and  I  believe  inter- 
nally, just  as  quiet  and  untroubled  as  about 
the  most  trivial  external  detail.  I  remember 
meeting  him  the  day  after  the  monitor  "  Pa- 
tapsco "    was    sunk    by  a  submarine  mine  off 


302  Admiral  Sampson 

Charleston,  a  personal  experience  which  would 
have  made  many  men  nervous  as  well  as  care- 
ful about  torpedoes  in  after  life.  With  her 
small  reserve  of  buoyancy,  a  torpedoed  monitor 
went  from  under  the  men  on  deck  with  some- 
thing of  the  suddenness  of  the  drop  of  a  gallows, 
and  Sampson,  who  was  keeping  watch  on  the 
turret  roof,  described  his  experience  as  step- 
ping from  it  into  the  water.  Nevertheless, 
when  I  saw  him,  he  was  as  unaffectedly  and 
without  effort  imperturbed  as  though  nothing 
remarkable  had  occurred.  Quite  consistent 
with  this  observation  of  my  own  is  the  account 
given  of  him  off  Santiago  by  his  flag-captain, 
Chadwick,  in  an  admirably  sympathetic  sketch 
contributed  after  the  admiral's  death  to  the 
New  York  Evening  Post.  "  He  usually  had 
a  chair  upon  the  quarter-deck  until  about  ten 
in  the  evening,  when  he  turned  in  and  slept 
soundly,  unless  called  for  something  important, 
until  six  in  the  morning.  His  calm,  equable 
temperament  carried  him  through  the  night 
without  any  of  the  sleeplessness  usually  asso- 
ciated with  the  mental  strain  of  great  respon- 
sibilities." 

In  his  conduct  of  a  war  command,  however, 


Admiral  Sampson  303 

there  was  not  to  be  found  any  of  the  lethargy 
or  sluggishness  which  might,  perhaps,  be  in- 
ferred from  this  unmoved  exterior.  Mental 
activity  and  enterprise  suffered  nothing,  but 
rather  gained,  from  a  composure  of  spirit  which 
preserved  all  his  other  faculties  from  derange- 
ment, insuring  the  full  utilization  of  the 
abundant  intelligence,  extensive  professional 
knowledge,  and  vivid  interest  in  his  work,  by 
which  he  was  characterized.  It  is  true  that 
apathy  is  the  defect  of  this  quality  of  compos- 
ure, and  in  military  biography  has  often  been 
found  to  accompany  it.  During  the  Civil  War 
there  was  an  amusing  anecdote  of  a  certain 
commanding  officer  in  a  particular  incident. 
"  Was  he  composed  }  "  it  was  asked.  "  Oh,  yes  ! 
he  was  perfectly  composed,"  was  the  reply ; 
"  but  he  had  n't  the  faintest  idea  of  what  ought 
to  be  done."  Sampson's  professional  character 
was  here  well  balanced.  It  was  only  in  the 
matter  of  personal  ambition,  of  self-assertion, 
or  self-vindication,  that  his  reticent  calmness 
entailed  an  inaction,  which,  though  dignified, 
and  preservative  of  his  own  self-respect  as  of 
the  esteem  of  his  comrades,  did  not  save  him 
from  suffering  keenly  when  he  thought  himself 


304  Admiral  Sampson 

unworthily  treated.  He  consulted  me  on  one 
occasion  as  to  how  far  it  would  become  him  to 
take  action  that  had  been  suggested  for  his 
benefit.  I  told  him  that  while  I  heartily  wished 
him  all  the  good  that  was  at  stake,  I  believed 
the  particular  step  would  be  injurious  to  the 
navy.  He  expressed  no  decision  to  me  then 
or  afterwards ;  but  I  thought  I  read  assent  in 
his  eyes,  and  I  know  that  he  went  no  farther 
in  the  matter. 

The  opening  acts  of  a  war  drama,  especially 
after  a  long  period  of  peace,  are  necessarily 
characterized  by  a  considerable  tension  of 
feeling  among  the  actors,  which  seeks  natural 
relief  in  immediate  action.  So  big  a  deed  as 
war  calls  clamorously  for  something  to  be  done, 
and  speedily.  Probably  few  appreciate  in  this 
light  how  great  was  Dewey's  privilege  in  the 
opportunity,  so  consonant  to  his  personal  qual- 
ities, and  of  which  he  so  admirably  availed 
himself,  overriding  all  consideration  of  hazards, 
to  strike  at  once  at  the  enemy's  fleet  at  its 
anchorage.  Upon  Sampson  fell  the  more 
arduous  trial  of  prolonged  expectancy,  in  un- 
avoidable attendance  upon  the  enemy's  move- 
ments, which  he  could  only  by  indirection  force 


Admiral  Sampson  305 

or  control ;  submitting  to  the  necessity  of  not 
attempting  to  enter  a  harbor  like  Santiago,  or 
risking  on  mine  fields  the  armored  ships  which 
were  the  nation's  most  important  diplomatic 
asset  at  that  moment.  In  this  he  had  no 
choice.  The  orders  of  the  Government  were 
positive,  though  his  own  opinion  coincided 
with  them.  No  man  was  more  fitted  by  tem- 
perament than  he  to  bear  this  strain,  without 
disturbance  of  judgment  or  inconsiderateness 
of  act.  The  tension  which  he  felt  in  common 
with  others  manifested  itself  in  sustained 
energy,  rising  indeed  on  necessary  occasion  to 
impetuosity,  but  characterized  rather  by  the  con- 
tinuous and  increasing  stringency  of  methods 
adopted  to  meet  a  sortie  by  the  enemy.  In 
the  strong  professional  admiration  I  have  felt 
for  his  conduct  of  operations  in  every  respect, 
as  soon  as  the  appearance  of  the  enemy's  fleet 
had  really  defined  the  situation,  it  has  been  to 
me  a  matter  of  satisfaction  that  my  judgment 
differed  decisively  from  his  own  in  two  pre- 
liminary matters:  his  wish  to  attack  the  sea 
defences  of  Havana,  and  the  expediency  of  his 
movement  against  Porto  Rico,  undertaken  in 
the  hope  that  on  arrival  he  would  find  Cervera 


3o6  Admiral  Sampson 

there.  Soon  after  the  war  I  criticised  the  latter 
step  in  the  pages  of  McClurcs  Magazhie,  draw- 
ing from  him  a  warm  remonstrance  on  what  he 
considered  an  inadequate  appreciation  of  his 
reasons.  Whether  he  or  I  was  right  in  this 
is  to  me  immaterial,  compared  with  the  fact 
that  it  gives  me  assurance  of  my  own  impar- 
tiality in  the  profound  admiration  I  have  felt 
for  all  his  dispositions  and  actions,  without  ex- 
ception that  I  can  recall,  from  the  time  he 
knew  the  enemy  to  be  on  this  side. 

The  methods  of  the  Santiago  blockade  are 
now  commonly  understood,  but  their  precise 
military  merit  has  scarcely  been  adequately 
appreciated.  By  them,  as  appears  from  the 
Spanish  telegrams  published  since  the  war, 
Sampson  compelled  the  enemy  to  accept  battle 
on  the  terms  they  considered  most  disadvan- 
tageous. Many  may  remember  the  classical 
story  of  the  leader  who  cried  to  his  opponent, 
"  If  you  be  the  great  commander  men  sa}^  why 
don't  you  come  down  and  fight  me  ?  "  and  re- 
ceived the  pertinent  reply,  "  If  you  be  the  gen- 
eral you  claim  to  be,  why  don't  you  m-ake  me 
come  down  and  fight  you  }  "  This  summarizes 
in  effect  the  credit  due  to  Sampson.     On  June 


Admiral  Sampson  307 

26,  just  a  week  before  the  battle,  the  Spanish 
authorities  at  Madrid  and  Havana  had  decided 
that  the  surrender  of  the  squadron  in  Santiago, 
or  its  destruction  there  by  its  own  officers, 
would  be  more  injurious  to  their  cause  than  its 
destruction  in  battle,  and  they  held  that,  by 
"choosing  a  dark  night  and  favorable  oppor- 
tunity while  part  of  the  enemy's  ships  are  with- 
drawn," there  was  a  fair  chance  of  eluding  the 
United  States  fleet.  Cervera  replied  that  to 
go  out  "  at  night  was  more  perilous  than  in 
daytime,  on  account  of  the  hostile  ships  being 
closer  inshore."  After  the  war,  he  explained 
at  length,  in  a  letter  dated  October  7,  1898: 
"  At  night  the  enemy  remained  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  the  harbor  entrance.  They 
always  had  one  ship  less  than  a  mile  distant, 
constantly  illuminating  the  entrance;  and  as 
though  this  were  not  enough,  they  had  other 
smaller  vessels  still  nearer,  and  steamboats 
(launches)  close  to  the  headlands  of  the  en- 
trance. Once  in  a  while  the  latter  would  ex- 
change musketry  fire  with  our  forces.  Under 
these  circumstances  it  was  absolutely  impossi- 
ble to  go  out  at  night,  because  in  this  narrow 
channel,   illuminated    by  a  dazzling    light,  we 


J 


08  Admiral  Sampson 


could  not  have  followed  the  channel.  But 
even  supposing  we  had  succeeded  in  going  out, 
before  the  first  ship  was  outside  we  should 
have  been  seen  and  covered  from  the  very  first 
with  the  concentrated  fire  of  the  whole  squad- 
ron." These  details  will  be  found  to  corres- 
pond with  Sampson's  published  orders. 

The  thoroufjhness  of  the  blockade  after 
Sampson's  arrival  determined  the  detention  of 
Cervera  in  Santiago  till  our  army  arrived.  To 
use  an  expression  of  one  of  the  American  cap- 
tains, it  "  put  the  lid  on  Cervera's  coffin."  After 
the  army  came,  the  same  measure  determined 
the  destruction  of  the  squadron  if  it  attempted 
to  escape ;  for  it  decided  the  time  and  condi- 
tions under  which  the  battle  would  be  fought, 
when  on  July  i,  the  further  land  defence  be- 
ing considered  practically  hopeless,  a  peremp- 
tory order  to  sail  was  given  to  Cervera.  The 
forcing  of  the  enemy  to  action  under  these  dis- 
advantageous conditions  was  the  great  decisive 
feature  of  the  campaign  from  start  to  finish. 

The  skill  with  which  advantage  was  taken 
of  all  the  possibilities  of  the  situation  was  char- 
acteristic of  Sampson's  deliberate  painstaking 
energy.      No  less  characteristic,   indicative  of 


y 


_r 


i 


f    \' 


10 20 JO 40 SO  60  70  80 


90  1°°  '1°  120  130  140  150  160  170 igT 


Admiral  Sampson  309 

the  sustained  purpose  which  rises  of  its  own 
force  to  impetuosity,  when  impetuosity  is 
needed,  was  his  urgent  repeated  telegram  to 
the  Department  for  its  sanction  to  go  to  San- 
tiago with  only  two  ships,  dropping  the  slower 
but  powerful  battle-ship  "  Indiana,"  when  news 
was  received  that  Commodore  Schley  felt  it 
necessary  to  bring  back  his  squadron  to 
Key  West  for  coal.  For  once  he  betrayed 
impatience  at  the  apparent  delay  of  the  De- 
partment, although  it  replied  the  same  day. 
It  was  a  flash  of  the  fire  that  burned  within 
him  unremittingly,  but  with  regulated  fervor ; 
a  token  of  the  entire  absorption  in  his  duties 
which  was  the  groundwork  of  his  professional 
character.  Disregardful  of  all  but  the  necessity 
of  success,  he  was  heedless  of  personal  danger, 
and  daring  in  professional  risk.  The  mastery 
which  the  service  had  over  his  interest  and 
affections,  united  to  entire  self-mastery  in 
temper  and  under  responsibility,  insured  his 
eminence  as  an  officer,  which  history  will 
unquestionably  recognize  and  afiirm. 


Francis  Parhman^ s  Works 

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Including  LIFE  OF  PARKMANby  Charles  Halght  Farnham 


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Count   Frontenac  and  New  France  under  Louis  XIV.    .  i  vol. 

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.  .  .  The  next  American  writer  of  assured  position  among 
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JVork^  July,  1902. 


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